
Elections and Politics in Indonesia
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Elections and Politics in Indonesia

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Elections and Politics in Indonesia

Leo Suryadinata

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Contents

Preface vii

Acknowledgements ix

About the Author x

Glossary xi

Chapter 1
Introduction: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Religion 1

Chapter 2
Pancasila versus Political Islam, 1955–97 19

Chapter 3
Exit Soeharto, Enter Habibie: Prelude to the 1999 Election 43

Chapter 4
The Search for Legitimacy and Democracy 74

Chapter 5
Old Rivalries, Blurred Identities 102

Chapter 6
Democracy and Ethnic Chinese Politics 126

Chapter 7
The MPR Elects a President 139

Chapter 8
Challenges Facing Gus Dur 161

Chapter 9
The Rise of Mega 182

Chapter 10
Democracy, Indonesian Style? 203

Appendix I
The 1999 General Election Results for DPR by Province 218

Appendix II
Profile of MPR Members (1999–2004) 224

Appendix III
The Indonesian Cabinets (1999–2004) 261

Appendix IV
Symbols of Political Parties in the 1999 General Election 267

Index 273

Preface

The 1999 general election in Indonesia and the presidential election following it are significant events in the history of the country. Being the first free and democratic general election for over thirty years, it has a profound impact on the whole region.

Similar to the approach adopted in my two earlier books on Golkar and Soeharto's foreign policy — *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar* and *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership* — this book has also employed the political culture approach. This approach has its weaknesses — it does not give sufficient attention to other important variables such as the economy. Nevertheless, I need a tool to interpret Indonesian elections and politics. This political culture approach helps me organize the information in a coherent manner to make it easy to understand. On the other hand, by doing this, I am running a risk of distortion and simplification.

Although this book focuses on the recent elections, there is the need to provide some framework and background. Major characteristics of Indonesian society and culture — ethnicity, regionalism, and religion — which affect electoral behaviour are highlighted. Also examined are the continuity and change in Islam as practised by Indonesians and their impact on the country's politics.

The chapters are organized along the lines of political parties and general elections. Several past elections are briefly discussed in order to throw light on the most recent one. The results of the June 1999 general election are also examined and compared with

those of the 1955 election. A section has been devoted to analyse the members of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) and the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly) of 1999–2004. This is followed by the presidential election in October 1999, challenges faced by former President Abdurrahman Wahid, and the rise of President Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001. The book concludes with the prospects of the political system and future elections.

Unique to this monograph is the inclusion of a case study on the political participation of the ethnic Chinese in the 1999 election. I see the ethnic Chinese as an integral part of Indonesia and their importance has been recognized. In fact, the pattern of ethnic Chinese participation in the election is similar to that of the indigenous population in one aspect: they tend to vote for national parties rather than ethnic or strictly sectarian parties, although ethnic parties (in this case Chinese parties) do still exist. However, the inclusion of this chapter is partly due to my personal interest — I have conducted a study on this minority group. There is scope for a study on voting patterns among other ethnic groups.

In the process of writing this book, I have benefited tremendously from my discussions with many Indonesian specialists. I would like to thank Dr Mochtar Pabotinggi and Drs Sjamsuddin Haris of the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI), and Dr Vedi Hadiz of the National University of Singapore. I would also like to thank Professor Richard Leirissa of the University of Indonesia, Dr Mely Tan of the Atma Jaya University, Indonesia, Dr Yoon Hwan Shin of Sogang University, South Korea, and Mr Derwin Pareira of the *Straits Times* who read the initial draft of the manuscript and offered useful comments. Similar thanks go to two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Lastly, I am grateful to Mrs Triena Ong, Managing Editor at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, for her editorial assistance, which has definitely improved the manuscript. However, I am solely responsible for the contents of this book.

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Leo Suryadinata
November 2001

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About the Author



Leo Suryadinata, Ph.D., is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS). Before joining the NUS, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He has published extensively on Indonesian politics, foreign policy, and ethnic Chinese. His recent publications include *Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership* (1996), *Chinese and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia* (1997, 1999), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics* (1998), and *Nationalism and Globalization: East and West* (as editor, 2000).

Glossary

abangan	nominal Muslim (opposite of *santri*)
ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia); now the TNI
aliran	stream; refers to socio-religious division
Bakom	Badan Komunikasi (Communication Body); an official organization to replace the LPKB
Baperki	Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body); an ethnic Chinese association banned in 1965
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning Agency)
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika	Unity in Diversity (or, We Are Many but We Are One); the national motto
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik Nasional (National Logistics Board)
bupati	regent; head of a kabupaten (regency or district)
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies; ICMI's think-tank in Jakarta
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies; a think-tank in Jakarta esablished by General Ali Murtopo
cukong	Chinese term for boss; in Indonesia it refers to Chinese businessmen who collaborate with power élite
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representatives Council); the Indonesian Parliament
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's Representative Council); Regional Parliament
Drs	Doctorandus, a Dutch Master's degree; an Arts and

	Social Science graduate; equivalent to the *Sarjana* degree.
dwifungsi	literally, "dual function"; the military's doctrine stipulating a dual security and socio-political function
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Independent Movement)
Gestapu	Gerakan Tigapuluh September (The 30 September Movement); the acronym used by the military to refer to the 1965 coup
Gestok	Gerakan Oktober; the term used by Sukarno to refer to the 1965 coup as it took place in the early morning of 1 October rather than 30 September
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Groups); the ruling political organization in Soeharto's Indonesia; also called Partai Golkar after Soeharto's fall
hajj	pilgrimage to Mecca
IBRA	Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association); formed in 1990
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia; the group which assisted Indonesia after the 1965 coup; disbanded in March 1992
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPKI	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission)
kebatinan	Javanese mysticism
kejawen	another name for the *abangan*'s religious beliefs
KKN	*korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme*; an acronym for corruption, collusion, and nepotism
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Law and Order Restoration Command)
Korpri	Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Civil Servants Association)
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)

LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Academy of Sciences)
LPKB	Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Institute of Promotion of National Unity); a rival of Baperki; *see* also Bakom
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims); major modernist Islamic political party in the 1950s
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly); Indonesia's supreme sovereign body which drafts the state outline, amends the Constitution, and elects the President.
Muhammadiyah	Indonesia's second largest Islamic modernist organization; *see* also NU
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars/Teachers Association); Indonesia's largest traditionalist Islamic organization (mainly in Java); *see* also Muhammadiyah
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for a Free Papua)
Orde Baru	New Order; era of President Soeharto
Orde Lama	Old Orde; era of President Sukarno
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Pancasila	five principles; Indonesian state ideology
Partai Golkar	*see* Golkar
PARTI	Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Reform Party)
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party)
PBI	Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle); established by Megawati after the fall of Soeharto
pemilu	pemilihan umum (general election)
Petisi-50	Petition of 50 Men
peranakan	local-born, Indonesian-speaking Chinese
Pertamina	Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Nasional (Indonesian State Oil and Gas Company)
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)

PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI	Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party); banned in 1965
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party); became part of the PDI after 1973
poros tengah	central axis (loose coalition of Islamic parties)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party)
pribumi	indigenous (Indonesian)
priyayi	Javanese aristocrats or Javanese officials
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia)
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
PSII	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
reformasi	reformation; the post-Soeharto period; also a group of Islamic parties in the DPR (1999–2004)
Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan)
RI	Republik Indonesia (The Republic of Indonesia)
santri	pious Muslims (opposite of *abangan*)
satgas	*satuan tugas* (security forces)
suku	ethnic group
SH	Sarjana Hukum; Indonesian law degree
syariat	Islamic law
Timtim	Timor Timur (East Timor)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces); used during the 1945 revolution, readopted on 1 April 1999 to replace ABRI
totok	Chinese-speaking Indonesian Chinese, mainly China-born, but also the second generation who are still culturally Chinese.
WNA	Warga Negara Asing (foreign citizen), usually refers to the Chinese Indonesian who is non-citizen
WNI	Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizen), usually refers to Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent
yayasan	foundation

1

Introduction Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Religion

To understand Indonesian politics and the general election of 1999 in particular, one should be familiar with the basic characteristics of Indonesian society which account for Indonesian political behaviour. This chapter presents an introduction to Indonesian society, highlighting its salient features including multi-ethnicity, regionalism (Java versus the Outer Islands), and the existence of nominal (liberal) and pious (orthodox) Muslims.

A Multi-Ethnic Society

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society consisting of about 300 ethnic groups (*suku bangsa*) and at least six major religions. However, the precise number of ethnic groups is debatable. One recent study put forward more than 600 ethnic groups (sometimes, including sub-ethnic groups) in Indonesia.[1] There has been no census since 1930 which gives the percentage breakdown of each ethnic group. The Indonesian Government considered ethnicity a potentially divisive and an extremely sensitive issue. As Indonesia is supposedly a "nation-state", the government appears thus not to

have focused on the ethnic origins of its citizens. In reality, Indonesians have always been conscious of ethnicity. Because of the fear of "national disintegration", the Indonesian Government in the last fifty years had never identified ethnic affiliation in its population census. Therefore, in order to examine Indonesian ethnic groups, the only "reliable" source is the 1930 census, gathered during the colonial era. To rely on the percentage derived seventy years ago may be misleading and even dangerous. However, I would argue that it is better than a wild guess without any data at all. According to the 1930 census, there were at least thirteen major "indigenous" ethnic groups in Indonesia, namely Javanese (47 per cent), Sundanese (14.5 per cent), Madurese (7.3 per cent), Minangkabau (3.3 per cent), Buginese (2.6 per cent), Bataks (2 per cent), Balinese (1.9 per cent), Batavian or Jakartan (1.7 per cent), Malay (1.6 per cent), Banjar (1.5 per cent), Acehnese (1.4 per cent) and Makassarese (1.1 per cent).[2] The Javanese constituted the largest group, numbering about 100 million. The non-indigenous minorities consisted of ethnic Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and Europeans, with the ethnic Chinese forming the largest group. According to the 1930 census, they constituted 2.3 per cent of the total population of Indonesia. The current percentage is estimated between 2.5 to 3 per cent.[3] The increase was due to higher birth rates, lower mortality rates and new immigrants (both legal and illegal) among the Chinese.

These multiple ethnic groups do not share a common religion. Indonesia is a multi-religious state. There are six major religions. Muslims form the largest group (87.5 per cent), followed by Christians/Catholics (7.4 per cent), Hindu-Bali (2.0 per cent), Buddhists (0.9 per cent), and Confucians (0.8 per cent).[4] This diverse population was put together by historical accident. Indonesia is the product of Dutch colonialism. Dutch rule provided various ethnic groups in Indonesia with a sense of "national" belonging or "peoplehood". Under Dutch rule (1619–1945), these ethnic groups received some Western/modern education, were ruled under the same economic and administrative system, and discovered that they had similar, if not identical, problems. Dutch colonial experience was a form of "social communication" (to borrow Karl Deutsch's concept),[5] which eventually enabled these

various groups to come together. Benedict Anderson's recent theory of "print capitalism" is also relevant. It was the print media which provided the people of various ethnic groups in the Dutch East Indies with a sense of an "imagined community".[6]

The Japanese Occupation, although it lasted only three and a half years (1942–45), was significant in providing the indigenous Indonesians with military training and mobilizing the masses, which were never previously allowed by the Dutch, and served as further impetus for pursuing independence. It was not surprising that Sukarno, a Javanese, and Mohammad Hatta, a Minangkabau, declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, soon after Japanese capitulation. However, the colonial Dutch masters of Indonesia did not intend to give up their colony and attempted to return to Indonesia, the new name for the Dutch East Indies, by force. There was a protracted war against the Dutch. Through both diplomatic and military means, the Dutch were eventually forced to recognize the independence of Indonesia. Towards the end of 1949, the Dutch signed the Round Table Treaty and transferred political power to the indigenous Indonesians. The history of the Republic of Indonesia, the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of Indonesian society, and the role of the military are three important factors to remember when analysing Indonesian politics.

The multi-ethnic and multi-religious aspects of Indonesian politics have been highlighted here to help explain the conflict and co-operation in the Land of the Garuda.[7] Let us now look at the socio-cultural perspective of Indonesian politics.

Javanese Domination

As noted above, the Javanese form about 47 per cent of the Indonesian population. However, in the 1970s and the 1980s, more than 70 per cent of the key positions in the military were held by the Javanese. Even administrative and bureaucratic positions were filled by this ethnic group. Although the number of non-Javanese holding key positions in the bureaucracy and the military has increased significantly over the years, the perception

of Javanese domination persists. Apart from B. J. Habibie (1998–99), all the Indonesian Presidents, including Megawati Sukarnoputri, have been Javanese. It is interesting to note that many non-Javanese Indonesians, after living an extended period of time in Java, have become "Javanized". They often think and behave like the Javanese. The thirty-two-years rule of Soeharto re-established the perception of Javanese control over the non-Javanese. His ruling style, which was similar to the king of Java, and his promotion of Javanese traditions and customs perpetuated the concept of Indonesia being ruled by the people of Java. According to some observers, Soeharto also tended to employ Javanese as well as non-Javanese who had married Javanese in high positions in his government.[8] Because of the Javanese domination, Indonesian politics can be seen as a contest for power between the Javanese and non-Javanese. This notion often leads political analysts to focus on the study of the ethnic Javanese to understand Indonesian politics.

In the last century, there have been intermarriages between various Indonesian ethnic groups. This phenomenon became more common after Indonesia's independence. Some observers argue that due to these intermarriages, it has become more difficult to talk about ethnic identity and hence ethnic politics. In theory, the offspring of intermarriages have dual identities and should not be considered as representatives of only one ethnic group. However, in reality, ethnic identity is still strong. Edward M. Brunner, an American anthropologist, conducted a study of the Batak community in Bandung. He discovered that the children of Batak men and Sundanese women still retain a strong Batak identity rather than a dual identity. This is also perceived as such by the Batak and non-Batak groups.[9] I would argue that this finding — that ethnic identity follows that of the male for the offspring of an intermarriage — can be applied to other Indonesian ethnic groups, including the Javanese. Sukarno was the son of a Javanese father and a Balinese mother but there was no doubt that Sukarno was considered a Javanese. The same can be said about Megawati, who is the daughter of Sukarno (Javanese) and Fatmawati (Sumatran). Megawati's ethnic identity is Javanese and perceived as such by the Indonesian people. It is also interesting to note that

the ethnic identity of B. J. Habibie, the son of a Bugis-Makassarese man and a Javanese woman,[10] is Bugis-Makassarese, although at one stage during the 1999 presidential election, he portrayed himself as a Javanese, or at least a man with a dual ethnic identity. However, he is considered to be a Sulawesi man by both the Javanese and non-Javanese.

Java versus the Outer Islands

There is competition, if not conflict, between Java and the Outer Islands (i.e. outside Java). About 59 per cent of the Indonesian population live in Java,[11] although it constitutes only 6.58 per cent of Indonesian territory.[12] Java has always been seen as a "consumer society" while the Outer Islands are the producers. Government revenue has gone to Java from the Outer Islands. This has caused an uneven distribution of revenues between Java and the Outer Islands, which in turn creates ethnic tension.

Uneven distribution of power and wealth has been an ongoing problem affecting the relationship between Java and the Outer Islands. During the Sukarno period, some non-Javanese rebelled against the central government in Jakarta and attempted to gain more autonomy, if not independence. They also wanted to enjoy a larger share of the revenue for regional development. However, the rebellions were always crushed. The Soeharto rule caused the Java–Outer Islands relationship to deteriorate further. The 1974 local government laws, which replaced the 1957 laws, gave the monopoly of political and economic power to Jakarta. This created discontent and grievances among the Outer Islanders. The Soeharto regime blatantly robbed the local resources at the expense of the local people. Although those involved were not necessarily Javanese, they were the collaborators of the Javanese regime. Anger towards Javanese "rulers" escalated when Jakarta used military means to oppress the local discontent. The repressive and brutal measures against ethnic minorities in a number of provinces became apparent, especially after the suppression of East Timor. When the economic condition was relatively good and the central government was strong, ethnic minorities did not have the opportunity to express their discontent openly but when the central

authority declined, ethnic nationalism emerged, giving rise to the movement for greater autonomy, even separatism.

Divided Muslim Majority: the *Abangan* and *Santri*

Approximately 87 per cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims but Indonesia is neither a Muslim state nor an Islamic state. (A Muslim state refers to a state which selects Islam as the official religion or a state religion, while an Islamic state refers to a state which is based on the *syariat* law.[13]) This is in contrast to Malaysia where, although Malay Muslims constitute less than 60 per cent of the population, Islam is the state religion.

Indonesia is a "secular state". The national flag, the plain red and white flag (known locally as *Sang Merah Putih*), does not include an Islamic symbol. The national emblem is a *garuda*, a mythical bird from Hindu-Indian mythology. The Indonesian national airways is also named Garuda. The national anthem, Indonesia Raya, was composed by a Javanese Christian composer and is conspicuously nationalistic and secular. How should the "non-Islamic nature" of Indonesia be explained? I would suggest that this lies in the nature of Islam in Java. The Javanese Muslims are divided into *abangan* (liberal Muslims) and *santri* ("purist" Muslims).[14] These are often considered as two political cultures of Java, which, I would maintain, can be applied to Indonesia as a whole, as Islam is not confined to Java alone.

I am fully aware that the division of Muslims into these two groups is controversial. The first Western academic who popularized the concepts of *abangan* and *santri* was Clifford Geertz, who divided the Javanese into three (not two) groups: *abangan*, *priyayi*, and *santri*. He differentiated them according to the elements of Islam and Hinduism-Buddhism. The *santri* is the most Islamic, the *priyayi* is a Hindu-Buddhist, while the *abangan* has both Islamic and Hindu-Buddhist elements, the latter element being stronger. From his categorization, it is quite clear that the *priyayi* is non-Muslim, the *abangan* is less Muslim, and the *santri* is the "real" Muslim.

After the publication of Geertz's work, Indonesian sociologist

Harsya Bachtiar and anthropologist Koentjaraningrat commented on Geertz's categorization, pointing to the misreading of Javanese religion. In their view, *priyayi* is a social class, not a religious category while the *abangan* and *santri* are both Muslim, having different degrees of Islamic elements.[15] Nevertheless, Koentjaraningrat recognized the contribution of Geertz, praising Geertz's book "on the religion of Java … for being the first scientific description of the two variants of Javanese Islam".[16] He also stated that "the book has dominated the current academic literature on Javanese religion for more than two decades".[17] Later, Mark Woodward, who wrote a book entitled *Islam in Java*, disagreed with Geertz's argument on the sources of Javanese Islam in general and the *abangan* in particular. He is of the view that these Javanese are Muslims who follow the tradition of Islamic Sufism rather than Hinduism and Buddhism.[18] Robert Hefner, whose earlier study was on Tengger tradition and Islam, also felt that Geertz overstressed the Hindu-Buddhist element of the *abangan*.[19]

Despite the shortcomings of Geertz's pioneering work, we should thank him for popularizing the concepts of the *abangan* and *santri*. These two concepts are extremely useful in explaining Indonesian politics both in the past and at present. Careful observers of the Indonesian political scene will notice that the division among the Javanese Muslims continues and this is reflected in their political behaviour, including their electoral behaviour. Koentjaraningrat's refinement of these concepts throws light on the Javanese Muslims and helps us understand the nature of this division and their respective characteristics.

Relying on the work of Geertz and Koentjaraningrat, I present the following arguments about two types of Javanese Muslims. The *abangan* are Muslims who have a mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs. They have been heavily influenced by Javanese mysticism and Hinduism. This syncretism, also known as *Agami Jawi* ("religion of Java") or *kejawen*, is often reflected in their religious behaviour. They worship Allah but also pay respects to Hindu and Javanese gods and goddesses. They perform *slametan*, a kind of ritual feast involving offerings to the spirits and the supernatural in order to achieve calmness and safety. Geertz

maintained that the *slametan* is the core of the *abangan* belief system. However, equally important is their frame of reference, which is the family, and the fact that many of them are civil servants. The *abangan* are not rigid in their Islamic practices. Many do not pray five times a day, for example. But the *santri,* on the other hand, are rigid in performing prayers. They observe Islamic rituals strictly and their frame of reference is the *ummah* (Islamic community) rather than the family. As the *santri* are often traders, this leads to conflict with the ethnic Chinese who are usually involved in economic activities.

Afan Gaffar, an Indonesian political scientist, further divides the *abangan* and *santri* into strong, moderate, and weak in each category.[20] A strong *abangan* is:

> an individual who never practises Islamic teachings, has negative perception of *ummat* [=*ummah*] and strongly believes in *kejawen* or Javanese religious practice[s]. A moderate *abangan*, on the other hand, is an individual who practises *kejawen* and casually practises Islamic teachings but does not have negative perception [of] Islamic community, while the weak *abangan* is one [who] is willing to accept both Islam and *kejawen*.[21]

Using the same division, Gaffar defines a strong *santri* as:

> an individual who wholeheartedly believes in Islam and [its] practices. A moderate *santri* is an individual who believes in Islam and practises Islamic teachings but does not have full commitment to struggle for the *ummat*. The weak *santri* is an individual who believes in Islam but does not fully practise Islamic teachings nor has the commitment to the struggle of the *ummat*.[22]

The above subdivisions are useful for understanding the complexity of the Indonesian Muslims which affect their political behaviour, especially the acceptance of the political ideology, Pancasila. I will return to this point later. At this juncture, however, I should point out that some commentators suggest that this perspective has to be discarded as it is no longer relevant to the

present situation. This is now a new millennium and a new paradigm is needed to explain new developments. I beg to differ from this view for a simple reason — Indonesian Muslims in general and Javanese Muslims in particular remain divided. Their "religious division" affects their political behaviour. The 1999 general election, which is the major issue of this book, illustrates the relevance of this concept. Islam was an issue and the victory of the "nominal Muslims" or "Pancasila parties" in the election has been significant.

The presence of these two broad types of Muslims is the result of uneven penetration of Islam.[23] Islam spread to the coastal areas of Java but failed to penetrate the interior. Thus the *santri* are found in the coastal areas while the *abangan* in the interior. In the recent past, the *abangan* Muslims formed the majority of both the civilian and military élite.[24] Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia, was an *abangan*. The second President, Soeharto, is an *abangan* too. Even Habibie, the third President, cannot be considered as a *santri*. The fourth President, Abdurrahman Wahid, is a *santri,* and Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's fifth President, is an *abangan*. However, in the last ten years or so of the New Order, Soeharto appeared to be more "Islamic" than before. He encouraged Islamic religious practices, sponsored the establishment of a Muslim intellectual association, performed the *hajj* before the 1992 general election, began to wear Islamic attire, and prayed in public. Official publications of the Golongan Karya (Golkar), or the ruling party, constantly highlighted Soeharto as a pious Muslim by calling him Mohammad Soeharto, as if he had transformed himself into a *santri*. In fact, the inner world of Soeharto had not changed. He stuck to his Javanese mystical beliefs and traditions. Unlike the *santri*, Soeharto was not excited about praying at the holy Kaaba.[25] I would argue that due to the prominence of the *abangan* in the population, Indonesia had adopted the Pancasila ideology — religious freedom and equality/parity — rather than the supremacy of Islam. In ideological terms, the *abangan* is closer to the Pancasila while the *santri* to political Islam. The Pancasila as it was expressed in the 1945 Constitution is more the product of the *abangan* élite rather than the *santri*.

Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter

Before proceeding further, it is imperative to discuss the origins of the Pancasila and its development. In March 1942, the Dutch were defeated by the Japanese, and Indonesia was occupied by its new rulers. A year later the Japanese, encountering difficulties in the battlefield, began to mobilize the local population and promised independence to the Indonesians. However, the body for the Investigation for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, or BPPKI as it is known in Indonesian, was only formed on 29 April 1945 when the Japanese were losing the battle on many fronts.[26] The BPPKI was aimed at securing Indonesian support for the Japanese efforts. The Indonesian leaders also made use of this opportunity to prepare for independence.

The BPPKI, which had sixty-two members, all residing in Java were Javanese, consisting of both the *abangan* (secular nationalists) and the *santri* (Islamic nationalists).[27] From May 1945, the BPPKI began to discuss a state ideology and constitution. Many major speeches were delivered, and the one by Sukarno on the Pancasila (Five Principles) was later used as the basis for discussion. The five principles of state identified by Sukarno were nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God.[28]

A smaller committee within the BPPKI was later formed to draft the state Constitution based on an agreeable ideology. Nine members, headed by Sukarno and Hatta, formulated a compromised statement on 22 June 1945 which was known as the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Djakarta*). It accepted the Pancasila concept of Sukarno with some modification. The last principle in Sukarno's Pancasila speech, Belief in One Almighty God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), was made the first principle with the following amendment: "Belief in One Almighty God, with the obligation to carry out the Islamic *syariat* for its adherents".[29] The second principle is "Just and Civilized Humanity", the third "Unity of Indonesia", the fourth "Peoplehood Guided by the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation", and the last principle "Social Justice". This Jakarta Charter was intended to be used as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution. In this Constitution, it was

also suggested that the President of Indonesia should be an indigenous person who is a Muslim.

However, the Jakarta Charter was not accepted by many *abangan* and non-Muslim Indonesians. To achieve national unity, on 10 July 1945, Sukarno announced that there would be some changes to the drafted Constitution. Later Mohammad Hatta, a Sumatran (of the Minangkabau ethnic group), was given the task of explaining the changes.[30] He stated that the wording of the preamble would be altered and the clause on the requirement of a Muslim president would be dropped. The first principle of the Pancasila is still "Belief in One Almighty God" but without the stipulation "with the obligation to carry out the Islamic *syariat* for its adherents".

The Islamic nationalists did not protest against the revision probably because they realized that if they insisted on the original stand, Indonesian unity could not be achieved. This shows that the Indonesian leaders were willing to accept the Pancasila for the sake of territorial integrity and independence. Possibly, the Islamic nationalists anticipated that since the Muslims were the majority, the Constitution could be amended again once Indonesia attained independence. Indeed after independence, the issue of the Jakarta Charter emerged again. However, before independence, nationalism instead of religion (in this case, Islam) was emphasized. The Indonesian Constitution was ready but the independence of Indonesia under Japanese sponsorship was scheduled for 18 September 1945. By 15 August 1945, however, Japan had already surrendered. Sukarno and Hatta were forced by revolutionary groups, mainly youths, to proclaim Indonesia's independence without regard to the original schedule.

On 17 August 1945 Indonesia's independence was proclaimed. From that time onwards, the Pancasila became an Indonesian philosophy. After the transfer of power in 1949, the 1945 Constitution was abandoned and a temporary Constitution (known as the 1950 Constitution) was introduced but the Pancasila principles were still preserved in the new Constitution.[31] However, the Islamic nationalists continued to fight for the restoration of the Jakarta Charter but failed. In 1959, Sukarno re-adopted the 1945 Constitution and this has remained valid until today.

Pancasila, the *Abangan*, and the *Santri*

With this background on the Pancasila, I am fully aware that it is a gross simplification to argue that only secular nationalists (*abangan*) accepted the Pancasila while the Islamic nationalists (*santri*) rejected it. However, generally speaking, it is hard to deny that the Pancasila as expressed in the 1945 Constitution is preferred by the *abangan*, while the Jakarta Charter is preferred by the *santri.*

It is within this context that I argue that there is a fundamental difference between the *abangan* and *santri* in their perception regarding the position of Islam in society and politics. This division has become a major issue in Indonesian political history. Nevertheless, we still have to address the issue why some *santri* could accept the Pancasila while others could not.

There are two possible answers. One is related to the heterogeneity of the *santri* community and the other has something to do with the strategies adopted by Muslims in politics.

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that Gaffar had divided the *santri* groups into three subgroups, of which weak *santri* tend to be the least inclined to fight for the goal of the *ummah*.[32] During the Soeharto era, these weak *santri* had a tendency to vote for the *abangan*-dominated Golkar while the strong *santri* tended to vote for the *santri*-dominated Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, or the United Development Party).[33] Nevertheless, in general the *santri* preferred the PPP to Golkar. It is also interesting to note that the majority of the *abangan* voted for either the Golkar or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, or the Indonesian Democratic Party). Very few voted for the PPP.[34]

During the Soeharto era, for instance, Soeharto used his interpretation of the Pancasila to disempower his political enemies. There were some *abangan* and non-Muslims (for example, church leaders) who were critical of the Pancasila. Nonetheless, they were pro neither the Jakarta Charter nor the formation of an Islamic state — they were merely critical of Soeharto's use of the Pancasila to silence his opponents.

The Pancasila is complex and often vague.[35] It encompasses religious belief and also other concepts. Principles 2, 4, and 5

might be acceptable to both secular and religious (Islamic) groups as they are religiously neutral. But the third principle on the "Unity of Indonesia" may be seen as an Islamic principle rather than a secular one. However, many Indonesians, especially the Javanese, interpret the unity of Indonesia as Indonesian nationalism (as expressed in the 1950 Constitution) and view it as a secular principle. While the centre of Islam can be Saudi Arabia or Egypt, the centre of Indonesian nationalism is the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesian nationalism often puts a lot of Islamic Indonesians, especially the Javanese, in a dilemma. Many Indonesian nationalists, including Islamic nationalists, facing the issue of Indonesian nationalism, were often forced to accept the Pancasila. For example, during the Soeharto era, Amien Rais accepted the Pancasila but argued that Islam is more than the Pancasila. In other words, if the Pancasila came into conflict with Islamic teachings, Islam prevails over the Pancasila.[36]

There is no doubt that the Pancasila is generally perceived by both the *abangan* and *santri* as a secular concept. The first principle of "Belief in One Almighty God" gives Indonesians not only religious freedom but also parity for many religions. Indirectly it was a rejection of Islam as an alternative ideology. Yet during the 1999 election, there were *santri* who voted for the *abangan* and non-Muslim-dominated Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P, or the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle). Perhaps the explanation used for the Soeharto era can also be applied here. The weak *santri* might feel comfortable to vote for the *abangan*-dominated nationalist party. These *santri* are neo-traditionalists rather than modernists who feel Javanese nationalism is as important as Islam.[37] In East Java where the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) is strong, it was reported that many *santri* voted for the PDI-P rather than for Islamic parties in the 1999 elections.[38] Part of the explanation is that traditionalists and neo-traditionalists are more tolerant towards Javanese traditions and non-Muslims as they are rooted in the "pre-Islamic Javanese culture" as well as Islam. They can accept the Pancasila while the modernist Muslims have a tendency to reject the Pancasila. The modernists are "purists" and do not accept Javanese traditions which contradict Islamic teachings. They are less tolerant towards non-Islamic culture and

political orientation. It is also possible that some traditionalist *santri* voted for the PDI-P because they saw the PDI-P leader, Megawati, as a symbol of opposition to the repressive government.

However, there are modernist "strong *santri*" who agreed with the Pancasila during the 1999 election. However, this did not coincide with our understanding of the strong *santri*'s views and values. Therefore it is difficult to know whether their acceptance of the Pancasila is a genuine change of heart or a mere strategy. Many observers gave them the benefit of the doubt while others are not convinced that these *santri* have undergone a fundamental change in their ideological stand.

Despite the growth of Islam in Indonesia as a significant religious and political force in the past thirty-three years, the majority of political parties are still based on the Pancasila rather than Islam.[39] The Pancasila is still upheld by Indonesians as a principle of the Republic, but it is no longer the *sole* state ideology.

Concluding Remarks

To understand Indonesian politics in general and the 1999 general election in particular, three characteristics should be borne in mind: the multi-ethnic nature of the Indonesian society which often produces regionalism, Javanese domination, and division within the Muslim communities, especially among the Javanese. These characteristics have existed for a long time, even before Indonesia's independence, serving as a kind of continuity. However, there was also a change in the thirty-two years of Soeharto's rule. It appears that Javanese domination became more conspicuous through authoritarian rule. Military means were often used by the central government to consolidate its power, resulting in the polarization between Java and the Outer Islands. In addition to ethnicity and regionalism, the religious factor, especially Islam, complicated the matter. The struggle between the *abangan* (secular nationalism) and the *santri* (Islamic nationalism) intensified and was reflected in the Pancasila ideology. It is in this context that the 1999 election should be seen.

Notes

1. See Zulyani Hidayah, *Ensiklopedi Suku Bangsa di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1997).
2. *Statistische Zakboekje voor Nederlandsche-Indie 1940* (Batavia, 1941). However, this is based on the 1930 census. Scholars studying Indonesian ethnic groups have no alternative but to rely on the pre-war census and make projections or educated guesses. For instance, in *Jakarta Post*, 16 October 1998, one writer claimed that minority ethnic groups have increased in their percentages while the percentage of the Javanese has declined: Javanese (39 per cent), Sundanese (14 per cent), Malay (7 per cent), Madurese (6 per cent), Bugis/ Makassarese (5 per cent), Minangkabau (5 per cent), Bataks (4 per cent) and Chinese (3 per cent). The reasons are not clearly spelled out. I suspect that the reduction of the Javanese and the increase of the non-Javanese are driven by the author's desire to see a political change because the Javanese are no longer a "majority". In the 2000 population census, the Indonesian Government, for the first time in the history of the Indonesian Republic, has decided to include the ethnic identity of the Indonesian population.
3. G. William Skinner in his 1963 article estimated that the Chinese constituted 2.6 per cent of the Indonesian population. See his chapter on "The Chinese Minority", in *Indonesia*, edited by Ruth McVey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 99
4. *Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia 1979/1980* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1980), p. 97.
5. For a concise discussion of Karl W. Deutsch, see his book, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 14–16.
6. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Vesco, 1991).
7. The *garuda* (mythical eagle), the Indonesian national symbol, is derived from the Hindu epic, Ramayana.
8. There were a few examples of non-Javanese Cabinet ministers during the Soeharto era who married Javanese, namely, B. J. Habibie, Akbar Tanjung, Cosmas Batubara, General Hartono, and Theo Sambuega.
9. Referring to the intermarriage between a Batak male and a Sundanese female, Edward M. Bruner argued that "the child inherits his ethnic identity from his Batak father but most of his culture patterns from his Sundanese mother as well as from his Sundanese peer group". See his "The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia", in *Urban Ethnicity*, edited by Abner Cohen (London: Tavistock, 1974), especially pp. 271–72.

10. His father is Alwi Abdul Jalil Habibie (born in 1908 in Gorontolo) and his mother is Tuti Marini Puspowardojo (born in 1911 in Yogyakarta). See A. Makmur Makka, *B. J. Habibie: Kisah Hidup & Kariernya* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1998), p. 22.
11. *Statistik Indonesia 1997* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1998), p. 37.
12. Computed based on Table 1.1, *Statistik Penduduk 1997* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1998), p. 6.
13. John L. Esposito, for instance, had divided states with a large Muslim population into three types: the Islamic state which is based on the supremacy of Islamic law (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan); the Muslim state which recognizes Islam as the state religion (e.g., Egypt and Malaysia); and the secular state which "separates Islam from the state and hence restricts religion to private life" (e.g., Tunisia). See John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), p. 54. I would argue that Indonesia can be classified as a "secular state" as Islam is not a state religion — it recognizes five religions which are on parity.
14. Clifford Geertz is the first writer who drew our attention to these divisions, but he divides the Javanese into three religious categories: *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi*. See *Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960). Despite its shortcomings, Geertz's work on the *Religion of Java* is outstanding and thought-provoking.
15. Harsya Bachtiar, an Indonesian sociologist, criticized Geertz for mistaking *priyayi*, a social category, as a religious one. (Harsya Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary", *Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia* (1973).) Koentjaranigrat, a leading anthropologist, later produced major works such as *Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia and Malaysia* (California: Cummings, 1975) and *Javanese Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) which detailed both the *abangan* and *santri* traditions. However, it should be noted that Koentjaraningrat did not use the term *abangan* but "the followers of *Agami Jawi* or *kejawen*" to refer to the nominal Javanese Muslims as the term *abangan* (meaning "red"), which is coined by the *santri*, is degrading. See Koentjaraningrat (1975, 1985), p. 21 and pp. 316ff. I am aware that the negative connotation of the term but I still use it as it is the most widely used in academic writings and it is more concise than the term introduced by Koentjaraningrat. Nevertheless, I have no intention to degrade the *abangan*.
16. Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture*, p. 427.
17. Ibid.
18. Mark R. Woodward, for instance, maintained that the *abangan/priyayi* belief is *Islam Jawa* (Java's Islam) which derives from Islamic Sufism

rather than the Hindu-Buddhist tradition. See Mark Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989).

19. Robert W. Hefner argues that Geertz "tended to see the Javanese Muslim community as a split between those whom he effectively regarded as true Muslims, the so-called *santri*, and those whom he thought only nominally Islamized, the *abangan* (literally "red"). The *abangan* religious culture, Geertz felt, owed more to animism and Hindu-Buddhism than to Islam". See Robert Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, eds., *Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 14.
20. Afan Gaffar, *Javanese Voters* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992), p. 31.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 31–32.
24. Before the "de-Benny-zation" of the military in 1992, the Indonesian military was dominated by both *abangan* Muslims and non-Muslims. Benny Murdani himself is a Catholic Javanese.
25. See his own explanation of his "religious experience" at the Kaaba in his autobiography, *Soeharto, Otobiografi: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya* (Jakarta: Cita Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), pp. 327–28.
26. Richard Z. Leirissa, *Terwujudnya Suatu Gagasan: Sejarah Masyarakat Indonesia: 1900–1950* (Jakarta: Akademika Pressindo, 1985), pp. 89–90.
27. While I use the terms *abangan* and *santri*, Indonesian Islamic writers use secular nationalists and Islamic nationalists. See H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional Antara Nasionalis Islam dan Nasionalis "Sekuler" Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia* (Bandung: Pustaka Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981), pp. 25–26.
28. Sukarno, *Lahirnja Pantjasila* (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1960). It should be noted that the Pancasila has been given different names at different times. Initially it was referred to as *falsafah negara* (state philosophy). Later it was known as *dasar negara* (the foundation of the state). During the Soeharto time, it was called the *asas tunggal* (the sole basis or sole principle).
29. In "Indonesian: Ketuhanan, dengan Kewajiban Menjalankan Syari'at Islam bagi Pemeluk-Pemeluknya" in Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945*, p. 27.
30. Ibid., pp. 42–43; also Roeslan Abdulgani, *Pendjelasan Manipol dan*

Usdek (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, Penerbitan Chusus No. 147, Jakarta, 1960), pp. 20–21.

31. The wording in the 1950 Constitution is a bit different from the 1945 Constitution but the order of the five principles remained the same: 1. Belief in One Almighty God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), 2. Humanitarianism (*Peri-Kemanusiaan*), 3. Nationalism (*Kebangsaan*), 4. People Sovereignty (*Kerakyatan*), and 5. Social Justice (*Keadilan Sosial*). See Mohammad Hatta, *Pengertian Pancasila* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1977), p. 18.
32. See Gaffar, *Javanese Voters*, p. 31.
33. Gaffar in his village-level study discovered that during the 1971 election, 52.08 per cent of weak *santri* voted for Golkar, while only 36.36 per cent of strong *santri* voted for the Islamic parties (after 1973 it became PPP). In the 1977 election, 44.87 per cent of *santri* voted for Golkar while 26.42 per cent of strong *santri* voted for Golkar. See Gaffar, J*avanese Voters*, p. 122. In another study of other villages conducted in 1982, he had similar results. Ibid., p. 123.
34. Gaffar discovered that between 3.7 per cent and 13.13 per cent of weak/moderate *abangan* voted for the PPP. Ibid., p. 123.
35. There are many books on the Pancasila in Indonesian, but very few in English. One of these few books is Eka Darmaputera's *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society: A Critical and Ethical Analysis* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988). However, the book is based on the author's Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Boston College and the Andover Newton Theological School. The translation of the five principles in this book is slightly different from mine.
36. For his argument on Islam and the Pancasila, see his collected work entitled, *Cakrawala Islam antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1987), especially pp. 116–28.
37. In his interview with *Tempo* after the 1999 election, Robert Hefner noted that the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) is led by neo-traditionalist Muslims. I would like to borrow this term to differentiate it from Muslim traditionalists as represented by the NU in the 1950s. See "Umat Tak Mungkin Dimarginalkan Lagi", *Tempo*, 11 July 1999, p. 28.
38. See "Pilihan di Luar Pagar", *Gatra* 5, no. 31 (19 June 1999). Of course, one has to be aware of the complexity of the voting behaviour. It is not decided by a single factor. Nevertheless, I would argue that the cultural attitude of the voter is a major factor.
39. For a discussion of political parties after the fall of Soeharto, see Chapter 4 of this monograph.

2

Pancasila versus Political Islam, 1955–97

Pancasila, the five principles of Indonesia's state ideology, and political Islam are important aspects of politics in Indonesia. The two political cultures — the secular *abangan* (the Pancasila group) and the *santri* (the Islamic group) — have existed throughout Indonesian political history. This chapter examines Indonesian political parties and the general elections between 1955 (the year when Indonesia held its first general election) and 1997 (the year of the last general election held during the Soeharto regime). It explains the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system, from the purely proportional system during the "Liberal Democracy" period under Sukarno to a mixed proportional system during the Soeharto era. At the same time, it examines the socio-religious cleavages of Indonesian political parties from the start of Indonesian independence in 1945 up to the late 1990s.

The 1955 General Election: The Proportional System

Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 but became a sovereign state only in December 1949 after signing the Round Table Treaty with the Dutch. Indonesian history entered a period

of parliamentary democracy — it was also called either "Constitutional Democracy" or "Liberal Democracy" — where political parties rather than an authoritarian leader or the military were in power. Sukarno was a figurehead president and the army was subordinate to civilian rule. It should be noted that political parties were established before World War II, but they were unable to form a government during the colonial period. Only after independence were the political parties — many of them an "extension" of pre-war parties — able to fulfil this role. In the early 1950s, the political parties decided to hold a general election to legitimize the government.

There are many types of electoral systems. The Indonesian political élites are most familiar with the proportional system (commonly known as the proportional representation system) and the district system (commonly known as the majority system). The proportional system is often seen to be the most democratic as it is based on the principle of one person one vote and that parties should be presented in an assembly or parliament in direct proportion to their overall voting strength. Their percentage of seats equals their percentage of votes.[1]

> The [proportional system] is generally used to refer not to a single method of election, but to a variety of electoral mechanisms, those able to secure proportional outcomes, or at least a high and reliable degree of proportionality.[2]

The proportional system can also be subdivided into the party-list system, the single transferable-vote system and the additional member system. The proportional system has been mainly practised in Western Europe. Understandably, Indonesia as the ex-colony of the Netherlands adopted the proportional system (the party-list system) during the 1955 election.[3]

The 1955 election was the most democratic election held in Indonesia after the establishment of the Republic as it fulfilled the electoral process of a democratic system. Usually, elections in democratic systems are free. There are at least eight characteristics, including regular elections, freedom to put forth candidates, freedom to know and discuss the choices, universal adult suffrage, equal weighting of votes, free registration of votes, accurate

counting of choices, and reporting of the results.[4] It appears that the 1955 election fulfilled most of the above requirements. It had a high degree of freedom; even the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) was allowed to contest in the election.

The 1955 Election Results

In 1955 there were only sixteen electoral districts. One of them was Irian Jaya (then known as West Irian) which was still occupied by the Dutch.[5] The other fifteen electoral districts were East Java, Central Java, West Java, Greater Jakarta, South Sumatra, Central Sumatra, North Sumatra, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, and West Nusa Tenggara. The election was to elect Members of Parliament as well as members of the Constituent Assembly.

> Each area was allotted seats on the basis of the number of its citizens-residents, with provision however for each area to have the right to minimum representation, six seats in the Constituent Assembly and three in Parliament.[6]

It was decided that the Parliament would consist of 257 elected seats and three appointed seats for Irian Jaya, which did not participate in the election. However, later, there was a decision to add twelve more appointed seats for non-indigenous ethnic minorities: three appointed seats for Arabs, three for Europeans, and six for ethnic Chinese.[7] The number of votes for the Constituent Assembly was 150,000 per seat, while for the Parliament it was doubled, to 300,000 per seat. The same criteria were applied to populated Java and also to the less populated Outer Islands.[8]

Fifty-two parties and groups participated, but twenty-eight parties managed to get one or more seats in the Parliament. Of these, only four were Islamic parties: Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, or Muslim Scholars/Teachers Association), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party), and Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiah, or

Islamic Educational Movement).[9] The other twenty-four parties were either Christian or secular parties.

Of these twenty-eight parties, only four parties emerged with substantial support. These parties were the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, or Indonesian National Party), Masyumi, NU, and PKI (see Table 2.1).[10]

There is no doubt that Indonesian political parties have similarities with their European counterparts as they are modelled on European (Dutch) parties. But they are different from American or British parties. One of the differences is their socio-cultural characteristics. Scholars argued that these parties represented different socio-cultural traditions and regions. Indonesian political parties, in Soedjatmoko's view, were "political representatives of cultural solidarity groups".[11] Clifford Geertz also maintained that they represented various *aliran* or main socio-cultural traditions. *Aliran* means "stream" or "current", which was first used in his study of an Indonesian town published in 1965.[12] In Geertz's view, *aliran* is "a social movement, an ideologically defined political action animated by rather far-reaching moral ambitions".[13] He further elaborated, that an *aliran* "was more than a mere political party and it was more than a mere ideology: it was a set of interconnected social forms which acted to group large masses of people into a generalized category".[14] He argued that in the 1950s, there were four major *aliran* represented by four major political

TABLE 2.1
Results of Indonesia's 1955 General Election
(In percentages)

Name of Party	Percentage of Votes
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	22.3
Masyumi (modern Muslim party)	20.9
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, traditional Muslim party)	18.4
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	16.4
Other 24 parties	22.0
Total	100

Source: Herbert Feith, *Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1957), pp. 58–59.

parties with their clusters of related organizations such as women's groups, youth groups, peasants associations, labour unions, and the constituencies from which they drew their support.

Geertz also noted that the political leaning of the *abangan*, *priyayi*, and *santri* differed. While the *abangan* and *priyayi* were affiliated with either the PNI or PKI, the *santri* were supporters of either the NU or Masyumi.[15] Geertz labelled the *abangan* and *priyayi* as "Javanist" while the *santri* as "Islam", differentiating their religious components.

Although Geertz based his research on a Javanese town, his findings had a wider implication. Using the concept developed by Geertz, Daniel Lev highlighted the social class background of these four parties and their regions. (See Table 2.2 for the regional strength of each party.) The PNI was basically a Javanese *priyayi* (civil servants or aristocrats) party. It had the support of Indonesian civil servants, especially those of *priyayi* and *abangan* background. The PKI also drew its support from Java, but among the lesser *priyayi* and *abangan* peasants. The two Islamic parties received their support from devout Muslims. The NU support came from the Javanese *santri* and commercial elements in small towns in both Central and East Java, while Masyumi drew its support from the Muslims in the Outer Islands: they were landlords, traders, and modern Islamic intellectuals.[16] It is true that the followers of these parties had ethnic and class elements but they could not be explained solely in class terms.

TABLE 2.2
Number of Votes Gained by Four Major Parties in the 1955 Election in Java and the Outer Islands

Name of Party	Number of Votes in Java	Number of Votes in the Outer Islands	Total
PNI	6,964,595	1,470,058	8,434,653
Masyumi	405,703	7,498,183	7,903,866
NU	5,945,993	1,009,148	6,955,141
PKI	5,497,766	679,148	6,176,914
Total	11,814,057	10,656,537	29,470,574

Source: Computed from Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, pp. 58 and 85.

In the 1955 election, the votes gained by the four major parties reflected the relative strength of the secular *abangan* and Islamic *santri* groups. The *abangan*-supported parties were in the lead, but the *santri* parties followed close behind. Counting the votes gained by the *abangan* and *santri* parties, it appears that the *abangan* group, or more correctly, the Pancasila group, gained a total of 56.5 per cent of the votes, while the *santri* group gained 43.5 per cent.

The concept of *aliran* as developed by Geertz is useful in understanding Indonesian party politics, but not his detailed division of *aliran* since after the end of the Liberal Democracy period, the Masyumi was banned, and during the Soeharto era, the PKI was eradicated. There was a new government party called Golkar (Golongan Karya), which could not be fitted into Geertz's original category. After the fall of Soeharto, with the mushrooming of new political parties, it became even more difficult to use Geertz's original model. Nevertheless, I would argue that the two political cultures — the *abangan* and *santri* — have existed throughout Indonesian political history, which can be used to analyse both Javanese and non-Javanese politics. This division can be applied beyond the 1950s. It is important to note that during the 1955 election, there was no single majority party. Therefore, a coalition government was established, a situation which would be repeated in the June 1999 election after the fall of Soeharto.

The *aliran* (stream) concept, not the Indonesian term, was also used by Herbert Feith. Feith disagreed with the division of four streams as represented by the four major parties in the 1955 election. To him, there were five streams between 1945 and 1965: radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islam, democratic socialism, and communism.[17] The term "stream" was used to refer to five areas of political thinking. Feith argued that the 1955 election which gave rise to "the four ideologically distinctive parties … has led many to think of Indonesia's ideological scene in terms of fourfold division".[18] However, he maintained that, "the correspondence between major parties and distinctive streams of political thinking was not complete".[19] Some parties tended to be influenced by more than one stream, and two important streams of

thinking — Javanese traditionalism and democratic socialism — "were not characteristically embedded in any one of the four major parties though each of them exercised some influence within several".[20] Like Geertz, Feith's specific arguments are no longer valid, but some elements discussed are still relevant in Indonesian political parties today. (See Chapter 10 for further discussion.)

From Liberal Democracy to Sukarno's Guided Democracy

The period of Parliamentary Democracy or Liberal Democracy from 1949 to 1958 was characterized by the competition of various political parties for power, but their diversified interests made their co-operation short-lived. The Army was outside the parliamentary system, and felt that its interests were not looked after under the system; Sukarno was a figurehead president and had no real power; and the PKI was excluded from the Cabinet. These three political forces found that they did not benefit from the system.

The military in Sumatra was critical of Jakarta and staged an abortive coup in 1956. However, the unhappiness against the Javanese-controlled government was growing in the Outer Islands. In 1957, Sukarno was invited by the PNI-dominated government to form a presidential Cabinet, and he brought the PKI into his Cabinet. This led to another episode of open rebellions in Sumatra and North Sulawesi. The rebels, including military dissidents and Masyumi leaders together with one leading politician (Dr Soemitro Djojohadikusumo) from the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia or PSI), proclaimed the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI).[21] They were joined by the rebels from North Sulawesi. The revolutionary government accused Sukarno of leading Indonesia to communism and appealed to the outside world for recognition. However, Sukarno was supported by the pro-Jakarta army and succeeded in crushing the rebellions. The Constituent Assembly (*Konstituante* 1956–59), which aimed at drafting a new constitution, had a deadlock on the issue of state ideology. Masyumi, the NU, and

other Islamic parties jointly opposed the adoption of the Pancasila as the Indonesian state ideology.[22] Sukarno decided to dissolve the Assembly and returned to the 1945 Constitution, abandoning the provisional Constitution, which had been used since 1950, marking the end of the parliamentary democracy period.[23] The 1945 Constitution followed a presidential system, giving tremendous power to the President. In July 1959, Sukarno introduced the so-called Guided Democracy system, sharing power with the military and the PKI.

During the Guided Democracy period, Sukarno reduced the number of political parties to ten: the PNI, NU, Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Parkindo (Protestant Party), Partindo (Indonesia Party), Partai Murba (Proletariat Party), PSII, IPKI (League of the Upholding of Indonesian Independence), PKI, and Perti, after banning Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party. The latter two were involved in the abortive regional rebellions of 1958. However, under the Guided Democracy system, with the exception of the PKI, political parties in general were weak. In fact, this period saw three major "extra-parliamentary" actors: President Sukarno, the Army which grew in strength due to its success in crushing the regional rebellions in 1958, and the PKI which became stronger through turbulent years. But both the Army and the PKI were not idle — they competed against each other to gain more power. Sukarno played the balance of power game. When the army was too strong, he sided with the PKI. But gradually he moved closer to the PKI, which caused alarm among right-wing military generals.

Soeharto and the New Order

On 30 September 1965, there was an alleged communist coup, commonly referred to as G-30-S or Gestapu (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, or the 30 September Movement), which resulted in the liquidation of the PKI, the fall of President Sukarno, and the triumph of the military. An army general, Soeharto, emerged as the strong man. Indonesian politics entered a new phase known as the "New Order". To manage Indonesia, Soeharto did not want to adopt overt military rule, and a façade of democratic form was

preserved. Regular elections and economic development were introduced by the new government to legitimize its newly acquired power.

To contest in elections, the military required a new vehicle, which could represent its interests. Although the PNI represented the *abangan* interest, it was civilian- rather than military-controlled. The Soeharto group set about to revive an obscure organization called the Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group (Sekber Golkar) as an election machine.[24] Golkar represented the political arm of the Indonesian army, reflecting the *abangan* rather than the *santri* culture. But it took a few years to transform this loose federation into an election machine. There were pro-Sukarno generals in Sekber Golkar (after the 1971 election it became known as Golkar) and some civilians refused to be ruled under the military. Meanwhile, the New Order military was also divided into the Soeharto group — which was moderate and conservative — and the General A. H. Nasution and Dharsono group which was "radical". Initially the "radical" group had a say but the Soeharto group gradually took over. Both groups wanted to legitimize the new government through "constitutional means" by conducting a general election. They quickly prepared an election bill so that the election could be conducted in 1968.[25]

The Election Bills: Towards Authoritarianism

Let us look at the election bill and two related bills. This will be useful for our comparison with the 1999 election and political parties laws later. On 24 November 1966, the new government had submitted an election bill ("Bill on the Election relating to Members of the MPR and DPR") together with two other relevant bills to be debated in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), namely the "Bill on the Structure and Position of the MPR, the DPR and the DPRD", and the "Parties, Mass Organizations and Golongan Karya (Golkar) Bill".[26] The latter bill was discussed for more than a month without any result. It was obvious that the government wanted to introduce the restructuring of political parties by limiting their membership and grouping them into fewer clusters in accordance with the suggestion put forward at the 1966 Army

Seminar held in Bandung. The opposition from the political parties was so great that the DPR eventually decided to concentrate on the other two bills (i.e. the election bill and the structure bill).[27]

Disagreement also existed on the election bill, especially with regard to matters relating to the electoral system, the proportion between representatives from Java and the Outer Islands, and the structure of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), DPR, and DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). The government was at first in favour of the single-member constituency (district system) rather than the proportional system. Under the district system, small parties would not be able to survive but people could elect their own leaders rather than be represented by established political party leaders. According to this system, residential requirements for the candidate would be imposed. This was also in accordance with the 1966 Army Seminar. New Order "militants" such as General A. H. Nasution (who was then chairman of the Provisional MPR) and anti-communist intellectuals (especially those affiliated with various action fronts) were major supporters of the district system.

To discuss the bills, a committee called the Panitia Chusus (Khusus) 3 RUU (Special Committee for Three Draft Laws) was established on 30 January 1967. The committee consisted of forty-five members, which was later reduced to forty-three members. The military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI) had six members and the Karya faction A, B, and C (i.e. Golkar) had eleven members. The remaining twenty-eight members were political party representatives.[28] However, political parties objected to the district system and the Soeharto regime eventually backed down. The Karya faction was persuaded to go along with the government. By July 1967, it was reported that a general consensus between the Parliament and the government was reached, and the proportional system was adopted. In addition, both sides also agreed that one third of MPR members would be appointed from both the ABRI and non-ABRI, while the DPR would consist of 460 members, of which 360 would be elected. The remaining 100 would be appointed.

General Nasution was not satisfied with the election system nor were the New Order militants within and outside Parliament.

Up to January 1968 the election bill had not yet been ratified by Parliament. There were rumours that various action fronts exerted pressure to postpone the ratification. The DPR intended to ratify the bill together with the other bill on the structure of the MPR, the DPR, and the DPRD. By then it was clear that the election could not be held as scheduled in 1968. Acting President Soeharto expressed his intention to postpone the election. In March 1968, the MPR appointed Soeharto as the President and decided to postpone the election to 5 July 1971.

There were several crucial points in the structure bill which impeded its smooth approval in the DPR. Most of these points were related to the number of appointed members from ABRI, non-ABRI, and the political parties in the three institutions (MPR, DPR, and DPRD).[29] There were also clauses which gave the President, Minister for Home Affairs, and the Governor sole power to appoint those members. By this time, the election bill which was supposed to have been settled, was discussed again. The debate was on Article 34, which only allowed the existing parties and Golkar to participate in the election. In other words, parties banned during the Sukarno era were not permitted to contest the election.[30]

The debate on the election bill and the structure bill dragged on and by October 1969 there were still no concrete results. Soeharto then intervened. He met party leaders and Golkar representatives separately: major political parties formed one group while minor parties, ABRI, and the Karya faction (Golkar) formed another group which supported the government's position. As a compromise, it was decided to accept the PNI's proposal that appointed members for the DPR and DPRD would not exceed 20 per cent. Meanwhile, the Karya faction suggested reviewing Article 34 of the election bill. But it was decided by the Special Committee (Panitia Chusus 3 RUU) that the motion of the Karya faction would not be entertained. The ABRI faction in Parliament compromised with political parties in order to have the election bill passed at the expense of the New Order "militants", many of whom were civilians. It is also interesting to read the memorandum of the Karya faction which noted that the faction did not want to withdraw its proposal but admitted that it was defeated by the "existing reality".[31]

It should be noted that the New Order elections were conducted under an authoritarian system, not a democratic system. The military, represented by Soeharto, was in firm control and hence it was a controlled election. The laws were formulated to favour the ruling party, Golkar. The number of parties was restricted. Even the ideology of political parties was decided by the state. The Communist Party, which was implicated in the 1965 coup, was outlawed, and was not allowed to contest the election. But the most undemocratic aspect was the role played by the government in the election: the government was the player as well as the referee. There was no role for independent observers or non-government participants in the electoral process. The freedom enjoyed by political parties during the 1955 election was completely absent.

The electoral system adopted during the New Order regime was no longer the pure form of proportional system, but a combination of the proportional system and the district system. Under the new electoral system in the New Order, it was stated that there should be a balance between representation in Java and the Outer Islands. The law stipulated that every district would have at least one representative in Parliament, guaranteeing the Outer Islanders a Member of Parliament for each district.[32] In theory, this system was designed to balance the Javanese control over the non-Javanese, but in practice, it did not function as the Parliament was largely the rubber stamp of the government.

The 1971 General Election: The Military and Abangan Ascendancy

The first election during the New Order — which was under military control — was held in 1971. This election set a pattern for the following elections in the New Order. It produced a hegemonic party system. Throughout Soeharto's thirty-two-year rule, there were six general elections, of which Golkar always won landslide victories.

Before examining the elections results, it is important to note that when Soeharto first came to power, there were ten political parties (including Golkar). But in 1973 the number of political

parties were reduced to three: apart from Golkar which remained as a party, four Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, Perti, and PSII) were merged into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, or United Development Party) and five "secular" parties (PNI, Partai Katolik, Parkindo, Partai Murba, and IPKI) were merged into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, or Indonesian Democratic Party). It was obvious that the fusion of the parties was intended to allow the government to have easier control over these parties, but at the same time, it was also intended to weaken them as there was a perennial struggle within the new parties. Nevertheless, the Islamic parties were able to gain almost 30 per cent of the votes, at least initially, posing a challenge to the *abangan*-dominated Golkar.

The three new political parties which emerged after the 1971 election can be classified into two political cultures. Golkar and the PDI are basically *abangan* parties; they are very similar, except one was dominated by the military. Soeharto decided to have three parties instead of two — this effectively prevented a direct confrontation between Golkar and the PPP. In any case, the role of the PDI was insignificant and the old PNI and non-Muslim supporters went to Golkar. These two parties had the shadow of *aliran* but they were not the same as the 1955 parties as Golkar was neither the PNI nor the PKI. Nevertheless, Golkar had an ideology, the Pancasila, and its own various affiliated organizations derived from the component groups such as the Central Organization for Indonesian Socialist Karyawan (Soksi), the Co-operative for the Mutual Assistance Efforts (Kosgoro), the Family Mutual Help Association (MKGR), etc.[33] But unlike the PNI and the PKI in the 1950s, Golkar had more complex and diverse component organizations. They were held together by the military. There was no doubt that the *abangan* elements, at least up to 1989, were most powerful. Golkar was controlled by the military, particularly by Soeharto, who eventually made Golkar his personal political vehicle. The PPP was supported by the *santri* elements and it also had a political ideology — Islam — and affiliated organizations, mainly from Java. The non-Javanese elements were also represented but they were unable to outnumber the Javanese. Again, the party was largely controlled by the government-accepted leaders and was not led by independent *santri* men.

TABLE 2.3
Results of Indonesian Elections, 1971–97
(In percentages)

Party	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	62.80	62.11	64.34	73.16	68.1	74.51
PDI	10.09	8.60	7.88	10.87	14.9	3.06
PPP	27.11	29.29	27.78	15.97	17.0	22.43
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Leo Suryadinata, *Interpreting Indonesian Politics* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 199.

Table 2.3 shows the results of the six elections (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) conducted during the New Order period. During the elections, government control was tight and there was constant pressure, if not intimidation, to vote for Golkar. The number of the opposition parties was small and they were under the influence of the government. Communism and Islam as political ideologies were not allowed. In fact, Indonesia was under the firm control of Soeharto whose rule resembled that of a Javanese king. He made himself the Chief Mentor (*Pembina Utama*) of Golkar. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that Indonesia developed into a hegemonic political system with the Army and Golkar at the helm.

Although Soeharto was able to control the situation until Indonesia was hit by the economic crisis towards the end of his rule, his power was challenged as more violence and opposition against him occurred. The 1997 general election can be used as a good indicator of growing opposition to his rule.

The 1997 General Election: Violence and Riots

The May 1997 election was the most violent in Indonesia's electoral history.[34] The Indonesian Government decided to use all possible means, including force, in order to continue to rule. The people who disagreed with the government gathered strength and refused to be dominated. But research findings showed that at the local level, both the government and the opposition used Islam as a weapon to achieve their respective objectives.[35] During the

campaign period, many riots occurred in small towns in both Java and the Outer Islands. According to an unofficial report, at least 250 people lost their lives during the election campaign. The most serious riot took place in Banjarmasin (Kalimantan) on the last day of campaigning. About 140 people were killed, 164 persons went missing, some shopping centres, a temple, a Catholic school, and six churches were burnt down, and government offices and private houses were destroyed.[36] What were the factors which contributed to the riots?

A wide economic disparity exists between different Indonesian social groups. In the years preceding the 1997 elections, this disparity had become more glaring with the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer. The unemployment rate had also been accelerating without sufficient jobs available for Indonesians. These two inter-related factors sowed the seeds of the riots.

Tension between the indigenous population and the ethnic Chinese minority had worsened, as the average Chinese is perceived to be economically better off than his indigenous counterpart. Since the majority of the Chinese are non-Muslims while the majority of indigenous Indonesians are Muslims, both economic as well as religious tensions were evident between these two groups. Prior to the election campaign, several conflicts had already occurred. To a degree, the riots/conflicts occurring during the campaign period were an extension of those which had occurred during the preceding months.

Government policy towards the opposition also contributed to violence. Megawati, the daughter of former President Sukarno, was seen as a formidable challenger to the regime. Before the election campaign, she was removed as the chairperson of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) during a government-sponsored PDI congress held in Medan and replaced by Soerjadi, who was acceptable to the government. Megawati's removal disqualified her from contesting the parliamentary election as only members of the three parties recognized by the government (Golkar, PDI, and PPP) were eligible to become candidates. The supporters of Megawati were unwilling to accept the *fait accompli* which the government had slammed on the PDI. Clashes between the pro-Megawati group and the pro-Soerjadi group occurred, with security

forces supporting the Soerjadi group. Many were killed in one such conflict on 27 July 1996 in Jakarta, and the confrontation continued during the election campaign. Clashes between the two sides forced Soerjadi to abandon his campaign in East Java. It was later revealed that the military was involved in the killing of the pro-Megawati PDI supporters on 27 July 1996, to prevent Megawati from challenging Soeharto.[37]

Golkar and the two opposition parties also clashed frequently during the campaign period. The bloodiest campaign conflicts were between the supporters of Golkar and those of the PPP. The government sought to solve this by requiring the parties to campaign on different days, but did not achieve the intended objective. Prior to the election, the government announced that processions were not allowed. However, this regulation was not observed by contestants. Election rallies provided opportunities for the discontented elements to instigate the public and eventually transformed rallies into violent conflicts.

There were two views regarding the conflicts, both connected with the Indonesian military. One view attributed the conflicts to a group in the military who was unhappy with Soeharto. This group instigated the riots, aiming to weaken Soeharto's position. The other view was that the military did not make serious efforts to prevent the riots to show to voters that its dual-function concept should not be dropped: without the participation of the military, there would be no political stability in Indonesia.

Disunity within the élite and the relative decline in Soeharto's power were partly the reason for the increased number of conflicts. Although still in control, Soeharto was facing growing opposition from urban groups dissatisfied with the conditions then. It is possible that the riots were meant to damage the image of the Soeharto regime and to destabilize the situation before March 1998 — when the presidential election, which followed the general election, was due to take place.

Golkar and "Opposition Parties"

Golkar's victory in the 1997 election was a foregone conclusion, yet many people did not expect it to win 74.5 per cent of the votes

compared with 68 per cent in 1992. The PPP won 23 per cent (17 per cent in 1992) while the PDI polled only 3 per cent, a big drop from 15 per cent in 1992.

Golkar's performance was 4 per cent higher than its target of 70.20 per cent. Many, however, maintained that there were polling irregularities which favoured the ruling party.[38] Open conflicts between the supporters of Golkar and the PPP during and after the election took place. In Sampang, Madura, for instance, the PPP supporters burnt some polling stations, leading to fresh elections. Despite this, Golkar still won with a convincing majority in Sampang. In the Muslim stronghold of Jember, there was also a riot. The supporters of the PPP were reportedly unhappy with the election results, claiming that they were rigged to ensure a Golkar victory. They looted Chinese shops, ransacked government offices and burnt temples and churches. In Madura and Pasuruan, riots recurred even weeks after the general election had ended.

Many PPP supporters believed that they would gain more votes during the elections, especially in those areas where Islam served as a rallying point against the Soeharto regime. It thus came as a surprise to many PPP supporters when the PPP was defeated in such areas. The chairman of the PPP lodged a protest about irregularities but was eventually pressurized to accept the election results in the "interests of the nation".[39] Prior to the election, the PPP leadership was quoted as saying that the party expected to get at least 27–29 per cent of the votes, as it did in the 1971 and 1977 elections.

The poor performance of the PDI was expected. During the campaign period, PDI rallies were attended by very few supporters. This had much to do with Megawati declaring that she would not vote in the election and urging the PDI members to follow her. It is possible that many of her followers did not vote. Some Megawati supporters also may have co-operated with the PPP to maximize opposition towards the Soeharto regime, notwithstanding the denial made by the chairman of the PPP.[40]

The election, despite the government's control, was a significant indicator because it showed that the opposition to Soeharto had grown. More and more, Soeharto had to rely on force to stay in power. Most significant is perhaps the development

of the Indonesian political system from a three-party system to a *de facto* two-party system. Although Golkar was "Islamized", the division between the *abangan* and the more pious *santri* among the Indonesian Muslims still remained. However, the strength of the Islamic force in Indonesian politics under Soeharto had increased. The *abangan* group was being threatened.

The Rise of the *Santri* and the Decline of the Military

The New Order regime under Soeharto started to suppress the PKI and left-wing movement when it first came to power in the mid-1960s. In order to attain the objective, religious forces (especially Islam) were used to eliminate the PKI. Once the PKI was eliminated, Soeharto began to restrict political activities of Islamic groups.

However, in the late 1980s, when the military began to move away from Soeharto, the President began to cultivate Islamic groups. He gradually co-opted the moderates within the Islamic groups. In 1990, he even established ICMI (Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association), sending his trusted Minister for Research, Dr B. J. Habibie, to be the chairman of the organization. The modernist Islamic group also took over the leadership of Golkar. In the last ten years of his rule, Soeharto received considerable support from the Muslim community, especially in the rural areas. Even in the military, he cultivated Islamic generals to undermine the influence and strength of non-Muslims, especially the group led by a Catholic military general, Benny Moerdani.

Under Soeharto's leadership, the political power of Islam grew. This was due to the fact that Muslim politicians had learned from their past mistakes, i.e. solely relying on Islamic parties. Towards the end of the Soeharto era, they had adopted both "Muslim politics" (*politik Muslim*) and "Islamic politics" (*politik Islam*).[41] Muslim politics refers to a strategy of rendering support to Muslims in non-Islamic parties/organizations, while Islamic politics refers to a strategy of supporting only Islamic parties/organizations. Past experience showed that Islamic politics had failed miserably in seizing political power. Therefore Muslim politicians stressed

the strategy of Muslim politics and succeeded in seizing power in Golkar. Many were worried that Islam might eventually challenge the state ideology and transform Indonesia into either a Muslim state or an Islamic state. But this did not happen because in the thirty-two years of Soeharto's rule, the Muslims were not united. The division between the *abangan* and *santri* remained. So did the division between traditional and modern Islam. Equally important had been the attitude of the military as a group, which had been against the establishment of an Islamic state. However, it is clear that the *santri* became much stronger politically at the end of Soeharto's rule. Some observers argued that Indonesian society in general and Javanese society in particular have been much more Islamized. More *abangan* and their children have been *santri*nized and the *kejawen* tradition has been weakened.[42] They were waiting for an opportunity to exercise their power. They were ready to share power in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

The end of the Soeharto regime also witnessed the decline of military strength and increase in presidential power as shown in the choice of the vice-presidential candidate. Long before the March 1998 presidential election, the Indonesian press had engaged in intense speculation on vice-presidential candidates: Try Sutrisno (the incumbent), B. J. Habibie, General R. Hartono, Harmoko, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Moerdiono, and Sudharmono. None of these potential candidates had a strong political base.

As the election drew nearer, only two names continued to be mentioned as possible vice-presidential candidates: Try Sutrisno and B. J. Habibie. Try was the favourite candidate for those close to the military establishment, while Habibie was the choice of President Soeharto himself. Habibie was also supported by some Islamic groups because of his "Islamic identity" — he was the chairman of ICMI. The tussle between the pro-Try and pro-Habibie groups clearly divided the Jakarta élite. Habibie's position gradually firmed up in January 1998. President Soeharto was quoted as saying that his vice-presidential candidate had to be someone who had an international reputation as well as being a man of science.[43] In an apparent show of unity, Harmoko, Chairman of Golkar, stated in January that the three channels (the military, the civil servants, and civilians) in the big family of Golkar agreed

to put one rather than three separate candidates. Harmoko also said that the candidate did not have to be a military man. Habibie and Ginandjar (Minister of State for National Development and Head of the National Development Planning Body or Bappenas) were acceptable as both were "men of science". By this time, most people thought that Habibie was going to be the Vice-President despite strong opposition from a segment of the military and the market forces, which did not think that Habibie would be good for Indonesian economic recovery.

In early February 1998, Golkar put up its vice-presidential candidates: Harmoko (Minister for Information and Chairman of both the DPR and MPR) and Habibie. However, a few days later, Harmoko withdrew from the candidacy, making Habibie the only candidate. At about the same time, Ginandjar also stated publicly that he was not interested in running for the vice-presidency.[44] The PPP supported Habibie, and the PDI (under the leadership of Soerjadi) finally endorsed him. Once the news was announced, there was a drop in the value of the rupiah again. Nevertheless, Soeharto was not deterred. He showed the world that he was in control and no one should interfere with his decision. It appeared that Soeharto trusted Habibie and he needed a trusted ally to help him take Indonesia out of the prevailing economic crisis. A cynic might also argue that with Habibie as Vice-President, Soeharto was ensuring that his presidency would be secure as Habibie was not favoured to become the President. During the March 1998 session, Soeharto was re-elected as the President of Indonesia for the seventh time, and Habibie as the new Vice-President. But riots and demonstrations escalated.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter examines the socio-religious cleavages of Indonesian political parties from the start of Indonesian independence in 1945 to the beginning of the decline of Soeharto in the 1990s. Their *abangan* and *santri* characters remained identifiable. It is noted that before Soeharto came to power, there had been a general election in 1955 which was most democratic. It had allowed all parties of different political persuasion to contest the election and

all members, with the exception of twelve who represented ethnic minorities, were elected. The government had adopted the proportional representation system and there had been no division in the "prices" of parliamentary seats between Java and the Outer Islands. It had been conducted under a democratic/liberal system which guaranteed fairness in the election. When Soeharto came to power, he modified the proportional system, restricted contestation, instituted a large number (100) of appointed parliamentary members from the military, and divided the "prices" of parliamentary seats between Java and the Outer Islands. His authoritarian rule made a free and democratic election impossible. The election was blatantly used to legitimize his regime rather than to reflect the desire of the people for political representation and participation. It also became a "useful fiction" for him to retain political power.[45] Nevertheless, the *abangan* elements and the Javanese domination were reflected in the party system and the general elections from the time of Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy under Sukarno to the New Order under Soeharto.

Notes

1. For a general discussion on electoral systems, see Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), pp. 205–28; Austin Ranney, *Governing: An Introduction to Political Science*, 7th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, 1996), pp. 158–81; Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems* (London: Faber & Faber, 1955). For detailed studies on the electoral systems, see Michael A. E., *Voting Procedures* (Oxford: Clarendon; New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Rein Taagepera and Mathew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945–1990* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
2. Heywood, *Politics*, p. 220.
3. For a brief discussion of the Indonesian electoral systems, see Bintan R. Saragih, "Masyarakat dan Sistem Pemilu Indonesia", in *Evaluasi Pemilu Orde Baru*, Seri Penerbitan Studi Politik (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka

and Laboratorium Ilmu Politik FISIP UI, 1997), pp. 33–43.
4. Ranney, *Governing*, pp. 159–60.
5. Herbert Feith, T*he Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1957), p. 3.
6. Ibid.
7. Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971), p. 2.
8. Ibid., p. 171. For the Undang-Undang No. 7 Tahun 1953 tentang Pemilihan Anggota Konstituante dan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, see ibid., pp. 162–99.
9. The PPTI, which was a *Tharikah* (*tarekat*) party, is a mystic party. I do not classify this into an Islamic party as it did not struggle for an Islamic state or Islamic order. However, some Muslim scholars may consider this as an Islamic party as Sufism is part of Islam.
10. Herbert Feith classified the twenty-eight parties into major parties (4), medium-sized parties (6), small groups of nation-wide significance (12), and small groups of regional significance (12). Two Islamic parties (Masyumi and NU) were classified as major parties, PSII and Perti were medium-sized parties. See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1957), p. 69.
11. Soedjatmoko, "The Role of the Political Parties in Indonesia", in *Nationalism and Progress in Asia*, edited by Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956) pp. 128–40.
12. Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1965).
13. Ibid., p. 127.
14. Ibid., p. 128.
15. Ibid.
16. Daniel S. Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 8, no. 1 (March 1967): 54–57.
17. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 13.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., pp. 13–14.
20. Ibid., p. 14.
21. For a recent study on the rebellions and the American role, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy, The Secret Eishenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle and

London: Washington University Press, 1995). Also see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 33.

22. For a debate between the secular nationalists and Islamic leaders at the Constituent Assembly, see Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956–1959*, especially pp. 106–18. The Islamic leaders were represented by Natsir (Masyumi) and Ahmad Zaini (NU). Both rejected secularism and favoured "Islamic state".
23. For various interpretations of the fall of parliamentary democracy by leading Indonesianists such as Herb Feith, Jamie Mackie and Daniel S. Lev, see *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, edited by David Bourchier and John Legge (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 16–42.
24. For a study of Golkar, see Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asian Series, No. 85 (Ohio University, 1989), 2nd printing 1992.
25. In fact, the major weaknesses of the general election during the New Order were discussed in detail in the LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) report, a summary of which was published in 1997. (See Syamsuddin Haris et al., *Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Telaah atas Struktur, Proses dan Fungsi* [Jakarta: PPW-LIPI, 1997].) In the report, there was little about the election system. It focuses on the role of the Indonesian state in the election, as it monopolized power and served as both participant and referee and used the election to legitimize power. As a result, the election is not an expression of political participation of the people but the endorsement of the power élite to remain in power. Therefore, the focus of the recommendation was how to limit the power of the state in the election and to allow the people's voice to be heard. The report was ignored.
26. Bustamam, SH., *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum dan Undang-Undang Susunan dan Kedudukan MPR, DPR dan DPRD* (Djakarta: Centra Publishing Company, 1969), p. 11.
27. The parties and Golkar Bill was only passed as a law in 1975 after the 1971 election.
28. Bustamam, *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum*, pp. 15–17.
29. Ibid., pp. 18–19.
30. Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa, *Pemilihan Umum 1971* (Djakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers, 1971), p. 45.
31. Bustamam, *Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum*, p. 37.

32. Saragih, "Masyarakat dan Sistem Pemilu Indonesia", p. 39.
33. For the components of Golkar in the earlier phase, see Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, 2nd ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992), pp. 184–97.
34. For a critical study of the 1997 election, see Syamsuddin Haris et al., eds., *Kecurangan dan Perlawanan Rakyat dalam Pemilu 1997* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia and PPW-LIPI, 1999).
35. Ibid., p. 205.
36. Tim, LBHN Banjarmasin, *Laporan Investigasi Kerusuhan Banjarmasin Tgl. 25–26 Mei 1997* (photocopy). For a detailed description of the riot, see Hermawan Sulistyo, "Anarki Enam Jam: Eokonstruksi Kerusuhan Jumat Membara di Banjarmasin", in Syamsuddin Haris, *Kecurangan dan Perlawanan Rakyat*, pp. 185–203.
37. After the fall of Soeharto, a LIPI team conducted a study on the military intervention in political party affairs and revealed that the bloody attack in July 1996 was done by "the Soerjadi camp, supported by hired gangsters and soldiers (*pasukan ABRI*)". See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., *Tentara Mendamba Mitra: Hasil Penelitian LIPI tentang Pasang Surut Keterlibatan Militer dalam Kehidupan Kepartaian di Indonesia* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, October 1999), p. 160.
38. Editorial, *Jakarta Post*, 24 June 1997; *Kompas*, 24 June 1997.
39. *Kompas*, 24 June 1997.
40. "Mereka Lebih Banyak Mengacau", *Gatra*, 7 June 1997, p. 44.
41. For a discussion on this concept, see Leo Suryadinata, *Golkar dan Militer: Studi tentang Budaya Politik* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992), pp. 154–56.
42. I have discussed this point with Indonesian scholars and many were of this view, especially towards the end of the Soeharto regime. Niels Mulder also held a similar view but he noted that there was a convergence between *abangan* and *putihan* (*santri*). See "Islamicization, 1980", in *Inside Indonesian Society: An Interpretation of Cultural Change in Java*, edited by Niels Mulder (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1994), pp. 184–87.
43. *Straits Times*, 13 March 1998.
44. *Gatra*, 21 February 1998, pp. 38–39.
45. The term "useful fiction" is used by R. William Liddle to refer to the elections in Soeharto's Indonesia. See his "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia", in *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, edited by R. H. Taylor (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 34–60.

3

Exit Soeharto, Enter Habibie
Prelude to the 1999 Election

On 21 May 1998 Soeharto announced that he was unable to continue leading the nation and had decided to step down: this dramatic three-minute announcement ended the Soeharto era. His deputy, B. J. Habibie, was immediately sworn in as the new President. This chapter gives an overview of the problems faced by Soeharto in the last six months prior to his stepping down, the crucial developments in the last weeks of his rule, and the "showdown" which eventually ended it all. This chapter also briefly evaluates Habibie's rule and the problems encountered.[1]

Corruption and the Economic Crisis

The Indonesian economy deteriorated rapidly in the wake of the financial crisis that began first in Thailand in the middle of 1997, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Indonesia was the hardest hit. The value of the rupiah dropped from Rp2,350 per U.S. dollar in June 1997 to Rp16,500 in January 1998. By early April 1999 it had somewhat stabilized at Rp9,000 per U.S. dollar. However, the low value of the rupiah made it impossible for Indonesian companies to import goods and to pay debts. Prices of imported and domestic products rose dramatically and many

companies faced bankruptcy. Unemployment rates jumped. These developments affected Indonesian politics. The presidential election, which took place after the general election, in March 1998 was thus conducted under the shadow of economic turmoil and increasing discontent, after Indonesia was compelled to ask for help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

There are two interpretations on the economic crisis in Indonesia: one is economic, the other is both economic and socio-political.[2]

The first view — the government view — was that the causes were economic. For almost three decades, Indonesia experienced good economic performance measured by conventional economic indicators: there was gross national product (GNP) growth, large foreign investments and low inflation rates. Massive foreign capital and short-term loans poured into Indonesia. In the view of Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs, a well-known economist

> [Indonesia] was paying the price for increased reliance on foreign capital to finance domestic investments, and for the erosion of export competitiveness by rapid capital inflows. Alongside, the financial system had grown fragile with excessive short-term debt.[3]

Once there was a crisis of confidence, investors withdrew their short-term loans; the banking system collapsed as it was unable to collect or pay the debts. The country was in turmoil. The government thought the problems could be solved by undertaking economic reforms: the situation would then improve, and political reforms would not be required. Some foreign economists also felt that it was mainly an economic problem and the situation could have been handled if the IMF had not made the wrong move. Sachs criticized the IMF "for its lack of strategy to tackle Indonesia's foreign debt. He maintained that Indonesia desperately needed strategy to recapitalize its banks, whose collapse he blamed on the IMF's alarmist and abrupt style of intervention."[4] In other words, the Indonesian economic crisis could have been overcome if the right economic strategy had been adopted. Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University also noted that had the Currency Board system been introduced, the Soeharto government would have survived.[5]

The second view is that the cause of the crisis was not only economic but also socio-political, and corruption was a factor. According to this view, the Indonesian financial system was weak: the economic crisis was caused by the overexpansion of the Indonesian economy and the use of funds in non-productive sectors. The sudden withdrawal of foreign loans caused the economy to collapse. Hal Hill, an Australian economist, put it more systematically when he pointed out that there were a number of "pre-crisis vulnerability factors", including external debt and capital mobility, poor economic management, poor financial regulation, corruption, and lack of governance. However, he maintains that although corruption was a serious problem, it was difficult to advance the argument that it was a key precipitating variable. In his view, "more plausible is the thesis that the particular forms of corruption, and the political system in general, that had assumed by the 1990s rendered the Soeharto government unwilling — indeed unable — to move decisively and swiftly once the crisis hit".[6] Therefore he argued, that "corruption deserves great emphasis at this stage of process, rather than as an initial precipitating factor".[7]

In my view, a large external debt, poor economic management, and poor financial regulation are the product of the political system. Authoritarianism and cronyism were responsible for these weaknesses. Corruption was one of the major components of cronyism. Soeharto's Indonesia had become a new Javanese kingdom, ruled by Soeharto, his cronies, and his family, especially from the 1980s when his children were in business. Economic rationale was abandoned and the interests of Soeharto's cronies were supreme. Cronyism and corruption resulted in a large debt incurred by both the private (US$74 billion) and state (US$63.4 billion) sectors.[8] Indebted private companies were owned by the New Order élite and Chinese conglomerates. Members of the first family and their cronies monopolized the Indonesian economy from the 1980s and beyond. The first family had entered almost every field, and according to Western media, accumulated wealth amounting to between US$16 billion and US$40 billion.[9] Corruption and cronyism were rampant. It was only a matter of time before this hollow economy collapsed.

During the initial period of the crisis, sixteen banks were declared insolvent, one of them belonging to Soeharto's son while a few others were also connected to him.[10] These insolvent banks were supposed to be closed down but soon after the announcement, Soeharto's son was allowed to purchase another bank in order to do business as usual. This is a clear example that economic reform was unlikely to succeed under Soeharto's rule.

IMF and the Gathering Storm

Since the Soeharto government regarded the economic turmoil as an economic problem, it expected to overcome the problem once the IMF came to the rescue. On 8 October 1997, Jakarta sought aid from the IMF.[11] After two weeks of negotiations, the IMF agreed to offer a US$43 billion loan bailout to pull Indonesia back from the brink of economic collapse. Indonesia was required to undertake financial reforms, including closing the insolvent banks, dismantling monopolies, applying austerity measures, and withdrawing subsidies on basic commodities. However, the loan would be released in stages. The first phase would amount to US$3 billion, but it would be divided into three payments. In November 1997, the IMF released the first payment of US$1 billion.

As stated earlier, Soeharto's children had deeply intruded into all lucrative contracts and monopolies. The IMF targeted several of them to be dismantled, "including the clove monopoly and a national car monopoly run by his son, Tommy, the power station contract to his daughter, Tutut, and banking licences to other sons [Bambang]".[12] Soon after the signing of the agreement with the IMF, sixteen banks were declared insolvent; one of them belonging to Soeharto's son while a few others were connected to him.[13] These insolvent banks were supposed to be closed down but soon after the announcement, Soeharto's son (Bambang) was allowed to purchase another bank in order to do business as usual. In other words, despite the agreement, Soeharto's children managed to find ways to continue their business.

The IMF conditions requiring the dismantling of monopolies run by Soeharto's children were ignored. This did not go well with the IMF, especially with the U.S. Congress. The Soeharto

government did not only continue to protect his children, it also resisted the lifting of subsidies for basic food and commodities required by the IMF as these measures would cause further price hikes and, in turn, worsen the socio-political situation. Due to Soeharto's resistance to the implementation of reforms, the IMF delayed the release of the subsequent payment.[15] The payment was supposed to be made in March 1998 but was only given to Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto.

From the onset of the monetary crisis, social unrest intensified, and anti-Chinese riots became more frequent. Ethnic Chinese traders, perceived to be economically successful, were made the targets of mobs. The riots started in small towns in Central and East Java before spreading to Sulawesi, West Java, and Sumatra in early 1998. Protests against the hike of food prices and basic commodities were the major factor behind the disturbances. University students in Java and the Outer Islands staged demonstrations demanding that the government introduce both economic and political reforms. They even demanded that Soeharto step down.

In an attempt to bring some immediate relief, in February 1998, Soeharto planned to establish a Currency Board to boost the value of the rupiah, pegging the currency at around Rp5,000 to US$1 — but the idea was quickly dropped. Many economists argued that this was unrealistic as the Indonesian monetary system was ailing. Indonesian foreign reserves were low (US$14–17 billion) and foreign debt amounted to US$137.4 billion in early 1998.[16] Both the United States and the IMF opposed the proposal, urging Indonesia to concentrate on IMF mandated reforms. Eventually, fearing the drastic impact of an Indonesian collapse for the region, the IMF and the United States negotiated with Indonesia, giving in on the subsidies for basic food, commodities and medicine, at least temporarily.

However, Soeharto appeared to be unaware of the seriousness of the Indonesian political problem triggered by the economic crisis. In March, he announced a new "crony" Cabinet with his daughter, Tutut, as the Social Minister and his golf partner Mohamad "Bob" Hasan (also known as The Kian Seng) as the Trade and Industry Minister. Habibie, his Vice-President, was a

long-trusted member of Soeharto's Cabinet but a controversial figure because of his close association with Soeharto and his high-cost, high-tech projects like the building of aeroplanes.[17] Soeharto was so confident that when the students and critics demanded that he introduce reform, he replied that it would be done only in the year 2003! He also thought that he would be able to control the situation after the removal of substantive fuel and electricity subsidies on 1 May 1998.

The price of gasoline increased from Rp600 to Rp1,200 per litre. Food prices rose immediately after the removal of the fuel subsidies. Students in the Sumatran city of Medan rioted. On 11 May 1998, Soeharto, who was still very confident, flew to Cairo to attend the G-15 Summit of non-aligned leaders. During his absence, large demonstrations developed. During this time, the split within the military became more obvious. One group appeared to favour a hard line solution while the other appeared to be more tolerant. (This will be discussed again later in this chapter.) Initially, the hard line group had the upper hand. On 12 May, four students from Trisakti, a private university in Jakarta, were killed by the Army Special Forces.[18] The following day, the unemployed, workers, the urban poor, and even gangsters joined the students in massive demonstrations in Jakarta.[19] Intellectuals also supported the students, demanding immediate economic and political reforms, and asking Soeharto to step down. Peaceful demonstrations developed into major riots on 13 and 14 May. Soeharto shortened his stay in Cairo and flew home in the morning of 15 May, promising reforms but still refusing to step down. (I will return to the May 1998 riots later as they were the turning point of the Soeharto regime.)

The situation in Jakarta rapidly deteriorated as burning, looting, and killing took place. Ethnic Chinese were again the target of the mobs, causing many to flee the country. The situation got out of control. Foreign countries began to evacuate their citizens, deepening the sense of crisis. Demonstrations and riots occurred nation-wide. There were rumours that students and the opposition would lead a nation-wide demonstration on 20 May, National Awakening Day. On 17 May, Amien Rais, a "radical" Muslim and leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim

association in Indonesia, announced that he would organize a National Awakening Day demonstration.

On 18 May, Harmoko, Soeharto's loyalist who was also the Speaker of the House (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) as well as of the Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) shocked the country by demanding that Soeharto step down. Harmoko was accompanied by Lieutenant-General (retired) Syarwan Hamid, then Minister for Home Affairs, when making the announcement. General Wiranto, chief of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) and Minister for Defence and Security, called it "illegal",[20] and Soeharto sought to fight back. On the evening of 18 May, Soeharto invited nine moderate/conservative Islamic leaders to his residence and asked for their support — non-Muslims were not invited. These Muslim leaders were Abdurrahman Wahid (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU), Ahmad Bagdja (NU), Ma'aruf Amin (NU), Emha Ainun Najib (Muslim intellectual/writer), Dr Nurcholish Madjid (Muslim intellectual), Ali Yafie (Head of Majelis Ulama Indonesia), Prof Malik Fadjar (Muhammadiyah), K. H. Cholil Baidawi (Muslimin Indonesia), and Sumargono (Muhammadiyah).[21]

The invitation of these nine Islamic leaders was symbolic and had cultural significance among Indonesians. There is a well-known Javanese legend of nine Muslim preachers known as the "nine saints" or *wali songo* who were responsible for the spread of Islam in Java. It was not a co-incidence that Soeharto, as a Javanese ruler, played up this myth again. He wanted to gain the Muslim support at that critical moment and accepted the suggestion of these moderate Islamic leaders to form the *Komite Reformasi* (Reform Committee). He promised reforms and a new general election within one and a half years but meanwhile he wanted to hang on to his presidency by forming his *Reformasi* Cabinet to buy time — but the Cabinet did not materialize.

The Fall of Soeharto

On 20 May 1998, the Indonesian Parliament declared it would impeach Soeharto if he did not step down by 23 May. On the evening of 20 May, fourteen of his ministers, led by Ginanjar

Kartasasmita, then Co-ordinating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry, tendered their resignation as they were not prepared to join the reshuffled Cabinet,[22] thus indicating that they no longer supported Soeharto. There was also an unconfirmed report that ABRI head, Wiranto, advised Soeharto to resign.[23] On 21 May 1998, Soeharto agreed to step down. He made a brief speech telling the Indonesian people that under the present situation, it was "very difficult to perform the tasks of government and [to promote] development of the country anymore". He therefore decided to resign (*berhenti*) from the presidency.[24]

Since 1997, Soeharto had talked of *lengser ke prabon*, a Javanese *wayang* term referring to a Javanese king withdrawing himself from the worldly matters to enter a rich spiritual world. But there was no indication that he really wanted to give up power. What were the reasons for his sudden change of mind?

Three factors were important. First, Soeharto realized that the military was no longer solidly behind him. This could be seen from the soft attitude of some military officers towards the students, especially when the students marched to occupy the Parliament building. The military displayed no willingness to crush the students. Wiranto, his trusted general, eventually lent his support to those asking Soeharto to resign.

Second, when closest associates such as Harmoko and other Cabinet ministers asked him to resign, he suddenly realized that he had been abandoned. Many individuals shifted their support to Habibie, and Habibie was also very eager to take over the helm from him. Perhaps Soeharto felt a deep sense of betrayal. He was suddenly standing alone.

Third, on 20 May, twenty-four hours before Soeharto's resignation, Madeleine Albright, American Secretary of State, openly stated that the Clinton administration wanted Soeharto to resign.[25]

The situation developed very quickly as both the economic and political crises deepened. Social upheaval appeared to be beyond government control. "Student power" was also a contributing factor.[26] The movement was nation-wide and the students also had the support of their teachers.[27] Soeharto had no other option but to give up his power.

At this juncture, a question could be asked as to whether the

fall of Soeharto was also due to the IMF reform programmes. Was there a hidden agenda in the IMF programme? Steve Hanke, for instance, was of the view that the IMF prescribed the wrong measures in demanding that Indonesia remove subsidies for food and fuels which resulted in deepening the crisis. But most important was the refusal of the IMF to let Indonesia adopt the Currency Board system to stabilize the rupiah. Hanke maintained that the primary intention of the IMF was not to help Soeharto but to remove him.[28]

Hanke's view may be extreme but there was no doubt that the IMF programme contributed to the fall of the authoritarian regime of Soeharto. Many Indonesians who were critical of "foreign intervention" were questioning the effectiveness of the programme in solving the Indonesian economic crisis.[29] In fact, the IMF programme of dismantling monopolies jeopardized the interests of the first family and his cronies. But without breaking these monopolies the economic situation would not improve, as international confidence would not be restored. Soeharto had no alternative but to accept the IMF conditions. Nevertheless, he refused to implement them seriously. When the IMF saw that Soeharto was not serious about the reforms, it withheld the second instalment of the loan, forcing Soeharto to comply.

The IMF requirements included cutting back and removing subsidies for basic food and fuels. It was unlikely for the IMF not to realize that this would result in price hikes and, thus, would deepen the socio-political crisis. One analyst commented that fuels and other basic subsidies were Soeharto's last defence.[30] However, the IMF insisted that "fuel prices in Indonesia were far below the international prices" and should be increased to improve the economic situation. The IMF only agreed to release the second instalment after Jakarta raised fuel and electricity prices.[31] This resulted in increased opposition and violence, reaching a point of no return.

Habibie: President in Transition

After resigning, Soeharto appointed his Vice-President, B. J. Habibie, as President. Some have questioned whether this was

legal without the approval of the Assembly (MPR, or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) as Soeharto was answerable to the MPR. The pro-Soeharto group argued that under extraordinary circumstances this was acceptable. According to Soeharto, Habibie was supposed to rule Indonesia for the rest of Soeharto's term (1998–2003). Many, however, saw him as a transitional President. Opposition groups considered Habibie to be a Soeharto man and, hence did not meet the aspirations of the Indonesian people. They wanted an immediate general election, and the election of a new President. Habibie responded by planning to hold an early extraordinary session of the MPR, and a general election in the following year. The opposition felt that this was too long, but the military, led by Wiranto, appeared to support Habibie's MPR and general election schedule.

Habibie's government was considered an extension of the New Order. His Cabinet included sixteen ministers who had served under Soeharto. He himself had been handpicked by Soeharto. The positions of Minister for Defence and Security and Chief of the Armed Forces continued to be held by General Wiranto, also a man selected by Soeharto. The overall structure of the government was little changed, in that the majority of MPR and DPR members were still those who had been appointed during Soeharto's time. Habibie even succeeded in replacing the MPR and DPR members, who were critical of Soeharto and himself, with his own people.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that the system of government remained totally unchanged. The upheaval which led to the fall of Soeharto unleashed new social forces. Students and the Indonesian Muslim groups became very militant and outspoken. The indigenous middle class, although small in number, had joined in the demand for *reformasi* (reform). There was a call for a more democratic political system and the immediate reduction of food prices. Many radicals even asked Habibie to step down at once. Habibie faced a new situation which required him to be more responsive towards opposition groups.

The Military

The fall of Soeharto also witnessed a decline in the role of the military. This decline can be attributed to the Indonesian military's

conduct before and after Habibie became President, and the publicity given to this in 1998. Indonesians became aware that the military (ABRI, now known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) had been involved in the kidnapping and killing of civilians who were suspected to be against the New Order regime. Some of the military members were involved in the killing of students who staged demonstrations. The military was also held responsible for the riots and subsequent looting in May 1998, as they were conspicuously absent during those crucial days. The media and human rights groups focused on the military's brutal suppression of ethnic minorities in Irian Jaya, East Timor, and Aceh during the previous twenty years. These incidents tarnished the image of the military and strengthened public distrust of it. ABRI could no longer claim its traditional moral authority.

The decline in the power of the military was also due to the continued split within ABRI. There had been divisions that were fully exploited by Soeharto so that the generals could not unite against him. The main split was between generals along the lines of what is broadly referred to as "nationalist" and "Islamic". In 1993, Benny Moerdani — known as the leader of "the nationalist group" — was purged. After this, the military leadership remained divided. By early 1998 the main group — identified as "Islamic" — was led by Major-General Prabowo Subianto (head of KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Reserve Command, and Soeharto's son-in-law) and Feisal Tanjung (Armed Forces Chief from 1993 to March 1998). It was an open secret that Prabowo had been very close to a number of Islamic radical groups, including the militia group known as the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Islam (KISDI, or the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World). The rival "nationalist" faction was led by General Wiranto (who in March 1998 succeeded Feisal Tanjung as head of the Armed Forces, and was also appointed Minister for Defence and Security). Soeharto had overall control over these groups. After Soeharto's resignation, a third pro-reform group emerged, led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (then Chief of the Socio-Political Section of the Armed Forces). In the contest for influence that followed, Wiranto used his position to remove Prabowo from his KOSTRAD post.

The fall of Prabowo was surrounded by controversy. The rise

of the student movement and their opposition to the Soeharto regime had angered many pro-Soeharto generals. The Special Forces Command (Kopassus) which was led by Prabowo had abducted student activists. Many disappeared and never returned. It is possible that Soeharto wanted to use the military — probably the Prabowo group — to create some minor incidents so that he would be able to "justify instituting martial law" to prolong his control.[32] According to the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta or TGPF) set up after Soeharto's fall and the bloody May 1998 riots to investigate the violation of human rights in Indonesia, the preparation for the riots had started from the "level of the highest decision-making people".[33] Many writers, including Stefan Eklof, maintain that:

> This wording implies that President Soeharto was involved and that he had ordered the operation in order to justify the use of the special powers which had been granted to him by the MPR two months earlier.[34]

By this interpretation, the May riots in Jakarta and elsewhere were believed to have been masterminded by Soeharto and executed by the Prabowo group. It is also interesting to note that Prabowo later complained to his father, Professor Soemitro, that he was victimized by the President.[35] Although the context of the complaint was on his removal from the army, it is related to the series of events prior to the fall of Soeharto, for which Prabowo was blamed.

A second interpretation on the May riots also focuses on a conflict between the Prabowo and the Wiranto groups.[36] According to this theory, the Jakarta Commander Safrie Syamsuddin, a close friend of Prabowo, and the Jakarta Police refused to act on 13 and 14 May, thus allowing looting, raping, killing, and arson to take place to embarrass Wiranto.[37] It is also interesting to note that Wiranto was out of Jakarta during the riots.

Prabowo's involvement in the Jakarta riots is still unclear but his involvement in ordering the kidnapping of student and political activists did become apparent. It was one of the offences which led to his trial in August 1998 where he was found guilty of being involved in illegal activities, and eventually dismissed from

military service. Nevertheless, the culprits of the May 1998 shootings and rioting remained at large.

The third interpretation of the May 1998 riots was that some Indonesian élites collaborated with the military, with the intention of driving away the ethnic Chinese, especially Chinese traders, so that the vacuum could be filled by the non-Chinese.[38]

The Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) Report, which was dated 23 October 1998, shows that the May 1998 riots appeared to have identifiable patterns which implicated the Indonesian military, especially the Prabowo group, as he was most active before the riots and stood to benefit from the situation.

The military was placed on the defensive after the fall of Soeharto. Many civilian politicians wanted to abolish the socio-political role (i.e., the dual function or *dwifungsi*) of the Armed Forces. ABRI itself also wanted to "redefine" its role. In late September 1998 a military seminar was held in Bandung to discuss the role of ABRI. Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, suggested that the term *dwifungsi* (dual function) be changed to *Peran ABRI* (Role of ABRI), a more neutral term.[39] Nevertheless, the military refused to abandon the concept of *dwifungsi*. Although the same concept has been retained, there was paradigm shift, signifying the decline of military strength. The official report of ABRI[40] stated that there is a "new paradigm" regarding the role of the Indonesian military. It would change from the concept of occupying (*menduduki*) to influencing (*mempengaruhi*), from influencing directly to influencing indirectly. It also said that ABRI is ready to engage in political role-sharing with other components of the nation.[41]

The decline of the military role in politics can also be seen in its decision to be separate from the Police Force as of 1 April 1999. On 31 March 1999, Wiranto announced that as the Police Force would henceforth be a separate entity, the Indonesian military would now consist of three forces: the Army, Navy, and Air Force. He also argued that the Indonesian name of the Armed Forces would be changed from ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Armed Forces) starting from 1 April 1999.[42] TNI was the name used during the Indonesian revolution when the military

played both security and political roles. The change of name at this time had political significance as pointed out by researchers at LIPI (Indonesian Academy of Sciences) — "through appealing for historical legitimacy, the military sought to reinforce its socio-political role".[43]

Nevertheless, the military's role in the economy remained unchanged. Military-linked businesses and companies were many[44] and remained untouched after the fall of Soeharto. In fact, the military-owned businesses had been the backbone of the military's power. With these independent sources of funds, the generals have not only been able to live comfortably but have also been able to finance their political activities.

Habibie's Regime

Habibie continued to be in coalition with the military. While co-operating with Wiranto, Habibie also had his own military supporters. General Feisal Tanjung and Major-General Maulani, head of Bakin (Military Intelligence), were identified as his men. Before the 1999 general election, the struggle between various groups was still evident.

Although some Muslim groups and the mainstream in ABRI supported the Habibie regime, the students and many party leaders did not. They perceived the Habibie regime as a continuation of Soeharto's political arm. When the MPR held a Special Session on 10 to 13 November 1998, the opposition, especially the students, continued to pressure the MPR to incorporate their demands into the resolutions. However, the Habibie government was determined to ensure that the session would not be disrupted. Regular troops were mobilized. But most controversial was the government's creation of the "self-made security forces" (*pengamanan swakarsa*) to "safeguard" the MPR Special Session. These "civilian security forces" consisted of pro-government youths, including hooligans who were hired. In fact, radical groups, such as KISDI which was linked to the military, were often mobilized for street demonstrations even during the end of the Soeharto rule and immediately after his fall.

The use of militia to achieve political goals is often called

premanisme politik or "political gangsterism". This type of militia or para-military group was not actually new, as it had developed during the end of the Soeharto era and became conspicuous after his fall. Such militia groups were either organized by the Indonesian military itself or by political parties/groups. They were used to attain specific political goals. Recruitment of members of the militia became easier when there were economic hardship and a high rate of youth unemployment. Apart from the military-sponsored group such as KISDI, political parties also had their own organizations: the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party) had its Pelopor Banser, Amien Rais and his central axis (*poros tengah*) had Laskar Bulan Sabit Indonesia (LBSI).[45] The PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) had Satgas Wirapati and the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) had Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah.[46] Golkar (Golongan Karya) had the Pemuda Pancasila and Habibie had the Forum Umat Islam Bersatu (FUIB), which included twenty-three militia groups (Laskar).[47]

"Political gangsterism" became a characteristic of Indonesian politics during the Soeharto and immediate post-Soeharto era. Political gangsterism involves violence which often frightens political opponents. It seems that the strength of these militia groups grew in accordance with the position of the political parties concerned. During the Soeharto era, Pemuda Pancasila was a powerful weapon used by Soeharto and Golkar to serve their political interests. During Habibie's time, however, the FUIB and Laskar were strong. When Abdurrahman assumed the presidency, Banser became prominent.

As Habibie moved to legitimize his regime by calling the Special Session of the MPR, anti-Habibie and anti-military students began nation-wide demonstrations. In Jakarta, students wanted to march to the MPR/DPR building but were stopped by the troops. The Army also mobilized "civilian guards" to safeguard the Special Session. The Habibie militia groups were in action, leading to clashes between the students on one side and the militia and civilian supporters of the government on the other. The military also moved in to suppress the students.

The students' strategy was to join forces with other opposition groups to pressure the Habibie government to step down. In fact, soon after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesian students in West Java, including Jakarta, formed the Communication Forum of the Students Senate Jakarta, which focused on inviting eminent reformists to form a presidium to take over from Habibie. This transition government would be assigned to prepare the general election.

The reformists, however, were far from united, and failed to co-ordinate their activities. Only on 10 November 1998 (the day the Special Session started) was the Communication Forum able to arrange for four major reform leaders — Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati, Amien Rais, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X — to discuss the nation's future at Wahid's residence in Ciganjur. These four eminent leaders issued the eight-point declaration — later known as the Ciganjur Declaration — demanding a clean and democratic government based on the 1945 Constitution, in order to preserve unity and to realize a prosperous society.[48] Four points were crucial:

- Immediate implementation of an honest and fair general election. The general election was considered a democratic way to end the transitional government led by Habibie. Three months after the May 1999 general election, a new government would have to be formed through a General Session of Parliament;
- Removal of ABRI's dual function by stages, to be completed in six years;
- Sincere efforts to end KKN (*korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme* or corruption, collusion, and nepotism), preceded by an investigation of Soeharto's wealth;
- Immediate dissolution of all "self-made security forces" of the MPR Special Session.

However, this reformist group refused to form a presidium to take over the government, as there was no strong legal basis for it. Radical students decided to continue their demonstrations, which put strong pressure on the MPR session. They demanded the immediate trial of Soeharto and the end of ABRI's dual function. The students gathered in the universities near the MPR/DPR

building and eventually came into conflict with the civilian security guards and the troops. In the two-day conflict, 253 people were wounded and five others were killed. One of those who were killed was a student from the Atma Jaya Catholic University.[49] The mob joined the students. Looting, arson, and chaos occurred again, reminiscent of the May 1998 riots. The situation in Jakarta became very tense and the MPR session ended under the shadow of these November 1998 riots.

The MPR resolutions took into account the student demands in three of twelve resolutions, although they still fell short of what the students asked for.[50] The investigation on Soeharto and his cronies was included as a clause in one of the resolutions but it was not as an independent resolution on its own. The political role of ABRI would be reduced in stages. The Pancasila would no longer be recognized as the sole ideological foundation of the state. The resolution on ABRI and the Pancasila have a profound impact on the politics of the post-Soeharto era. ABRI's future role will be restricted and it is difficult for the military to be as dominant as in the past. The resolutions also make the position of the Pancasila ambiguous. Islam is no longer prohibited as a political ideology. Islamic political parties are accepted and will compete with the Pancasila parties for power. Indonesia entered an era which is similar to the pro-Soeharto period.

After the 13 November 1998 riot, the situation in Indonesia became even more unstable. Student demonstrations continued and the authorities appeared unable to curtail them. In addition, the assassination of many Muslim leaders linked to the NU took place in Banyuwangi in East Java. Religious conflict escalated. The Ketapang Incident (22 November 1998) in Jakarta originating from a territorial conflict between gangster groups developed into a religious conflict.[51] Churches were burned down and this was followed by the burning down of mosques in Kupang, West Timor, then the burning of more churches in Sulawesi. Responsible religious leaders came together and appealed to the masses to be calm and not to destroy religious buildings, but to preserve the unity of the country. Abdurrahman Wahid even argued that if this was not controlled, a social revolution might result.

These ethnic and religious conflicts may have been engineered

as diversions from pressing issues at hand. Student radicals and other anti-Soeharto groups wanted Habibie to investigate Soeharto's wealth. Under constant pressure, he was eventually forced to instruct Andi Ghalib, the Attorney General, to act on this, but no significant results emerged. Students demonstrated again in December 1998, demanding that the government investigate Soeharto's wealth, but the Habibie government appeared to be reluctant to do so. Conflicts subsequently erupted between pro-Soeharto and anti-Soeharto groups.

Religion and the State

In the last decade of Soeharto's rule, there had been an increase in ethnic/religious conflicts. A survey in *Tempo* is quite indicative.[52] In the first fourteen years of Indonesian independence, only two churches were destroyed, presumably by Muslims. But during the Soeharto era, the number increased remarkably. Between 1965 and 1997 (over a period of thirty-one years), 398 churches were either burnt down or destroyed. But between 1995 and 1997 alone, 131 churches were burnt down, illustrating greater frequency of sectarian conflict towards the end of Soeharto's rule.

Although the reasons for this religious conflict are complex, the perceived threat posed by the non-Muslim community and Muslim dissatisfaction towards Soeharto's political policy should not be ignored. Another important factor is the weakening of government control. The number of mosques destroyed has always been very small as non-Muslims form a relatively weak minority. However, the non-Muslim minority (mostly Christians) have also responded, hence the destruction of some mosques.

Islam as the majority religion in Indonesia had been cultivated by the Soeharto regime since the late 1980s to counterbalance the *abangan* and Christian military group. With the resurgence of Islam worldwide, the Muslims in Indonesia also became more confident and began to reassert their role. Islamic identity has been increasingly highlighted. In every public function, Muslims demonstrate their Islamic identity by saying grace in Arabic. The wearing of Muslim attire has also been increasingly encouraged.

As a result, there is a heightened religious identity and consciousness. The establishment of the Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or ICMI) in December 1990 — endorsed by Soeharto and led by Habibie — was a symbolic triumph for Islam in politics.

However, not all Muslims supported ICMI. Abdurrahman Wahid of NU, for example, had been a leading critic of ICMI. In fact, Muslims continued to be split between the moderates and the radicals, the former continuing to accept the Pancasila (read: religious pluralism) as the state ideology, while the latter favoured a Muslim state (Islam as a state religion), if not an Islamic state (a state based on Islamic law). After Soeharto changed his policy towards Islam in 1989, Islam as a religious and political force grew rapidly. Many began to question the Pancasila as the sole ideology for mass and political organizations. As a result, at the Special Session of the MPR under President Habibie in November 1998, the law on the Pancasila as the sole ideology was abolished.

This does not mean that the Pancasila as a state philosophy has been abandoned, but the Pancasila is no longer imposed on mass organizations and political parties. The PPP, for instance, in a congress held in November/December 1998, decided to revert back to Islam as the ideology of the party, and readopt the Kaaba as the symbol of the party.[53] Islam as a socio-political force has been used again, this time not by the opposition, but by the new authority. An influential Jakarta magazine, *Tajuk*, in an article stated that the first two Presidents (Sukarno and Soeharto) did not use Islam as its foundation but Habibie is the first President who used Islam as his political base. The view is extreme but it is true that Islam had been used by Habibie to support his regime. The number of Islam-based parties suddenly increased.[54]

As a result of the resurgence of Islam, and its use by Indonesian politicians, religious conflict drastically increased. Abdurrahman Wahid of the NU was concerned with the situation and urged Indonesians of various religious persuasions to get together to maintain Indonesian unity. He also warned that the Pancasila should not be "politicized" for the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. He urged the Habibie government to pursue national reconciliation through dialogue to stop a social revolution.

However, his appeal was initially ignored by the government. General Feisal Tanjung even said that no such dialogue was needed because it was difficult to identify who would really represent the people. He suggested that this should be done only after the general election of 1999. Any move made by an opposition leader could have been seen as a move to gain votes for the forthcoming election.

Habibie continued to use the religious factor in order to survive. While paying lip-service to the Pancasila, he also projected himself as a Muslim leader. He selected many ministers with strong Muslim backgrounds — some even known as anti-minority religions. For instance, Dr A. M. Syaefuddin, the Agriculture Minister, commented that people from a minority religion cannot become the President of Indonesia.[55] He also claimed that Megawati was a Hindu, and therefore unsuitable to be the President. His statements angered Balinese who demanded his public apology and resignation. Syaefuddin reluctantly apologized but refused to step down. He continued to receive Habibie's support. However, he was defeated by Hamzah Haz of NU, who was Minister for Investment in Habibie's Cabinet, in the contest for the new PPP chairmanship.[56] The PPP could ill afford to have a controversial figure if it wanted to do well in the June 1999 election.

Syaefuddin's comments were part of a broader, concerted attack on Megawati. The government continued to support the Soerjadi faction of the PDI and refused to acknowledge Megawati as the legitimate leader of the party, so that Megawati's influence could be undermined. Pro-Habibie Muslim groups even met and declared that the Indonesian President and Vice-President could not be women as this was against Islamic law.

Regional Unrest

Ethnic as well as religious conflict escalated in the post-Soeharto period. Separatist movements in three provinces — East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh — made international headlines. East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1976, was never recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesian territory. In June 1998, East Timorese students and youths began to stage

demonstrations, demanding a referendum on the independence of their province. Habibie rejected the demand but offered limited autonomy to the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. He was also prepared to release Xanana Gusmao, the leader of Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente or Revolutionary Front for Independent Timor), in exchange for international recognition of East Timor. Affected by continuing conflict in East Timor, Indonesia eventually agreed to talk to Portugal, the former master of East Timor. The two countries decided to hold in-depth discussions on Indonesia's proposals for a "special status, based on a wide-ranging autonomy" for East Timor.[57]

In Irian Jaya, students and youths also made use of the *reformasi* era to stage their demands. The Irianese had suffered injustice under Indonesian rule for some years. It was reported that between 13,000 and 80,000 Irianese had been killed since 1969.[58] Government resources were unevenly distributed and most Irianese continued to live below the poverty line. In early July 1998, the protesters hoisted the separatist West Papuan flag. One person was killed by the police. In the next few days, more flag-hoisting events took place, resulting in further conflict between the Irianese and the police. Up to seven Irianese were killed. Wiranto considered hoisting a non-Indonesian flag as an act of treachery that could not be tolerated.[59] However, there were Irianese leaders who sought autonomy rather than complete independence. They wanted to have "one nation, two systems". Since Irian Jaya is recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesian territory, it is more difficult for them to gain independence.

The Aceh independent movement also re-emerged at the time when the power of the central government was declining. The issue of independence for Aceh is rooted in its colonial history. The people of Aceh, who are staunch Muslims, resisted Dutch colonialists for almost a hundred years and Aceh was the last area to be conquered. During the 1945 revolution, the Acehnese supported the Indonesian independence movement but gradually changed their attitude after Indonesia gained political sovereignty. Apart from socio-religious differences, the anti-Jakarta attitude was largely due to the hegemonic control policy introduced by the

central government. Initially Aceh was given the status of a province but in 1951 this status was abolished, resulting in the downgrading of the Acehnese leaders, the disbanding of Division X which was predominantly an Acehnese unit of the Indonesian army, and the suspension of the right to trade directly with Singapore and Penang.[60] The local leader, Daud Beureueh, started a movement to seek autonomy but in 1953 it became a separatist movement. He proclaimed Aceh as part of the Indonesian Islamic State. His troops held many urban centres until 1954 but the rebellion eventually failed. Jakarta employed soft and hard strategies and in 1957 the Sukarno government restored the status of province to Aceh and appointed a moderate Acehnese as governor. Using military operations and employing a divide and rule policy towards the Acehnese, the rebellion was eventually crushed. But during Soeharto's New Order, Jakarta again reintroduced a domination policy and exploited the resources of Aceh, giving rise to the new Acehnese independent movement. But when the central government was strong, the movement was easily suppressed.

Compared with the East Timorese and Irianese, the Acehnese in general have been better integrated into the Republic of Indonesia.[61] Nevertheless, similar to the situation in Irian Jaya, the uneven distribution of government resources and the harsh policies adopted by the central government have always been a problem in the central–periphery relationships. However, on 25 August 1998 there was a shocking revelation that between 1989 and 1998 when Aceh was treated as a Special Military Operation, 781 people (presumably Acehnese) had been killed, 163 people had disappeared, and 368 people had been tortured.[62] Public outcry forced the military to apologize to the Acehnese people and reduce its presence in Aceh as well as in Timor. However, conflict between the Acehnese and the military continued resulting in many casualties. Military–civilian relations in Aceh remained tense.

Because of these tensions in Indonesia's unitary system of government, some scholars and politicians suggested the introduction of a federal system to halt the process of disintegration. The Habibie government appeared disinterested.

The Chinese Minority

The ethnic Chinese experienced traumatic and tragic events on 13–14 May 1998 when they were targeted for lootings, arson, and gang rape. Those who could afford to go overseas fled the country. It was reported that about 150,000 people left Indonesia during the May riots, of which 70,000 are believed to be ethnic Chinese.[63] (If the figure is accurate, this means that only 1.2 per cent of the Chinese population left the country.) Many indigenous Indonesians condemned the barbaric acts. There was also an international outcry pressuring the Indonesian Government to investigate the matters and punish those who committed the crimes. Under international and domestic pressure, on 22 July 1998, Habibie eventually announced his decision to form a committee, the Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF), to investigate the violation of human rights in Indonesia, not only for the Chinese community but for all Indonesians. Since the composition of the committee was mixed — including people from the government, military, and non-officials — understandably there were differences of opinion. The Team's report, which was scheduled for release in three months, was delayed a week — it was only released on 3 November 1998.[64] It stated that fifty-two women had been raped although other sources believe that the number was far higher.[65] It found no proof that the riots and rapes had been planned or that ethnic Chinese, who formed the majority of the victims, were specially targeted. The government firmly denied that there was any organized terrorism against the Chinese, although independent reports pointed in that direction.[66]

There have been many theories seeking to explain the terrorism against the ethnic Chinese. One theory argues that the Chinese were terrorized so that all of them would leave Indonesia. The economic role of the Chinese businessmen would then be taken over by the *pribumi*. Of course, this theory is very naive. But the terror indeed frightened Chinese Indonesians and many fled the country, taking their family and capital with them. Many migrated to neighbouring countries; Singapore, Australia, and the United States were their favourite destinations, followed by Malaysia

where the cost of living was lower. Some even sent their children to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China just to escape the turmoil. Nevertheless, the majority of Chinese Indonesians — more than 98 per cent — had nowhere to go, and had to stay and fight for their rights.

Following the fall of Soeharto, three "ethnic Chinese parties" were formed: Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (PARTI), Partai Pembauran Indonesia (Parpindo) and Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI). Parpindo, however, was dissolved not long after its establishment due partly to a leadership conflict. Many Chinese leaders felt that their safety and prosperity could only be guaranteed if they formed an alliance with indigenous Indonesians. Not surprisingly, many ethnic Chinese leaders joined new political parties, despite the future uncertainty.

Poverty

The Chinese exodus made Indonesian economic recovery more difficult. The Indonesian authorities urged Chinese Indonesians to return — both in person and with their capital. Although the majority returned, only a small part of their capital was brought back as business opportunities were bleak. Businessmen took a wait-and-see attitude, and would not reinvest their money unless they were sure of a good return. Habibie's ambiguous attitude towards the ethnic Chinese also contributed to the uncertainty. Soon after the May riots, Habibie visited Chinatown and urged the Chinese to continue to help stabilize the situation. But in July 1998 he told the *Washington Post* that he did not care whether the Chinese returned — if they did not return, their role would be taken over by others. He also noted that Indonesia "will not die" without the Chinese.[67]

Under Habibie, the Indonesian economy showed some improvement, particularly in the slowing of inflation and the stabilization of the rupiah *vis-à-vis* the U.S. dollar. When Habibie became Vice-President, the rupiah plunged to Rp17,000 per dollar. However, after Habibie was made President, he extended full co-operation to the IMF, resulting in the resumption of the IMF assistance. The rupiah stabilized, then improved to the level of

Rp8,000 per U.S. dollar by December 1998. However, the banking system did not improve as the new bankruptcy law was not passed. Although Indonesia had closed sixteen banks considered insolvent and fifty-four banks were placed under the supervision of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), Indonesia still had to restructure private debts. Reform in the monetary system was slow. Without drastic reform in the political arena, economic recovery was unlikely.

The pro-Habibie group argued that inflation had been slowed. There was no shortage of basic food in the short term, but the long-term problem had not been solved. The general performance of the Indonesian economy was poor. In 1998, the Indonesian economy contracted between 13 and 15 per cent, the largest since Indonesia's independence. Most serious was the problem of poverty. In the last two years of Soeharto's rule, the number of people who lived below the poverty line increased. After the fall of Soeharto, this rate accelerated. According to an Indonesian economist, at the end of 1996, about 28 million people lived below the poverty line. At the end of 1997, the number increased to 72 million, and in the first three months of 1998, the number reached 128 million, constituting 65 per cent of the population.[68]

Golkar Prepares

Although the pro-Habibie group insisted that the Habibie regime was legitimate, opposition groups saw him as a transitional figure who would soon have to give up power. In their view, Habibie's job was to oversee the smooth conduct of the general and presidential elections. The MPR Special Session had generated twelve resolutions, one of which stipulated that the general election would be held on 7 June 1999, while the presidential election would be held on 10 November 1999. (Opposition groups disagreed with the date for the Presidential Election, and it was later brought forward to 28 October 1999.)

The ruling party, Golkar, made its own electoral preparations. Simmering rivalries between one group wanting to make a party for retired generals, and another wanting a civilian party, came to a head at an extraordinary national congress on 9 to 11 July 1998.

General (retired) Edi Sudradjat, former Chief of Armed Forces, and Akbar Tanjung, then State Secretary, were competing for the top position. Akbar, who was supported by Habibie, won the election and became the new head of Golkar. General Wiranto was also in favour of Akbar as he did not want his former boss to become the leader. Some retired generals who were disappointed with Golkar left the organization. General Sudradjat later established a new party called the Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan. This extraordinary congress also saw the decline of Soeharto's influence in Golkar. The Supervisors' Council, headed by Soeharto, was abolished. Sons and daughters of Soeharto were also purged from the organization. In October, the new Golkar held a regular national congress and declared officially that Golkar was a political party, called Partai Golkar. A "new image" was thus being projected for Golkar to win the forthcoming election. Two other old parties and 145 new parties were also making preparations for the 1999 election.

Notes

1. This chapter is a revised version of my article entitled "A Year of Upheaval and Uncertainty: The Fall of Soeharto and Rise of Habibie", in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1999* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 111–27.
2. For a concise study of the crisis, see Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
3. Sachs in *Ascent* 7, no. 2 (April 1998): 1 (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore).
4. Ibid.
5. "Tujuan Utamanya Menyingkirkan Soeharto", *Tempo Interaktif: Menyusut Harta Cendana* (Jakarta: PDAT and Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1998), pp. 163–68.
6. Hill, *Indonesian Economy in Crisis*, p. 69.
7. Ibid., p. 70.
8. For the Indonesian foreign debt in the 1990s, see Arif Arryman, "Momentum untuk Keluar dari Perangkap Hutang Luar Negeri", *Mitra*, Jurnal Budaya dan Filsafat, no. 2 (August 1999), p. 7.
9. "Calls grow for return of 'Suharto trillions'", *Straits Times*, 31 May

1998. The article was based on the reports of the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times*. It seems that the amount was very high. Another source maintains that Soeharto's wealth was between $9 billion and $20 billion. Cited in Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 202. According to *Forbes*, "Suharto family, net worth: At least $4 billion, may be much more", *Forbes*, 6 July 1998, p. 54.

10. "Ulah Mereka yang Dilikuidasi", *Gatra*, 8 November 1997, pp. 30–31.
11. "IMF Menuang Bensin dalam Bara Api", *Tajuk* 1, no. 11 (23 July 1997), pp. 10–11.
12. Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000* (Singapore: Times Publishing, 2000), p. 313.
13. "Ulah Mereka yang Dilikuidasi", *Gatra*, pp. 30–31.
14. Lee Kuan Yew wrote in *From Third World to First* that he met Tutut on Christmas Day of 1997 and suggested to her and her siblings that it would be advisable if they "withdrew completely from the market and not engage in any projects" but to no effect (p. 311).
15. See Eric Altbach, "Suharto Challenges IMF Plan: Aid to Indonesia Delayed", *Japan Economic Institute (JEI) Weekly Review*, no. 10 (13 March 1998).
16. See "Tujuan Utamanya Menyingkirkan Soeharto", p. 163.
17. See "Dari Tutty Alawijah Sampai Mbak Tutut", *Gatra*, 21 March 1998, pp. 30–33.
18. For a study of the events which led to the death of four Trisakti students, see Rene L. Pattiradjawane, *Trisakti Mendobrak Tirani Orde Baru: Fakta dan Kesaksian Tragedi Berdarah* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1999). These four students — Hafidhin Royan, Elang Mulia Lesmana, Hery Hartanto and Hendriawan Sie — were later honoured as "*Pahlawan Reformasi*" (reform heroes). Hendriawan Sie was a Chinese Indonesian.
19. For a study of the student movement in 1998, see Ariobimo Nusantara, Masri Sareb Putra, and Y. B. Sudarmanto, *Aksi Mahasiswa Menuju Gerbang Reformasi* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1998).
20. "Suharto resign call 'illegal'", *Straits Times*, 19 May 1998.
21. In fact, these nine leaders are also known as "*Tim 9*" (Team-9). See Emha Ainun Nadjib, *Membuka Tabir Saat-Saat Terakhir Bersama Soeharto, 2, 5 Jam di Istana,* 2nd ed. (Yogyakarta: Zaituna Yogyakarta, 1998), p. 52ff. Although more than nine Muslim leaders were present, the core team constituted these nine men. Those who were present but excluded from the team were Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Soeharto's speechwriter and law professor at the University of Indonesia, and

Sutrisno Muhdam of Muhammadiyah. See Anas Urbaningrum, *Ranjau-Ranjau Reformasi: Potret Konflik Politik Pasca Kejatuhan Soeharto* (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo, 1999), p. 74; also S. Sinansari Ecip, *Kronologi Situasi Penggulingan Soeharto: Reportase Jurnalistik* (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1998), p. 99.

22. See "Detik-Detik Menjelang Pak Harto Berhenti", *Forum Keadilan*, 15 June 1998, pp. 22–24.
23. Stefan Eklof in his book argued that Wiranto did not ask Soeharto to resign. Soeharto made up his own mind in the morning of 20 May 1998 when his ministers resigned. See his *Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1966-98* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 1999), p. 212.
24. For the text of the speech, see Ecip, *Kronologi Situasi Penggulingan Soeharto*, pp. 136–39. For the English translation, see "Suharto: Why I am quitting", *Straits Times*, 22 May 1998.
25. "Madeleine Albright urges Suharto to resign now", *Straits Times*, 21 May 1998. In fact, in her speech at a training centre for US coast guards in New London, Connecticut, Albright did not use the word "resign". What she said was: "now he [Soeharto] has the opportunity for a historic act of statesmanship, one that will preserve his legacy as a man who not only led his country but who provided for its democratic transition." This is diplomatic code language used to say to a dictator that "it's time to effect the transition now".
26. The banned political party, Partai Rakyat Demokratik, led by Budiman Sudjatmiko, has a large following among university students and urban youths. Members of this party played a major role in organizing students' demonstration. I owe this point to Sukardi Rinakit. See also "PRD di Tengah Gerakan Mahasiswa", *D & R*, 14 December 1996, pp. 28–30.
27. For a discussion of the student movement during the 1998 call for reform, see Ricardi S. Adnan and Arvan Pradiansyah, "Gerakan Mahasiswa Untuk Reformasi", in *Kisah Perjuangan Reformasi*, edited by Selo Sumardjan (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999), pp. 133–96.
28. See "Tujuan Utamanya Menyingkirkan Soeharto", pp. 163–68.
29. "IMF Mengaku Salah", *Bisnis Indonesia*, 22 January 1999.
30. On the importance of the subsidies for the Soeharto regime, see "Benteng terakhir Pemerintah Adalah Subsidi BBM", *Tempo Interaktif: Soeharto, Akhirnya*, Vol. 8 (May-June 1998), pp. 45–48.
31. "IMF Menuang Bensin dalam Bara Api", pp. 10–11.
32. James T. Siegel, "Early Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998 in Jakarta", in *Indonesia*, no. 66 (October 1998), p. 87.

33. "Laporan Akhir Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Tanggal 13-15 Mei 1998". Cited in Stefan Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-98* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 1999), p. 195.
34. Ibid.
35. See *Sumitro Djojohadikusumo: Jejak Perlawanan Begawan Pejuang*, an authorized biography written by Aristedes Katoppo, Hendra Esmara, and Heru Cahyono (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), pp. 429–30.
36. Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis*, pp. 195–96.
37. The TGPF report stated that the Jakarta Commander "did not perform his task as he should have". "Laporan Akhir Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Tanggal 13-15 Mei 1998: Ringkasan Eksekutif, 23 Oktober 1998". (Photocopy), p. 23.
38. However, there was a slightly different version as given by Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis*, p. 196. He stated that the purpose was to drive "parts of the Chinese community out of the country and thus facilitating a redistribution of their businesses and other assets to non-Chinese Indonesians".
39. "Dwifungsi ABRI dihapus, diganti dengan 'Peran ABRI'", *Republika*, 21 September 1998; see also "ABRI lakukan redefinisi atas Doktrin Dwifungsi", *Media Indonesia*, 23 September 1998.
40. The official report was published on 5 October 1998 under the title "ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa".
41. For a discussion of this "new paradigm", see Harold Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations since May 1998", in *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, edited by Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), especially pp. 137–39. Crouch argues that ABRI's "new paradigm" was announced by Wiranto and was discussed in detail in the September seminar. For an Indonesian study of the declining role of ABRI, especially after the fall of Soeharto, see Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., *Tentara yang Gelisah (Hasil Penelitian YIPIKA Tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi)* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999).
42. "Pangab Usulkan ABRI Diubah Menjadi TNI", *Kompas*, 1 April 1999; "Editorial: Dari ABRI ke TNI", *Media Indonesia*, 6 October 1999.
43. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al., *Tentara Yang Gelisah*, p. 152.
44. For a detailed discussion of the military in business, see Indria Samego et al., *Bila ABRI Berbisnis: Buku Pertama yang menyingkap data dan kasus penyimpangan dalam praktek bisnis kalangan militer* (Bandung: Mizan, 1998).

45. *Premanisme Politik* (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1999), p. 61.
46. Ibid., p. 178.
47. Ibid., pp. 58–59.
48. "Empat Tokoh Reformasi Akhirnya Bertemu", *Kompas*, 11 November 1998.
49. "Tragedi di akhir SI MPR", *Kompas*, 14 November 1998.
50. "SI MPR 1998 Hasilkan 12 Ketetapan", *Suara Pembaruan*, 14 November 1998.
51. "Peristiwa Ketapang", *Suara Pembaruan*, 23 November 1998. Ketapang is the name of a street in Jakarta.
52. "Ketika Ika Menindas Bhinneka", *Tempo*, 14 December 1998, pp. 24–25.
53. "PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka'bah dan Asas Islam", *Suara Pembaruan*, 1 December 1998.
54. "Dilema Presiden Ketiga", *Tajuk*, 12 November 1998, p. 12: "Beraliansi atas nama umat", *Tajuk*, 12 November 1998, pp. 18–21.
55. "Menyoal Ucapan A. M. Syaefuddin", *Media Indonesia*, 1 November 1998.
56. "Muktamar Belum Tetapkan Tanda Gambar", *Kompas*, 1 December 1998; "Hamzah Ungguli A. M. Syaefuddin", *Suara Merdeka*, 1 December 1998.
57. "Indonesia, Portugal agree on East Timor Package", *Tempo Interaktif*, 6 August 1998.
58. These are the figures released by the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). The organization claimed that 13,000 people were killed, and in aerial bombardments a further 80,000 people were "massacred". Cited in Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 186. Another source quoted an even higher figure: 200,000 people were "eliminated" by the Indonesians over the period of thirty-five years. See *Tempo Interaktif*, 29 July 1998.
59. Jose Manuel Rizal, " A Rash of Flag-raising", *Asiaweek*, 17 July 1998.
60. For a study of Acehnese rebellion, see Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).
61. For Indonesian scholars' studies on various separatist movements in Indonesia, see Syamsuddin Haris, ed., *Indonesia diambang Perpecahan* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1999).
62. "TPF Komnas HAM gali kuburan massal di Aceh", *Suara Merdeka*, 25 August 1998.
63. Pronowo, Director General of Immigration, told the media that

between 14 and 20 May 1998, 152,363 people left Indonesia, of which 70,837 were Indonesian citizens. See *Tempo Interaktif*, 9 June 1998. Those citizens are assumed to be Indonesians of Chinese descent.

64. "Assessing the May Riots", *Asiaweek*, 13 November 1998. The TGPF report was submitted to the government on 23 October 1998 but the full report was not released. The government only released the 23-page summary of the report a week later as the findings were considered controversial by the military. See Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis*, p. 177.
65. The Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan (Volunteers Team For Humanity) reported that there were at least 152 rape and sexual abuse victims at Jakarta and its environs. See *The Rapes in the Series of Riots: The Climax of an Uncivilized Act of the Nation Life* (Early Documentation no. 3), July 1998, p. 8.
66. "Pola Kerusuhan di Jakarta dan Sekitarnya" (Dokumentasi Awal no. 1) in *Sujud di Hadapan Korban: Tragedi Jakarta Mei 1998* (Laporan Investigasi dan Analisa Data Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan) (Jakarta: Divisi Data Tim Relawan, 1998).
67. According to the *Jakarta Post* (22 July 1998) which republished Habibie's interview, Habibie made the following statement: "If the Chinese refused to return, do you really think that we will die? ... Their place will be taken by others."
68. Sjahrir, "Dampak Negatif Kontraksi: Sampai Hancurkan Kita?", *Warta Ekonomi*, 6 July 1998, p. 8. However, another source gives a lower figure: by the first half of 1998, 79.4 million people lived below the poverty line, constituting 39.1 per cent of the Indonesian population: "Astaga, Rakyat Miskin Meroket", *Forum Keadilan* 7, no. 8 (27 July 1998): 71.

4

The Search for Legitimacy and Democracy

Indonesia saw the emergence of new political parties after the fall of Soeharto. However, the old as well as the new parties could only hastily prepare for the 1999 general election in a new political situation. The military grip was loosened while new freedom was won. The government succeeded in preparing various laws to conduct a free and relatively fair election — the first democratic election after Soeharto's thirty-two-year authoritarian rule.

New Political Parties: Old Wine in New Bottle?

During the Soeharto regime, political activities were restricted. The number of political parties had been confined to three and they had to be approved by the government. After the fall of Soeharto, the restrictions (except on the PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party) were removed and people began to enjoy political freedom which they had been deprived of for more than thirty years. Responding to this newly found freedom, people started to organize themselves and form political parties. It was reported that 145 parties (aside from the three New Order parties) were formed or revived soon after Soeharto's fall.

These parties ranged from major parties such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) to obscure parties such as the Women's Party (Partai Perempuan), Youth Progressive Party (Partai Remaja dan Pemuda Progressive), Drivers Party (Partai Reformasi Sopir Sejahtera Indonesia), Peasants and Fishermen Party (Partai Kemakmuran Tani dan Nelayan), and Poor People's Alliance Party (Partai Aliansi Rakyat Miskin Indonesia).[1]

A large number of parties had no mass base and were created on the spur of the moment. Understandably, these parties did not even survive the first round of selection. Even those which succeeded in contesting the election — almost thirty parties altogether — did not get any seats in National (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) and Regional (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I, or DPRD I) Parliaments. These parties were often called the "Blur Parties" (*Partai Gurem*).

Many Islamic-oriented parties did not manage to contest the elections. Compared with the 1955 election when there were only four Islamic parties, on the eve of the 1999 election there was a sudden surge of such parties. Two of these medium-size parties were the Partai Keadilan (PK, or Justice Party) and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, or Star Crescent Party), which were dominated and supported by the Islamic intelligentsia. Many former activists of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, or Islamic Students' Association) supported the PK, which was led by Dr Nur Mahmudi. The PBB was led by a relatively young academic, Prof Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Although many former HMI leaders also occupied the leadership position in Golkar, some HMI leaders preferred the PK, which was influential among Muslim students and intellectuals. Not surprisingly, opinion polls conducted by the press before the election revealed that the PK and PBB gained a lot of support in the urban areas. Another major Islamic party formed during the Soeharto era is the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), which was also a force to reckon with.

Apart from a greater number of Islamic parties in the post-Soeharto era, there is also a difference in their ideologies. In the 1950s, all Islamic parties were based on Islam and rejected the

Pancasila (principles of state), but during the post-Soeharto period two types of Islamic parties emerged. One type subscribes to the Pancasila ideology but their support comes mainly from the Islamic communities. However, these "Islamic parties", such as the PKB and PAN, open their membership to non-Muslims. The other type declares Islam as their ideology and hence restrict their membership to Muslims only. They intend to establish an Islamic order, if not an Islamic state. The PK, PBB, and PPP belong to this category. The Partai Golkar (Golongan Karya) under Habibie and Akbar Tanjung was dominated by ex-leaders of HMI and ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals). Partai Golkar became more "Islamic" in the 1990s and gained the support of many Islamic leaders but it is not considered an Islamic party — this is not only because of its ideology but, more importantly, its historical development. The image of a secular, if not an *abangan*, party remains.

Many new parties formed for the 1999 election were connected with old ones. Let us examine these parties in a brief historical perspective. During the 1955 general election, there were fifty-two parties, of which four major ones emerged: the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Party), Masyumi, the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), and the PKI. Masyumi was involved in the 1958 regional rebellion and was banned by Sukarno. The PKI was implicated in the 1965 coup and was banned by Soeharto. During the 1971 election under Soeharto, only ten parties participated — namely Golkar, the PNI, NU, Parkindo (Protestant Party), Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Partai Murba (Proletariat Party), IPKI (Partai Ikatan Penerus Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or Independence Vanguard Party), PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party), Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiah, or Islamic Educational Movement), and the newly established Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). It is worth noting that Parmusi was supposed to represent Masyumi but as old Masyumi leaders such as M. Natsir and Mohmad Roem were unacceptable to the Soeharto regime, the party was led by Mintaredja, a lesser known leader from Masyumi. In 1973, nine parties were fused to form two parties, the PPP and PDI (Partai

Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party). (For details, see Chapter 2.).

Following the downfall of Soeharto, the PDI, of which the PNI was a major component, was broken into at least five parties: the PDI (led by Budi Hardjono), the PDI-Perjuangan (PDI-P or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle), the PNI-Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party – Marhaenist Masses), the PNI-Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Party – Marhaenist Front), and the PNI-Supeni (Indonesian National Party – Supeni). The creation of similar parties reflected disunity within the nationalists, but it was also a strategy used by the remnants of the New Order to weaken the Megawati-led PDI, which later became the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, or Struggle). Even Soeharto's half brother, Probosutedjo, established the PNI-Front Marhaenis. It is also interesting to note that these five parties used a similar party emblem: the bull's head (see Appendix IV).

As stated earlier, the PPP was the fusion of Islamic parties but in 1984, NU formally withdrew. After the fall of the New Order, Masyumi was revived by at least two parties, the PBB and Masyumi Baru. PAN was established by Dr Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, which was a component of Masyumi before it was banned by Sukarno. During the post-Soeharto era, the NU itself split into five parties: the PKB, Partai Nahdlatul Ummat, Partai SUNI, and the post-Soeharto PPP, which is led by Hamzah Haz, an NU man. Golkar was also broken into the Partai Golkar, the Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP, or Justice and Unity Party), and the Partai MKGR.

The political parties in the 1999 election were thus more complex than during the New Order, not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of their political ideologies. In some cases, leaders with different ideologies formed a new party. However, the major component within such new parties was still identifiable.

The forty-eight parties allowed to contest in the 1999 election can be divided into two ideological groups: the Pancasila and the Islamic groups (see Table 4.1). Some *santri* supported the Pancasila-based parties since they had no problems accepting the Pancasila, as long as it did not come into conflict with their Islamic beliefs.

TABLE 4.1
Profiles of the 48 Political Parties in the 1999 General Election

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
1. Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB, or New Indonesia Party) 18 January 1999	Pancasila (Islam)	Chair: Drs. Hj. Muh. Syaheful Anwar; Sec-Gen: Drs. H. Zakiruddin Djamin	N.A.
2. Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Krisna, or Indonesian Christian National Party) 20 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Mrs CLM Sitompul-Tambunan Sec-Gen: Didiek Soegito SH	N.A.
3. PNI-Supeni (Indonesian National Party led by Supeni) 20 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Hj. Supeni Sec-Gen: I.M. Sunarkha	N.A.
4. Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia (PADI, or Indonesian Democrats Alliance Party) 23 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: H.M. Bambang Sulistomo Sec-Gen: Drs. Harry Ganda Asi	N.A
5. Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Kami, or Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party) 29 August 1998	Islam	Chair: Drs. H. Syamsahril SH Sec-Gen: Jamhari Maskat	N.A.
6. Partai Ummat Islam (PUI, or Islamic Community Party) 26 June 1998	Islam	Chair: Prof. Dr Deliar Noer Sec-Gen: Dr Judilharry Justam	N.A.
7. Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU, or Muslim Community Awakening Party) 21 September 1998	Islam	Chair: K.H. Yusuf Hasyim Sec-Gen: Drs. Asnawi Latief	East Java
8. Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party) 20 January 1996	Islam	Chair: Drs. Ridwan Saidi Sec-Gen: Drs. Bahar Hambali	N.A.

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
9. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, or United Development Party) 5 January 1973	Islam	Chair: Dr H. Hamzah Haz Sec-Gen: Alimarwan Hanan SH	Aceh, West Java, Jakarta
10. Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII, or Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 29 May 1998	Islam	Chair: H. Taufiq R. Tjokroaminoto Sec-Gen: Ir. H. Amaruddin Djajasubita	West Java
11. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) 14 February 1999	Pancasila	Chair: Megawati Sukarnoputri Sec-Gen: Alexander Litaay	North/ South Sumatra, Lampung, Jakarta, West/ Central/East Java, Bali, NTT, Irian Jaya, Maluku
12. Partai Abul Yatama (PAY, or Abul Yatama Party) 7 January 1999	Islam	Chair: Rusli Bintang Sec-Gen: Agus Suarman	N.A.
13. Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM, or Independent National Party) 18 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: K. H. Zaini Ahmad Noeh Sec-Gen: Cornelius D. Ronowidjojo	N.A.
14. Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB, or Love the Nation Democratic Party) 5 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Prof. Dr Manase Malo Sec-Gen: Seto Harianto	West Sumatra, West Kalimantan, NTT, Maluku
15. Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, or National Mandate Party) 23 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Prof. Dr Amien Rais Sec-Gen: Faisal Basri MA	Aceh, West Sumatra, Jakarta, West/Central/ East Java

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
16. Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD, or Democratic People Party) 22 July 1996	Social Democracy	Chair: Budiman Sudjatmiko Sec-Gen: Petrus H. Hariyanto	N.A.
17. Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia-1905 (PSII-1905, or Indonesian United Islam Party-1905) 21 May 1998	Islam	Chair: Dr H. Bustaman SH Sec-Gen: Muhammad Mufti BA	N.A.
18. Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD, or Democratic Catholic Party) 21 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Drs. Marcus Mali Sec-Gen: Nirwan Sembiring SE	Irian Jaya
19. Partai Pilihan Rakyat (People's Choice Party) 9 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Drs. R.O. Tambunan Sec-Gen: Fachrudin Hasan	N.A.
20. Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PARI, or Indonesian People's Party) 22 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: K.H. Agus Miftach Sec-Gen: Michele Poerwanto SH	N.A.
21. Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PPIM, or Indonesian Masyumi Islamic Party) 28 August 1998	Islam	Chair: KH Marwadi Noer SH Sec-Gen: Izam Hamka	West Java
22. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, or Crescent Star Party) 17 July 1998	Islam	Chair: Prof. Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra SH Sec-Gen: M.S. Kaban SE, Msi.	Aceh, North/ West Sumatra, West Java
23. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (PSP, or Workers' Solidarity Party) 7 February 1999	Pancasila	Chair: Dr H. Dedi Hamid SH Sec-Gen: Pardjaman BSc	N.A.

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
24. Partai Keadilan (PK, or Justice Party) 9 August 1998	Islam	Chair: Dr Ir H. Nur Mahmudi Ismail Sec-Gen: H. M. Anis Matta	West Sumatra, West Java, Lampung, Maluku
25. Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU, or Nahdlatul Ummat Party) 10 August 1998	Islam	Chair: KH Syukron Ma'mun Sec-Gen: KH Ahmad Sjatari	Aceh, Lampung, West Java, East/South Kalimantan
26. PNI-Front Marhaenis (PNI-Front Marhaenis, under the leadership of Probosutedjo) 21 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: H. Probosutedjo Sec-Gen: Bambang Suroso SH	Central Java
27. Partai Ikatan Penerus Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI, or Independence Vanguard Party) 12 September 1998	Pancasila	Chair: R. Soeprapto Sec-Gen: Rusli Dahlan	South Sulawesi
28. Partai Republik (PR, or Republican Party) 17 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Drs. H. Syarifuddin Harahap Sec-Gen: H. Yani Wahid	N.A.
29. Partai Islam Demokrat (PID, or Democratic Islam Party) 15 October 1998	Islam	Chair: H. Andi Rasyid Djalil Sec-Gen: Imam Depowinoto	N.A.
30. PNI-Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party – Marhaen Masses) 21 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Bachtiar Oscha Chalik Sec-Gen: Sadar Sibrani	Central Java
31. Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Murba Party) 2 July 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Hadidjojo Nitimihardjo Sec-Gen: Drs. Zulfikar Tan	N.A.

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
32. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, or Indonesian Democratic Party) 10 January 1973	Pancasila	Chair: Budi Hardjono SH Sec-Gen: Buttu R. Hutapea	West Java
33. Partai Golkar (Functional Groups Party) 20 October 1964	Pancasila	Chair: Akbar Tanjung Sec-Gen: Tuswandi	North/ West Sumatra, Riau, Sulawesi, Lampung, West/ Central Java, South Kalimantan, NTB, NTT, Irian Jaya, Maluku
34. Partai Persatuan (PP, or United Party) 5 January 1999	Islam	Chair: Dr H. Jailani Naro; Drs. H. Mardinsyah	West Java
35. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, or National Awakening Party) 23 July 1998	Pancasila	Chair: H. Matori Abdul Djalil Sec-Gen: Drs. A. Muhaimin Iskandar	Java, Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Lampung
36. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI, or Indonesian Democratic Union Party) 29 May 1996	Pancasila	Chair: Dr Sri Bintang Pamungkas Sec-Gen: Husni Akbar Lubis	N.A.
37. Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN, or National Labour Party) 28 August 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Tohap Simanungkalit SH Sec-Gen: Robikin Emhas SH	N.A.
38. Partai MKGR (MKGR Party) 27 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Mrs. Hj. Mien Sugandhi Sec-Gen: Kristiya Kartika	N.A.

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
39. Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR, or People's Sovereignty Party) 1 January 1999	Pancasila	Chair: Baharuddin Sec-Gen: Dodi Guntoro	N.A.
40. Partai Cinta Damai (PCD, or Peace Loving Party) 10 September 1998	Pancasila (Islam)	Chair: Drs. H. Iskandar Zulkarnain SH Sec-Gen: Drs. Sjahril Malik	N.A.
41. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP, or Justice and Unity Party) 15 January 1999	Pancasila	Chair: Gen. (Retired) Edi Sudrajat Sec-Gen: Hayono Isman	North Sumatra, West/ Central/ East Java
42. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (PSPSI, or All-Indonesian Workers Solidarity Party) 13 June 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Dr H. Rasyidi Sec-Gen: Drs. Sudar Siandes	N.A.
43. Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (PNBI, or Indonesian Nation's National Party) 30 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Ir. H. Endro Sec-Gen: Erstein Sri Rahayuningsih	N.A.
44. Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI, or Indonesian Unity and Diversity Party) 1 June 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Nurdin Purnomo Sec-Gen: Harider Singh	West Kalimantan
45. Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Suni Party) 27 July 1998	Islam	Chair: H. Abu Hasan MA Sec-Gen: Justian Jusuf MBA	N.A.
46. Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND, or National Democrats Party) 12 June 1998	Pancasila	Chair: Edwin Henawan Soekowati Sec-Gen: Eddy Sjafuan	N.A.

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

Political Parties*	Ideology	Leaders	Main Areas of Support†
47. Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI, or Indonesian Muslim Party) 21 May 1998	Islam	Chair: K.H. Anwar Junus SH Sec-Gen: H. R. Dhany SN, MBA	N.A.
48. Partai Pekerja Indonesia (PPI, or Indonesian Workers Party) 20 May 1998	Pancasila	Chair: H. Saleh Said Harahap Sec-Gen: Salam Sumangat SE	N.A.

*Includes date of party's inception.

†This column shows where the parties obtained their votes, which enabled them to get parliamentary seats during the 1999 election. The parties which did not gain any seat in the 1999 general election are listed as N.A. (Not Applicable).

Sources: "Nomor Urut Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu", *Kompas*, 6 March 1999; "The *Jakarta Post* — Election '99", see <www.thejakartapost.com>; Vincent Wangge, SH, ed., *Direktori Partai Politik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Permata Media Komunika, March 1999).

The PKB and PAN may be classified into this category, although they might change their stand on the Pancasila in future.

Categorizing the parties into Pancasila and Islamic parties has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that it confirms that the Pancasila remains as a force in Indonesian politics. On the other hand such a dichotomy may be misleading as some Pancasila-based parties during the post-Soeharto era have strong Islamic elements. They are no longer rigidly secular.

Among the new parties during the post-Soeharto period, three parties are worth mentioning since they emerged as major parties after the 1999 election:

- The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P, or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle), the splinter party from the old PDI which was controlled by the pro-Soeharto group. The new faction is led by Megawati, the daughter of ex-President Sukarno.

- The Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, or National Awakening Party), a party which was formed by Abdurrahman Wahid alias Gus Dur, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Indonesian Muslim association, although Gus Dur himself did not hold any official position in the party.
- The Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, or National Mandate Party), a party which was established by Amien Rais, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Indonesian Muslim association.

The Team of Eleven

Although Habibie obtained his power from Soeharto and claimed it to be legitimate, he was aware that the legitimacy of his regime was questionable. In theory he could stay as the President for the rest of the Soeharto term (1998–2003), but in practice he might not have been able to control the situation as opposition to Habibie was tremendous. The only way for him to stay in power was through a free election. Some also argued that the Habibie administration believed that his government, which was supported by Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI (led by Budi Hardjono) would be able to win the election. Not surprisingly, his regime responded to the reformists' demand that the election should be conducted as scheduled.[2] Under Habibie's instructions, the new elections and political party laws were drafted. The drafts were prepared by the Habibie regime but debated in a Parliament that had been formed after the 1997 general election of the earlier Soeharto regime. The new laws thus reflected a compromise between old and new forces.

The Habibie regime prepared the drafts and his Home Affairs Minister, General (retired) Syarwan Hamid, submitted them to Parliament for debate. The Parliament then comprised military appointees and representatives of the three parties (Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI) — without the participation of newly established parties. Although new parties were not represented, the parliamentarians had to take into consideration the forces outside the Parliament. For instance, there was a strong anti-military sentiment among students and the political public. The government

had initially proposed to have fifty military appointees in the new Parliament, but the number was eventually reduced to thirty-eight (about half of seventy-five, which was the number of military appointees in the last Parliament).[3] At the DPRD I (Regional Parliament) level, the military would retain 10 per cent of the seats, while 90 per cent would be allocated to elected members.[4] This compromise was still far from meeting the radicals' demand — they wanted the military to withdraw from politics completely — but many parties, including the PDI-P and the PKB, felt that it would be unrealistic for the military to be excluded from the national and provincial Parliaments entirely. Nevertheless, the laws stipulate that the participation of the military in politics will gradually be reduced until they eventually cease to play a role in real politics.

Another new feature of the new election law is that the DPR (or Parliament) had become more powerful than before. According to Law No. 4/1999 (UU No. 4/1999) on the DPR and DPRD, the DPR (Parliament) had the power to require any state official, government official, or citizens to supply information. Failure to comply with this requirement is punishable with a maximum sentence of one year in jail.[5] Dwight King pointed out that the DPR did not hesitate to exercise its power to call President Habibie to give testimony regarding his policy on East Timor and his handling of the Bank Bali scandal.[6]

With regard to the election system, the critics were divided into two camps. One camp favoured the proportional system, as represented by the report submitted by the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI, or Indonesian Academy of Sciences). (For a discussion on the proportional system, see Chapter 2.) However, another camp wanted to adopt the district system. Under the district system, which is also known as the single constituency system, the country is divided into constituencies, each approximately the same size. Voters select a single candidate by crossing the candidate's name on the ballot paper. The candidate with the most votes wins the district seat (the "first past the post" rule). This system has its strengths and weaknesses. While it shows a strong link between the voters and the representatives, the eventual government may not receive popular support if it

received only minority support during the election. Since a candidate is elected based solely on the highest number of votes gained in a constituency, that number might be small in percentage terms.[7] The elected government might face a legitimacy problem. According to many political analysts, this system is better suited to a country with a two-party system rather than one with a multi-party system.[8]

It is also said that under the district system, weak parties might be extinguished. In the 1987 election, when there were 300 districts in Indonesia, only four were won by the PPP. The rest were won outright by Golkar, while the PDI did not win any district at all. Had the district system been introduced then, the PDI would not have had a seat in Parliament.[9] In other words, the district system under present conditions would only benefit Golkar.

In February 1995 when Soeharto was in power, he asked LIPI to study the Indonesian electoral system and make recommendations. It is not known why Soeharto suddenly wanted to modify the election system. There are two possible explanations. He wanted to show the world that Indonesia under his rule was being more democratic and he was ready to accept a more democratic system. Another possible explanation was that LIPI, being a government institution, would not dare to recommend radical changes to the system. To Soeharto's surprise, the report which was submitted to the government in 1996[10] was very critical of the Indonesian authoritarian system, the role of the military, and the election practices. However, the LIPI report recommended a "perfected proportional" system.[11] The proportional system, not the district system, was the system used during the New Order election.[12] Some believed that the district system was more democratic because it focused on individual representatives rather than the party, and the party could not easily recall members who underperformed. They also felt that the situation during the post-Soeharto election was different and small parties might win under the district system. The majority of new parties, however, favoured the proportional system. The LIPI team also felt that Indonesia was not yet ready to adopt the district system in the 1997 election. As it would take time to adjust to the district system, the LIPI team proposed a transitional period for the election in 2002.

Indonesia would then aim to have adopted a perfected district system only in the 2007 election.[13] It should be stated that the report was prepared for the Soeharto regime.

However, after the fall of Soeharto, the Habibie regime attempted to implement the district system rather than the "perfected proportional" system as suggested by the LIPI team.[14] One analyst argued that:

> 427 out of 495 new DPR seats [would] be contested on this basis. The remaining 68 seats would then be allocated to individual parties according to their actual performance through a proportional representation system geared to minimize the "lost votes" that naturally result from a district-based system.[15]

Afan Gaffar proposed adopting the district system for the post-Soeharto general election as it was more democratic and would free individuals from the control of the party central leadership.[16]

However, the DPR committee after deliberation eventually rejected the district system and adopted the proportional system for the new election law.[17] The DPR had sensed the danger of adopting the district system which might have wiped out all minor parties. The Indonesian Parliament would then have been dominated by a few major parties and hence be non-representative. With the proportional system, however, a well-established party like Golkar still had advantages as it had "a functioning political machinery down to the remotest parts of Indonesia".[18]

Unlike the 1955 election law, the 1999 election law took into account the Java and the Outer Islands imbalance factor. Sixty per cent of the population live in Java while only about 40 per cent live in the Outer Islands. If the size of population were used as the basis for distribution of parliamentary seats, Java would have been allocated at least 277 seats (462 x 0.6 = 277.2) while the Outer Islands should only be allocated 185 seats (462 – 277 = 185). However, the Election Committee designed a complicated method which resulted in a fairer distribution of parliamentary seats. The seats were first distributed to the districts with at least 450,000 people. The remaining seats were later redistributed among the provinces with a larger number of population.[19] The results of the

distribution of parliamentary seats were 234 (50.6 per cent) for Java and 228 (49.4 per cent) for the Outer Islands.

Since the size of the population in the Outer Islands was smaller than in Java, the "value" of a parliamentary seat in the Outer Islands was less than in Java. For instance, in East Java, 287,199 votes would be needed to earn a parliamentary seat, while in Irian Jaya, 63,547 votes would be sufficient.[20] Without this adjustment, the Outer Islanders would have much fewer representatives in Parliament.

The Indonesian election system can hardly be called the proportional system. The 1999 election system had neither an exact precedent nor parallel anywhere else in the world. "It is a unique combination or proportional representation by province with some element of a district system … Experts have admitted the system as confusing, and open to interpretation from parties involved."[21]

Another point in question is the relationship between civil servants and political parties. Golkar which had relied on civil servants for support was very keen to have a regulation which favoured it. In the past, civil servants could join political parties after informing their superiors, but those holding certain positions would still require written permission.[22] This law benefited the governing party. Generally high positions in the civil service were held by Golkar men since permission to join political parties was only granted if the civil servants joined Golkar. After the fall of Soeharto, this regulation was strongly opposed. Even the PPP, which had been collaborating with Golkar, was against the regulation. Under pressure, the Habibie government thus proposed that civil servants resign from their posts when they joined political parties. Golkar was against this proposal but after lengthy debate, the government eventually promulgated Government Regulation No. 5/1999 which stipulated that civil servants must resign from their posts when they join political parties. Those joining political parties are required to inform their respective superiors within three months. However, they are allowed to retain their civil service position and are entitled to their basic pay for up to one year, renewable yearly up to a maximum of five years.[23] Those who failed to inform their superiors within the limited time would

be dismissed. The regulation also states that they can be reinstated in the civil service within a year of their resignation if they resign from the political parties. However, on 29 January 1999, three days after the promulgation of this regulation, the government introduced another regulation which reduced the period for the civil servants to receive their basic pay from five years to one year.[24] The earlier regulation was perceived to be too generous to civil servants and a tremendous financial burden to the state.

The new election laws are crucial for the conduct of a fair and free election. The President (then B. J. Habibie) had an important role in implementing the law. Although the President is still quite influential, he is no longer able to dominate the DPR committee, unlike during the Soeharto era. The law stipulates that the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU), which conducts and oversees the whole operation of the election, plays an important role. The Commission consists of one chairman, two deputy chairmen, five government representatives, and forty-eight representatives of the contesting parties, one from each party. The KPU chairman and deputy chairman are elected by members during a general meeting.[25] According to the law, the President is the person responsible for the general election while the KPU is answerable to the President.[26] Since the President is in charge of the election, Habibie had some say in the election process. It was rumoured that Adnan Buyung Nasution, then a civil rights lawyer, was supposed to be the chairman of the KPU but Habibie wanted General (retired) Rudini instead.[27] The election law states that if the KPU is unable to reach a consensus, the President can intervene — as Habibie did in the June 1999 election.

To screen the contesting parties in the 1999 election, Habibie established the Preparatory Committee for the Formation of the General Election Commission (P3KPU), better known as the Team of Eleven (Tim Sebelas). It was headed by Nurcholish Madjid, a respected Islamic scholar who was a student activist in the 1960s. The Team's responsibility was to examine whether the 141 existing parties met the requirements to contest the election.[28] The Team of Eleven was independent since it was not controlled by Habibie. Its members included human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, political scientist Afan Gaffar, and former dean of the

Faculty of Social Science at the University of Indonesia, Miriam Budiardjo.[29]

The Team of Eleven was given a limited time to do their job. They had to travel to the provinces to check the accuracy of information provided by the political parties. According to the regulations, the parties had to be registered with the Ministry of Justice, and then with the Team of Eleven. The Team then checked whether they had sufficient branches. According to the new election law, a party should have branches in at least fourteen provinces and fourteen districts/special regions in order to qualify to contest in the election. Forty-six parties did not meet the necessary requirements. A party contesting the election should also have established management (*pengurus*) in more than half of the Indonesian provinces, and in half of the Indonesian districts (*kabupaten*) and special regions.[30] Many small parties were unable to fulfil these requirements. It should also be noted that parties which did not gain more than 2 per cent of the total votes in the DPR will be disqualified from contesting the next election (in 2004).

The checking carried out by the Team of Eleven was divided into two phases. In the first phase, sixty parties met the requirements but they had to go through the second phase of examination. In the second phase, twelve parties were disqualified, leaving only forty-eight parties to contest the election. The Team of Eleven was criticized for only working thirty-six hours and only managing to visit ten provinces.[31] The twelve parties that failed to pass the second test accused the Committee of being biased. Nurcholish declared that the task of the Committee had been completed. The parties which disagreed with the decision could appeal to the KPU, which was officially established when the Team of Eleven was dissolved following the announcement of the qualified parties.

It should be noted that out of 141 parties, thirty-five (including the Parti Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia) which did not register with the Team of Eleven were automatically excluded from the election process.[32] Of the ninety-four parties which registered, only forty-eight finally qualified.[33] One of these parties was Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD), a socialist party led by Budiman

Sudjatmiko who was still in jail.[34] This young people's party, formed on 22 July 1996, was considered a subversive party by the Soeharto regime. Their members had been arrested, tried in court, and were sentenced to jail terms ranging from one and a half to thirteen years. Seen from this perspective, the Team of Eleven was quite liberal in screening the political parties.

Political Party Platforms

Once officially registered as contestants, political parties began to campaign. There were many similarities among the promises made by the major political parties. All promised to establish a democratic and prosperous Indonesian society according to the 1945 Constitution. As Indonesia was still facing an economic crisis, many parties tended to focus on the economy, especially Golkar which had been discredited on the political front. Akbar Tanjung, for instance, stressed that if Golkar won, it would improve the education system and extend compulsory education to twelve years. He also promised to control the price of fertilizer so that farmers could afford it.[35] When campaigning in Aceh, he also promised to promote human rights. Some Golkar leaders promised money to the electorates if Golkar won in certain areas or to increase the compensation of workers who were retrenched.[36] Golkar leaders did not talk about a clean government as few would have believed them. They did not mention anything about Soeharto either although he was the founder of Golkar. The PPP, on the other hand, mentioned Soeharto's name. One of the chairmen suggested that Soeharto need not be put on trial, but instead his wealth should be distributed among the poor and those who had been retrenched. He said that if Soeharto was put on trial, his wealth would only be divided among his lawyers![37] The general chairman of the PPP, Hamzah Haz, promised to remove entrance fees for public schools, and to offer private schools subsidies. He also promised to cultivate (*membina*) 39 million small entrepreneurs in Indonesia. To the Acehnese, the PPP spokesman promised to investigate and punish human rights violators in Aceh and offered a referendum. One of the PPP leaders

also mentioned that their party would close all places of entertainment and pass new laws prohibiting liquor and drug trafficking.[38]

Among the new parties, the PDI-P stressed its populist image. For instance, its Secretary-General Alex Litaay promised to allow trishaws to operate in Jakarta again. Another leader told the people in West Java that Soeharto and his family had illegally occupied the people's land. Therefore, if the PDI-P won the election, Soeharto's land would be redistributed to the landless people.[39] Manggara Siahaan, also of the PDI-P, stated that the party would reform the laws both at the national and regional levels so that the poor would benefit. On Soeharto, Guruh Sukarnoputra, younger brother of Megawati and a PDI-P leader, noted during the campaign in Yogyakarta that the former President should be tried in accordance with the process of law.[40] However, he did not elaborate. Another spokesman noted that there were still too many Soeharto cronies in the government. If the PDI-P won the election, these cronies would be removed. On the formation of a new government, the PDI-P spokesman said that Megawati would work together with other parties, indicating that the PDI-P would not monopolize power.

The same argument was also put forth by the PKB spokesman. Hasyim Muzadi argued that Golkar monopolized power during the New Order. If the PKB won the election, it would share power with the other components of the Indonesian nation.[41] Another party spokesman stressed the importance of national reconciliation to overcome the crisis and achieve stability. One spokesman also talked about the PKB's intention to combat corruption, suppression, and discrimination if they won the election. However, the PKB did not talk openly about their attitude towards Soeharto.

Unlike other parties, the attitude of PAN towards Soeharto was more critical. For instance, PAN leaders such as Ikranegara and Fatwa noted during the campaign that as soon as PAN won the election, Soeharto would be put on trial.[42] The chairman of PAN, Amien Rais, stressed his party's intention to share power with other reformist parties, to combat corruption, and to empower the people. Another spokesman of PAN also talked about

increasing the salaries of the police and soldiers, although it is known that PAN was critical of the dual function (*dwifungsi*) of the Indonesian military.

Campaign promises obviously played some role in getting votes for the respective parties. However, more important were the *aliran* and money politics (see Chapter 5).

The election was held as scheduled on 7 June 1999, a year after Habibie came to power. It has been labelled as the freest and fairest election in thirty-two years. The six previous elections under Soeharto were associated with fraud, coercion, and intimidation. On election day, a leading institute in Jakarta conducted a voters' survey in three provinces in Java and two major cities, Jakarta and Yogyakarta. About 91 per cent of the respondents viewed the June 1999 election as free and fair while 2 per cent had the opposite view.[43] Compared with the Soeharto era, the 1999 election was indeed a much freer election, although it was not necessarily fair as it was still conducted under the Golkar government — much of the political mechanism of the New Order remained. There was still a restriction on the banned parties, e.g., the PKI was still excluded from the electoral process. There was also a stipulation by law that the contestants should be free from any involvement in the 30 September Movement of 1965 (which implicated the Communists). Apart from these limitations and with the exception of four provinces which were still in chaos (Aceh, West Kalimantan, Maluku, and East Timor), independent observers viewed the 1999 election as free and democratic because there was no coercion, and non-government groups were allowed to oversee the election. Although the KPU (General Election Commission) was appointed by the Habibie regime, it was chaired by General (retired) Rudini who had left Golkar. All the forty-eight participating parties were members of the KPU.

The conduct of the election was free and smooth. Foreign observers invited to watch the election were also impressed.[44] However, the counting of votes took much longer than was originally envisaged. According to the schedule, the counting should have been completed by 21 June 1999,[45] but it took more than a month to finish. Some blamed it on the possibility of manipulation and the incompetence of the people in charge but

monitors were more inclined to believe that polling officials were erring on the side of caution.[46] One senior Western diplomat noted that the polling officers were too careful and counting only started when all the votes were in; the pattern was the same everywhere.[47]

However, some observers commented that the assessment of the general elections should be broken down into different stages. The preparation of the election was quite democratic, although it was done by the Golkar-dominated government. The conduct of the election, especially on election day when foreign observers were around, was also quite fair. However, the post-election stage presented a problem. In many areas, particularly in the Outer Islands where Golkar was deeply entrenched, there were irregularities. It was said that in these areas initially Golkar was left behind in the number of votes but overnight it became the winner.[48]

Irregularities and Offences

While the international observers commented that the election was in general democratic, two independent groups from Indonesia, namely the University Network for Free Election (Unfrel) and the Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (KIPP), were rather critical. They recorded various irregularities and offences during the election, such as intimidation and money politics.

According to the Unfrel data, of the ballot centres in twenty-two provinces that it monitored, about 10 per cent of the centres registered intimidation against the voters, and 14 per cent of these centres had wrong procedures. Therefore, the results collected in these ballot centres might be questionable.[49] Unfrel also discovered that some party leaders made attempts to offer money, groceries, and promises to influence vote outcomes. These were especially obvious in South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Riau, West Nusa Tenggara, Central Java, and Irian Jaya. Intimidation occurred in Central Sulawesi. Before the voting, the government officials threatened that if the residents did not vote for Golkar, the water supply would be cut off and other facilities would be withdrawn.[50]

The KIPP mentioned that there were twenty-seven categories

of offences, of which five were most conspicuous: some polling stations were not neutral (for instance, in the government buildings) (13,785 cases, constituting 13.62 per cent); their facilities were insufficient (13,696 cases, constituting 13.53 per cent); officials were not on time to open the ballot boxes (10,719 cases, constituting 10.59 per cent); some ballot boxes were not empty (8,310 cases, constituting 8.21 per cent); and double voting was prevalent (8,282 cases, constituting 8.18 per cent).[51]

The two election watch bodies identified Golkar as the most serious offender in terms of money politics. This was particularly in the cases where Golkar won absolute majorities; for instance, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, and part of Sumatra.[52]

Despite cheating and the above-mentioned offences, Unfrel noted that the election in general was free and smooth. Mulya Lubis, the chairman of Unfrel, stated that intimidation constituted not more than 7 per cent.[53]

Due to irregularities, the results were not released smoothly. The small parties (collectively known as the "Blur Parties") held up the election results as they complained about irregularities and improper conduct during the election at the provincial levels.[54] Some did not win any seats despite their expectations. Others which did win some seats expected to have more. Even the chairman of the KPU — General (retired) Rudini, whose MKGR Party did not get any seat — refused to endorse the results. Some parties wanted to be paid for endorsing the results.[55] Although the major parties approved the results,[56] Habibie had to intervene because of the deadlock. The results were eventually released by the Panitia Pemilihan Umum (General Election Committee) on 1 September 1999.[57] The distribution of seats was also a problem in view of the remaining votes after the first phase of seat distribution. A vote was eventually taken to decide that "the largest remainder list system" would be applied.[58]

Concluding Remarks

The Habibie government had succeeded in holding a general election that was intended to legitimize his political power if he were elected as President. Although the New Order was not

destroyed, new forces were released. A new democratic atmosphere prevailed and new electoral laws were drafted and passed. The election was still based on the proportional rather than district system, guaranteeing that all parties which gained significant votes would be represented in Parliament. The laws were not perfect but compared with the Soeharto rule, it is generally considered that the 1999 election was democratic — it fulfilled many requirements of a democratic election. Nevertheless, it was still far from just and fair, as the New Order government was still in control in the lead-up to the elections and money politics had also been a factor.

Notes

1. *Profil dan Visi 100 Partai di Era Reformasi* (Jakarta: Kipas Putri Aksara, 1999).
2. M. Sudibjo, "Pemilu Pertama Pasca Soeharto: Mempertahankan atau Menggantikan Rezim Status Quo", *Analisis CSIS* 28, no. 3 (1999): 119 and 203.
3. Thamrin Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pariba, 1999), p. 11.
4. "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 4 Tahun 1999 tentang Sususan Kedudukan MPR, DPR dan DPRD", in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 268.
5. Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 276.
6. Dwight King, see "The 1999 Electoral Reforms in Indonesia: Debate, Design and Implementation", in *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 28, no. 2 (2000): 99.
7. An example of a district system of election is as follows: Four candidates, A, B, C, and D, stood for an election in a district with 80 voters. A gained 21 votes; B and C gained 20 votes each; and D gained 19 votes. A, with the highest number of votes, is the winner even though 59 voters did not elect him.
8. Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 215; Bintan R. Saragih, "Masyarakat dan Sistem Pemilu di Indonesia", in *Evaluasi Pemilu Orde Baru*, Siri Penerbitan Studi Politik (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka and Laboratorium Ilmu Politik Fisip UI, 1997), p. 36.
9. Adriana Elisabeth Sukamto, Ganewati Wuryandari, and M. Riza Sihbudi, *PDI dan Prospeks Pembangunan Politik* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991), pp. 38–39.

10. Syamsuddin Haris et al., *Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Telaah atas Struktur, Proses dan Fungsi* (Jakarta: PPW-LIPI, 1997), p. i.
11. Tim Peneliti Sistem Pemilu, *Sistem Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Sebuah Laporan Penelitian* (Jakarta: LIPI and Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998).
12. Hasan Basri and Yanuar Jatnika, eds., *Agenda Politik Nasional: Prospek Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, October 1998), pp. 44–45.
13. Tim Penelitian Sistem Pemilu, *Sistem Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia*, p. 51.
14. The complete draft of the election law was published in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*. The section on the election system is on p. 80: "Pemilihan Umum dilaksanakan dengan menggunakan sistem distrik yang dikombinasikan dengan sistem proporsional".
15. Vedi R. Hadiz, "Contesting Political Change after Suharto", in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hartley and Damien Kingsbury, eds., *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), p. 115.
16. See his "Beberapa Pemikiran tentang Sistem Pemilihan Umum pada Masa Post-Soeharto di Indonesia". The paper was later published with his other papers in Afan Gaffar, *Politik Indonesia: Transisi Menuju Demokrasi* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999), pp. 249–78.
17. "Pemilihan Umum dilaksanakan dengan menggunakan sistem proposional berdasarkan stelsel daftar", in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 175:
18. Hadiz, "Contesting Political Change", p. 116.
19. At election time, Indonesia had a population of 209 million and there were 462 parliamentary seats. Therefore, 1 seat represented about 450,000 people. There were 312 districts with a population of at least 450,000 each. Hence, 312 parliamentary seats were allocated to these districts. In East Timor, since all its 13 districts had populations of below 450,000, the Election Committee decided to award 4 seats to the province. Therefore, 316 parliamentary seats were taken, leaving a remainder of 146 seats unfilled. There was a second round of distribution for the remaining 146 seats. These seats were divided among the provinces and 2 cities with special status. For Jakarta, the following calculations were used. Being densely populated with a population of 9,704,6000, Jakarta was divided into 5 districts. This translated to 7,454,600 people not represented in Parliament (9,704,6000 – (5 x 450,000) = 7,454,600). This number was then divided by 450,000, resulting in a round figure of 17 seats (7,454,600 ÷ 450,000

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= 16.56). Finally, 13 additional seats were awarded to Jakarta (17 x 146/191 = 13). Note that the figure 191 was obtained from the number of people who were not represented in the first round of allocation, divided by 450,000. Information provided by Sukardi Rinakit.

20. More examples can be given. For instance, for West Java, 281,305 votes are needed to get a parliamentary seat, while in South Sulawesi, only 155,517 votes are needed. For the results of vote count in the 1999 election see Appendix I of this book.
21. For a discussion of the procedures of this system, see "Indonesia's election system … one of its kind", <www.thejakartapost.com>, 15 March 2000.
22. This is stipulated in the 1975 Political Parties and Golkar Law. For a discussion of this point, see Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), pp. 82–83.
23. "Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Pegawai Negeri Sipil yang Menjadi Anggota Partai Politik", republished in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, pp. 311 and 320.
24. "Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 1999 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Pegawai Negeri Sipil yang Menjadi Anggota Partai Politik Presiden Republik Indonesia", in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 328.
25. "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemilihan Umum", in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 179.
26. Ibid.
27. For the complete list of the KPU members, see *Profil Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: Pabelan Jayakarta, 1999), p. 7. The chairman is General (retired) Rudini, deputy chairmen are Adnan Buyung Nasution and Harun Al Rasyid, the four government representatives are Andi Mallarangeng, Afan Gaffar, Anak Agung Oka Mahendra, and Adi Andojo.
28. Different sources give different numbers of political parties. Two sources state that there were 141 parties (see *Profil Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: Pabelan Jayakarta, 1999), p. 5; H. D. Haryo Sasongko, *Pemilu '99: Komedi atau Tragedi?* (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 1999), p. 75). Another source gives 148 as the number (Vincent Wengge SH, ed., *Direktori Partai Politik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Permata Media Komunika, 1999), p. iii).

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29. The rest include: Eep Saefulloh, Mulyana W. Kusumah, Kastorus Sinaga, Rama Pratama, Anas Urbaningrum, Andi Mallarangeng and Adi Andojo. "93 Parpol Gagal Ikut Pemilu", *Kompas*, 5 March 1999.
30. See "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 3 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemilihan Umum", reprinted in Sonata, ed., *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati*, p. 191.
31. "93 Parpol Gagal Ikut Pemilu 1999", *Kompas*, 5 March 1999.
32. *Harian Merdeka*, 5 March 1999, cited in H.D. Haryo Sangsoko, *Pemilu '99 Komedi atau Tragedi* (Jakarta: Pustaka Grakfiksi, 1999), p. 78.
33. Ibid.
34. "93 Parpol Gagal Ikut Pemilu 1999", *Kompas*, 5 March 1999.
35. Pax Benedanto, ed., *Pemilihan Umum 1999: Demokrasi atau Rebutan Kursi?* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan, 1999), pp. 119–20.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., pp. 121–23; also *Kompas*, 21 May 1998.
38. *Kompas*, 27 May 1998.
39. Benedanto, *Pemilihan Umum 1999,* pp. 117–19.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp. 123–24.
42. Ibid., pp. 120–21.
43. *Rakyat, Partai Politik dam Pemilu (III). Laporan Hasil Exit Poll 7 Juni 1999 di Jawa* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 14 June 1999), p. 3.
44. See for example, the "Statement of the AAEA Observer Delegation National Parliamentary Elections Republic of Indonesia, 7 June 1999", KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum website.
45. *Profil Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: Pabelan Jayakarta, 1999), p. 4.
46. "Free at Last", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 June 1999.
47. Ibid.
48. Interview with Drs. Syamsuddin Haris, LIPI.
49. Benedanto, *Pemilihan Umum 1999,* p. 107.
50. Reported in *Kompas*, 18 and 19 June 1999, cited in ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 108.
52. Ibid., pp. 108–109. Golkar donated between Rp200,000 and Rp400,000 to each mosque and between Rp100,000 and Rp200,000 to each church in Central Sulawesi and asked them to vote for it. In West Sumatra, Golkar gave Rp9,000 to Rp15,000 to individuals who voted for the party, while Rp100,000 were given to each village head.
53. Ibid., p. 107.
54. Twenty-seven parties refused to endorse the election results,

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constituting 6.38 per cent of the total votes, see *Kompas*, 27 July 1999.

55. "Setelah Partai Gurem Mati Kutu", *Tempo*, 25 July 1999, pp. 24–25; "Hasil Pemilu Tidak Sah", *Tempo*, 8 August 1999, p. 28.
56. Seventeen parties were prepared to endorse the elections results. They constituted 93.03 per cent of the total votes. See *Kompas*, 27 July 1999.
57. The results were signed by the PPI chairman, Drs. Jacob Tobing and the secretary, H. Rasyidi.
58. "Partai Gurem Sampai Di Situ", *Tempo*, 12 September 1999, p. 29. For the largest remainder list system, see Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), pp. 85–87.

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5

Old Rivalries, Blurred Identities

Although there have been a lot of new developments within Indonesia's political parties since the 1950s, old rivalries — Pancasila versus political Islam — did not go away. However, unlike the 1955 election, the parties that contested in the 1999 election could not be easily categorized.

The 1999 General Election Results

During the 1999 election, 93.54 per cent of the 117,815,000 registered voters turned out to vote. In the 1955 election, 43,104,464 voters registered and 91.54 per cent voted. The results of the two general elections were quite similar in that no single party won an overall majority and only four major parties gained between 11 and 34 per cent of the votes (see Table 5.1).

The press wrongly predicted that PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party) would emerge as one of the three top parties, together with the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) and the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party). The prediction that Partai Golkar (Golongan Karya Party) and the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party) — the "New Order parties" — would perform

TABLE 5.1
The 1999 Election Results

Party	Percentage	No. of Seats
PDI-P	33.73	153
Golkar	22.46	120
PKB	12.66	51
PPP	10.72	58
PAN	7.12	34
PBB	1.94	13
Other 42 parties	11.4	33
Total	100.00	462

Source: Extracted from Appendix I.

very poorly in the election was also incorrect. However, Golkar votes were drastically reduced from 74 per cent in 1997 to only 22 per cent in 1999. The PPP which gained 17 per cent in 1997 received only 10.72 per cent in 1999. Nevertheless, Golkar and the PPP were able to occupy second and fourth ranking in the 1999 election, respectively, showing that the influence of the New Order had not disappeared. This trend was expected, as the Habibie government was basically an extension of the New Order. The bureaucracy and the old political mechanism had remained intact. The Habibie regime was able to use these to promote the interests of Golkar and the PPP. It was later revealed that Golkar was also heavily involved in money politics.

The political scene showed a noticeable change after the election. Golkar was no longer the dominant party. A new party — the PDI-P — emerged as the largest political organization. Military strength declined and press freedom increased. There was an increase in the middle class in the urban areas as well as Islamic political activities.

The relatively good performance of Golkar, apart from its organizational strength, was due partly to the greater electoral weightage given to the Outer Islands. For instance, to gain a seat in Aceh, it only required 82,385 votes, and in South Sulawesi, 155,516, whereas in Central Java, the required number was 291,597

votes.[1] This also explains why the PPP, which received strong support in the Outer Islands, obtained 58 seats for the 10.72 per cent of votes it gained, while the PKB which got 12.66 per cent only obtained 51 seats! There was a strong anti-Javanese sentiment in the Outer Islands. In addition, money politics also played a role. It was widely reported that Golkar bought votes during the election.[2] The pro-Soeharto group offered Rp11 billion to Amien Rais for his personal use and the "struggle of the party".[3] Megawati also revealed that one party offered between Rp5 and Rp10 million to her PDI-P cadres to shift to another party.[4] It has become public knowledge that Golkar used a lot of money in their attempt to gain votes. Some of the money originated from illegal sources. The Bank Bali scandal, which implicated Golkar and Habibie, was one of the examples.[5] Later it was also revealed that Habibie contributed Rp1.5 billion to Prof Yusril Ihza Mahendra of the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or Crescent Star Party) for his party fund.[6] PBB, being a new party with no links to the establishment, did not have the funds and good infrastructure outside Java, and hence were unable to gain a lot of votes.

The results of the four parties in the election show that the PDI-P performed best on the islands of Java and Bali, while the PKB was primarily an East Java and Central Java-based party (see Table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2
PDI-P and PKB in Java and Bali in Comparison with PPP and Golkar (Number of seats)

Province	PPP	Golkar	PDI-P	PKB
Jakarta	3	2	7	1
West Java	13	20	27	6
Central Java	7	8	26	10
Yogyakarta (DIY)	1	1	2	1
East Java	4	9	23	24
Bali	0	1	7	1
Total	28	41	92	43

Source: Extracted from Appendix I.

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Golkar performed best in Sulawesi generally, particularly in South Sulawesi, Habibie's birthplace, and in north Sumatra and Irian Jaya where the government machinery was strong. The PPP excelled in the Islamic areas outside Java (see Table 5.3).[7] Ethnic and regional identities of party leaders had played a role in the party performance as in the cases of Habibie and Megawati. Habibie's party swept South Sulawesi, where he came from. Megawati's party did well in Java, Bali, Bengkulu, and South Sumatra, the districts from where her family originated. Being a daughter of the first President who was a Javanese, she is also considered as a Javanese. Her grandmother was an ethnic Balinese and her mother came from Bengkulu/South Sumatra.

The election shows the triumph of moderate Muslims over the more radical fundamentalists. During Soeharto's rule, Islam had become rather powerful politically. Nevertheless, the Indonesian population who preferred a Pancasila state to an Islamic one appeared to be stronger, as evidenced in the victory of

TABLE 5.3
The PPP and Golkar in the Outer Islands in Comparison with the PDI-P and PKB (Number of seats)

Province	PPP	Golkar	PDI-P	PKB
Aceh	4	2	2	0
West Sumatra	3	4	2	0
Riau	2	3	3	1
Jambi	1	2	2	0
South Sumatra	2	4	6	1
Bengkulu	1	1	1	0
West Kalimantan	1	3	2	0
Central Kalimantan	1	2	2	1
South Kalimantan	2	3	2	0
South Sulawesi	2	16	2	1
Central Sulawesi	1	3	1	0
North Sulawesi	1	4	2	0
Southeast Sulawesi	1	3	1	0
Total	22	50	28	4

Source: Extracted from Appendix I.

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Pancasila-based parties. There were thirty Pancasila-based parties and eighteen Islamic parties during the 1999 election.[8] The former gained 82.14 per cent of the votes while the latter gained 17.86 per cent (see Table 5.4). If the PKB and PAN, which received many votes because of their Islamic affiliation, were considered as Islamic parties, the percentage of votes gained by the Pancasila parties dropped to 62.41 per cent and that of Islamic parties rose to 37.59 per cent (see Table 5.5). Comparing both percentages with those of the 1955 election, Islamic parties performed far worse in 1999.

The PDI-P is dominated by the *abangan* and non-Muslims, and is strongly pro-Pancasila. The PKB and PAN, which are based on Islamic associations, also adopt the Pancasila as the party ideology. The Pancasila-orientation of these two Islamic parties is

TABLE 5.4
Comparison between Secular and Islamic Parties, Excluding PKB and PAN

Parties	1955	1999
Secular (Pancasila) (24 parties in 1955; 30 parties in 1999)	55.3%	82.2%
Islamic (4 parties in 1955; 18 parties in 1999)	43.5%	17.8%

Source: Alfian, *Pemilihan Umum 1955* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971); *Jakarta Post*, 16 July 1999.

TABLE 5.5
Comparison between Secular and Islamic Parties, Including PKB and PAN

Parties	1955	1999
Secular (Pancasila) (24 parties in 1955; 28 parties in 1999)	55.3%	62.5%
Islamic (4 parties in 1955; 20 parties in 1999)	43.5%	37.5%

Source: Alfian, *Pemilihan Umum 1955* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971); *Jakarta Post*, 16 July 1999.

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related to their dominant leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid is well known for his liberal and pro-Pancasila stand and disagreed with the establishment of an Islamic state, while Amien Rais is a new "convert" as he was in the past well known for his strong Islamic stand. However, when he emerged during the 1998 Reform Movement, to gain the support of non-Muslims, he formed PAN and stressed the Pancasila stand of the party. Some believe that he has genuinely changed his ideology but others continue to doubt him.[9] Only the PPP and a few small parties (e.g., the PBB, and Partai Keadilan or the Justice Party) openly declared an Islamic ideology and wanted to establish an Islamic order/Islamic state.

As the Islamization process developed during the Soeharto era and political Islam grew rapidly, why didn't Islamic parties gain the majority of votes in the 1999 election? In fact, in 1955 when the Islamization process was less obvious, the combined votes of Islamic parties were about 43.5 per cent. Why did only 17.8 per cent of the Indonesians vote for Islamic parties proper in 1999? Even if the PKB and PAN were categorized as Islamic parties, their combined votes were only around 37.5 per cent (see Table 5.5.)

There are two possible explanations. Firstly, Indonesian nationalism has been very strong as both the *abangan* and weak *santri* voted for the PDI-P, which is considered a "secular" nationalist party. (For a discussion of Afan Gaffar's concept of strong, moderate and weak *santri*, see Chapter 1.) The majority of non-Muslims had voted for Megawati's party. Many weak *santri* were aware of the danger of religious polarization and, hence, preferred a Pancasila state. The two influential Islamic figures, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, also boosted the strength of the Pancasila. The PKB and PAN adopted the Pancasila as their parties' ideology. Golkar, which was under Habibie and Akbar Tanjung, despite displaying a more Islamic outlook, continued to profess the Pancasila ideology and refused to have it changed to an Islamic ideology. (One can argue that even if they had changed it, very few people would believe that Golkar is an Islamic party!) It is likely that those related to the New Order and the weak *santri* voted for Golkar.

In some areas, for instance in East Java where the Nahdlatul

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Ulama (NU) was strong, there were *santri* leaders who voted for the PDI-P, claiming that Megawati is "an Islamic figure" (*tokoh Islam*) who is "straight" (*yang tak macam-macam*), unlike Gus Dur who is "not straight" (*mencla mencle*) and tends to "confuse people".[10] Because of their support for the PDI-P, the weekly news magazine *Gatra* argued that the differences between the *abangan* and *santri* were diminishing.[11] Nevertheless, the division was still present but during the 1999 elections, some *santri* voted for Megawati's party because they had been disappointed with the existing Islamic parties, for example the PPP and PKB.

A group of Islamic fundamentalists (the strong *santri*) insisted that as Muslims, they were obliged to strive for the realization of an Islamic state, and hence supported Islamic parties, which used Islam as the single ideology, and rejected the Pancasila. Mochtar Naim, a university lecturer turned politician, for instance, did not consider *abangan*-dominated Pancasila parties as Islamic parties. He argued that the failure of Islamic parties in the 1999 election was the failure of the entire Islamic community (*kekalahan seluruh umat*).[12]

Nurcholish Madjid, a leading Indonesian Islamic scholar, pointed to the dilemma of the Indonesian Muslims. He maintained that:

> our definition of *umat Islam* [Muslim community] is very narrow. With this definition, one will not consider Sukarno, Soeharto, Ali Murtopo and Megawati as Muslims, as if they are outside the fence. However, at the same time, we claim that 90 per cent of Indonesians are Muslims. This is an inconsistency.[13]

Secondly, the 1999 election results showed that even though Islamic organizations and political parties had proliferated, and Islamic leaders have been more vociferous and conspicuous than in the past, political Islam has not been translated into votes. It seems that Muslim extremists are vocal but they are the minority. They are not as numerous as the moderates.

Apart from the acceptance of the Pancasila as an ideology of the state and the growth of moderate Islam, the election results also indicated a change in the power structure in the provinces.

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There was a positive correlation between electoral regions previously controlled by the old élite (i.e., Golkar) and now in the hands of the new parties, e.g., PDI-P. The conflict ensuing as a consequence of changes in the power structure may explain the endemic cycle of violence. Indeed, there is some truth in this argument. For instance, in Ambon (in Maluku province) Golkar was defeated by the PDI-P (Golkar won 23,131 while the PDI-P won 64,292) and in Aceh PAN defeated Golkar (172,516 for PAN and 154,714 for Golkar).

The violence was not confined to Ambon but occurred in other areas in Maluku (especially Halmahera). If we take Maluku as a whole, Golkar still won the majority of votes (310,526 for Golkar and 274,613 for the PDI-P). Even in Halmahera Tengah where violence erupted after the election, Golkar won 43,375 votes while the PDI-P won only 11,209 votes.

In the case of Aceh, Golkar was dominant between the elections of 1987 and 1997. This changed in the 1999 election when the PPP and other Islamic parties won 54.55 per cent of the votes, defeating Golkar (see Table 5.6). This instance supports the argument that violence ensued from a "change of power structure". However, one can also contend that Aceh was a special case because of its separatist movements and the military operation. It was in turmoil even before the 1999 election.

The argument that the violence that ensued was caused by a "change of power structure" does not really hold. Indeed, there was evidence to the contrary. In many provinces (e.g., Yogyakarta, East Java and Central Java) where the PDI-P or PKB defeated Golkar, resulting in a "change of power structure", there was a conspicuous absence of violence. The causes of violence should be sought somewhere else. Perhaps, the violence had something to do with the élite power struggle in Jakarta. Political forces opposed to the new government, including the military, intended to destabilize the situation by creating continuous sectarian conflicts to achieve their political objective — to hinder reform both at the national and sub-national levels. On the one hand, it could have been an attempt to stop the further weakening of the military's political power while on the other, it may have been aimed at diverting people's attention from Soeharto's corruption trial.

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TABLE 5.6
Election Results in Aceh, 1955–99
(In percentages)

	1955	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999
Golkar		49.71	41.17	36.39	51.49	58.4	64.81	16.47
NU/PKB	0.74	9.26						1.25
Masyumi/ Parmusi/ PAN, PK, PUI, PBB	64.25	18.77						(24.41)
PSII	0.69	7.70						
Perti	11.54	13.16						
PPP	(77.22)	(48.89)	57.28	59.56	43.37	34.5	31.86	30.14
PNI	2.83	0.39						
Parkindo	1.36							
Murba	0.05							
IPKI	0.23							
Katolik	0.07							
PDI/PDI-P	4.54		1.55	4.05	5.14	7.1	3.33	13.45
PKI	1.23							
PSI	0.11							
Other parties	16.09							14.28

Source: *Tempo*, 18 April 1987; *Prioritas*, 27 April 1987; *Kompas*, 30 June 1992; *Jakarta Post*, 24 June 1997; 16 July 1999.

Comparison between the 1955 and 1999 Elections

It could be argued that the 1999 election was similar to that of 1955 as both elections were free and peaceful, had a high turnout of voters, and were democratic as multiple parties were permitted to participate both in the election committee, supervision, and election. The results of both elections were similar, too — no party won an overall majority. Another similarity was the re-emergence of *aliran* party politics.[14] William Liddle and Dwight King also noted that there is a "broad continuity" between both elections.[15] Dwight King, in his unpublished paper, maintains that this continuity is on the basis of party support in the two elections. He

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compares the support of six parties (namely, PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PAN, and PBB) in the 1999 election with five parties (namely PNI [Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Party], Masyumi, NU, PKI [Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party], and PSII [Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, or Islamic Union Party]) in 1955, using the election data and quantitative techniques. He discovered that there is a positive correlation between the PDI-P and the PNI. The higher the vote for the PNI in 1955, the higher the vote for the PDI-P in 1999. There is also a positive correlation between the NU and the PKB: the higher the vote for the NU in 1955, the higher the vote for the PKB in 1999. He also discovered that there is a positive correlation between Islamic parties (such as Masyumi, Perti, and NU) and the PPP. The higher the vote for any of the above Islamic parties in 1955, the higher the vote for the PPP in 1999. These findings may not be surprising but King has statistically proved their positive relationship.

His findings on Golkar are interesting. There is a positive correlation between Golkar, and Masyumi and the PSII: the higher the vote for Masyumi or the PSII in 1955, the higher the vote for Golkar. How do we explain this? Perhaps this is linked to Habibie and Akbar Tanjung. The "new" Partai Golkar, which emerged after the fall of Soeharto projected an Islamic image — and more importantly, Golkar was perceived as representing the non-Javanese rather than Javanese interest.

While agreeing with King's findings, I would like to examine whether major parties in 1955 and 1999 are really comparable. I would also like to reconfirm the area base of these major parties. Indonesian politics after the fall of Soeharto was characterized by *aliran* politics. Is post-Soeharto politics a revival of *aliran* politics in Geertz' sense? In the rigid sense, this is not the case, as those parties which existed in 1955, with the exception of the NU, no longer existed in 1999. However, if we look at it broadly, we can still maintain that some parties in 1999 are similar to those defunct parties in terms of their socio-religious/ideological orientations. They are still divided in terms of "secular nationalism" and "Islamic nationalism", and some claimed to have inherited the "spirit" of defunct parties. For instance, the PDI-P is closer to the PNI, the

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PKB was founded by the major NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid, and PAN was established by Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, the major component of the pre-Guided Democracy Masyumi. Hence, it could be regarded as the new Masyumi.

However the comparison is not clear-cut.[16] Apart from the PDI-P, there are the PDI, the PNI-Front Marhaenis, the PNI-Massa Marhaen, and the PNI-Supeni, which lay claim to the PNI. Nevertheless, the PDI-P can still claim that it inherited the PNI as Megawati is the daughter of the pre-war PNI founder, Sukarno. For the PKB, Abdurrahman has a legitimate claim to represent the NU, but there are other minor parties claiming to represent the NU. The PPP, although led by an NU man, is not regarded as part of the NU as it was not NU-based. It is more difficult to identify the "Masyumi" party in the 1990s. The post-1952 Masyumi was linked closely to Muhammadiyah, and Amien was the chairman of Muhammadiyah. But the PBB, the PK, Masyumi Baru, and the Partai Umat Islam (led by Prof Delier Noer) also have the "shadow" of Masyumi. PAN cannot claim to be the only party representing Masyumi since it gained less than 7 per cent of the votes, which was about 7 million voters, while the Muhammadiyah claimed to have 28 million members!

Golkar is the most difficult party with which to find a similarity in the 1955 election. It is a new party which did not exist in 1955. During the inception of the New Order, Golkar included most of the *abangan/priyayi* elements, but in the 1990s, it was gradually dominated by the Islamic-oriented group. This was particularly evident during the Habibie presidency.[17] Therefore, Golkar is left out of the comparison between the 1955 and 1999 elections, as it is difficult to categorize it under a 1955 political party.

Another party excluded from comparison is the PPP. This party is a fusion of four Islamic parties which was initially dominated by Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia), a new party controlled by Islamic leaders associated with Masyumi. However, its leaders were never considered genuine Masyumi leaders as Soeharto did not agree to the old Masyumi leaders, such as M. Natsir and Mohamad Roem, heading the party. Instead, the Soeharto regime accepted M. S. Mintaredja (of Muhammadiyah)

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and later John Naro as the party leaders. The PPP was also comprised of the NU, which left the party only in 1984. Nevertheless, some NU leaders stayed with the party. In the 1999 election, Hamzah Haz, an NU man who was at odds with Abdurrahman Wahid, was the chairman of the PPP. Many of its members were close to Golkar — and especially with Soeharto and Habibie. Due to its ambiguous nature, it is difficult to classify the PPP as either a new Masyumi or new NU since its leaders were minor figures in both parties.

It is clear that political parties in the 1999 election are different from those in 1955 and are more complex. Many cannot be neatly fitted into the categories of the PNI, NU, or Masyumi.

Since the 1950s, Indonesian society has become more complex and its attitude towards Islam has also undergone some changes. The NU and Muhammadiyah (then a component of Masyumi) were unable to accept the Pancasila in the 1950s, but in 1998 they — or at least the major factions (led by Gus Dur and Amien Rais) in these two organizations — did not reject the Pancasila as their parties' ideology.

The PDI-P still appealed to nominal Muslims (liberal Muslims) and non-Muslims (e.g., Christians), although in 1955, both Christians and Catholics supported their own parties. Even the leadership of the PDI-P had a significant number of non-Muslims. The Partai Golkar can also be considered as an *abangan*-dominated party although Muslim activists have seized the leadership since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, they have not been able to transform it into an Islamic party, as it would mean a complete break from the past, and this may not be credible. The Islamic nationalists — mainly *santri* — have identified with the PKB and PAN. More fundamentalist Muslims — those who prefer to see Islam as the state religion — have aligned themselves with Islam-based parties such as the PPP, PK, PBB and Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi). But some of these Islamic parties, for instance the PPP, often comprise both modernist and traditionalist *santri*. In 1955, this mixture was not possible. There is also another interesting development in the names of Islamic parties during the 1990s. For instance, the names of the PPP and PK do not contain the word "Islam".

In this study, I have argued that two factors — regionalism

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(Java versus the Outer Islands) and ethnic-religious cleavages (*abangan* and *santri*) — have remained constant in Indonesian politics. These characteristics have been reflected in the 1955 and 1999 elections. If it is the case, can we then compare the 1955 and 1999 elections results? As discussed earlier, there is one obvious problem in doing so: the existence of different political parties in 1955 and 1999, which may make party comparison difficult, if not impossible. In addition, there is a change in the election boundaries between 1955 and 1999.

Let us look at political parties. The comparison can still be made if we can agree with the following assumptions: the PDI-P, which is led by Sukarno's daughter, is similar to the PNI, and the PKB is based on the NU. The PAN, PBB, PK, and Partai Umat Islam (PUI) represent the defunct Masyumi. However, as noted earlier, this kind of comparison excludes the PKI, Golkar, and the PPP, which may have serious limitation.

With regard to the provinces, only three major islands were selected for comparison: Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi. In 1955, there were only four provinces (including a special district) in Java but there were five in the 1999 election. In Table 5.7, the votes for Yogyakarta are separated from those of Central Java for the 1955 election. There were three provinces in Sumatra in the 1955 election, but in 1999 there were eight. The votes for the three provinces are divided among the eight provinces according to the areas stated. There was no change in the number of provinces and boundaries for Sulawesi. Due to many problems and changes occurring between 1955 and 1999, the comparisons offer examples rather than a comprehensive analysis.

Table 5.7 shows that the PNI and the PDI-P performed strongly in Java. The results show that the PDI-P performed better throughout Java in 1999 than the PNI in 1955. In East Java, it gained almost as many votes as the PKB. It seems that the PDI-P was able to gain Chinese and Christian votes as well as those of Muslims who were pro-*reformasi*. On the other hand, the PKB, declined somewhat in West Java in 1999 compared with the performance of the NU in 1955, but improved slightly in its performance in East Java, which is the base of the NU. The loss in West Java might have been affected by the PPP. The PAN/PBB/

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TABLE 5.7
Selected Parties' Performance in Java, 1955 and 1999

	Jakarta		West Java		Central Java		Yogyakarta		East Java	
Parties	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**
PNI (PDI-P)	152,031 19.6%	1,895,964 38.7%	1,541,927 22.1%	7,525,503 32.6%	3,019,568 33.5%	7,380,900 42.8%	21,839 15.8%	643,202 35.6%	2,251,069 22.8%	6,703,699 33.8%
Masyumi (PAN, PBB, PK, PUI)	200,460 26.0%	1,128,411 23.2%	1,844,442 26.4%	3,080,915 13.4%	902,387 10.0%	1,502,988 8.7%	18,027 13.0%	369,199 20.5%	1,109,742 11.2%	1,216,705 6 . 1 %
NU (PKB)	120,667 15.6%	174,661 3.5%	673,552 9.6%	1,622,124 7.03%	1,772,306 19.7%	2,953,511 17.1%	2,387 1.7%	257,240 14.2%	3,370,544 34.1%	7,034,707 35.4%

Source: Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (DPR)* (Jakarta: LIPI, 1971); Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia, Hasil Perhitungan Perolehan Kursi DPR-RI Pemilihan Umum Tahun 1999; "1999 General Election — Provisional Results for DPR by Province", *Jakarta Post*, 16 July 1999.

PK/PUI also declined drastically in their performance in 1999 than Masyumi in 1955, except in Yogyakarta which is the base of Amien Rais. Again, the PPP was a factor.

Table 5.8 shows that in 1999 the PAN/PBB/PK/PUI performed very poorly in Sulawesi compared to Masyumi in 1955. The votes dropped from 48.7 per cent in 1955 for Masyumi to 5.7 per cent for the PAN/PBB/PK/PUI in South Sulawesi. The reason is that Golkar — or the Habibie factor — gained the votes at the expense of Islamic parties. The fragmentation of modernist Muslims in 1999 was also a major factor. Unlike in 1955, modernist Muslims did not cast their votes only for the above four parties. Many also voted for the PPP, another major Islamic party. Surprisingly, the PDI-P performed better in 1999 than the PNI in 1955 in these Outer Islands, signifying that it had a wider base than the PNI. The PKB performance in Sulawesi was disappointing. In some Southwest and Central Sulawesi provinces it improved marginally, but in North Sulawesi the votes dropped from 10.2 per cent in 1955 for the NU to 0.8 per cent for the PKB in 1999, and in South Sulawesi, from 10.9 per cent to 1.5 per cent.

Table 5.9 is revealing. Generally the PDI-P performed better than the PNI in 1955 in Sumatra, while the performance of the PAN/PK/PUI/PBB declined drastically compared with Masyumi in 1955. The reasons are many. For the better performance of the PDI-P, one of the reasons was the Javanese migrant factor. In Lampung and South Sumatra, a large number of the Javanese immigrant community favoured Megawati's party. It is also worth noting that Megawati's mother was from Bengkulu, which made her party popular in that province. The PAN/PK/PUI/PBB had to compete with the PPP which is also an Islamic party and had a better political machine than the new parties. With regard to the PKB, the same reason applied — the base of the NU is in Java.

With regard to the performance of Islamic parties outside Java, Aceh was an interesting case. During the 1999 elections, Aceh was one of the four provinces that was most turbulent. The number of the people who registered for elections was also reduced from 2,204,994 in 1997 to 1,486,294 in 1999. The number of voters turned out was also very low, from 95 per cent in 1997 to 69.98 per cent in 1999.

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TABLE 5.8
Selected Parties' Performance in Sulawesi, 1955 and 1999

	Southeast Sulawesi		South Sulawesi		North Sulawesi		Central Sulawesi	
Parties	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**
PNI (PDI-P)	16,045 6.6%	109,708 13.6%	30,289 2.1%	247,112 6.6%	18,846 11.3%	364,043 22.1%	84,009 12.5%	154,185 14.3%
Masyumi (PAN, PBB, PK, PUI)	81,912 34.1%	53,132 6.6%	700,305 48.7%	211,300 5.7%	56,526 33.9%	49,649 3%	132,673 19.7%	55,250 5.2%
NU (PKB)	1,099 0.4%	15,365 1.9%	158,094 10.9%	58,876 1.5%	17,056 10.2%	13,152 0.8%	4,563 0.6%	17,727 1.6%

Source: See Table 5.6.

TABLE 5.9
Selected Parties' Performance in Sumatra, 1955 and 1999

	Aceh		North Sumatra		Riau		West Sumatra	
Parties	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**
PNI (PDI-P)	18,207 2.83%	126,038 13.45%	316,425 17.4%	2,052,680 39.7%	24,093 5.9%	583,583 27.4%	6,209 0.6%	212,347 10.9%
Masyumi (PAN, PBB, PK, PUI)	412,875 64.2%	228,762 24.41%	377,040 23.1%	594,996 11.5%	184,809 45.0%	300,173 14.1%	438,972 43.2%	623,506 32.0%
NU (PKB)	4,769 0.7%	11,750 1.25%	83,004 4.5%	57,269 1.1%	25,305 6.2%	62,851 2.9%	5,651 0.5%	17,083 0.8%
	Jambi		**Bengkulu**		**South Sumatra**		**Lampung**	
Parties	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**	**1955**	**1999**
PNI (PDI-P)	12,256 3.2%	286,042 24.7%	4,178 3.5%	198,512 30.0%	127,007 11.4%	1,378,668 39.0%	82,581 16.1%	1,322,032 40.2%%
Masyumi (PAN, PBB, PK, PUI)	173,911 46.5%	128,505 11.1%	36,206 30.5%	83,374 12.6%	423,766 38.2%	451,680 12.7%	168,414 32.9%	275,749 8.3%
NU (PKB)	41,003 10.9%	55,024 4.7%	2,885 2.4%	24,128 3.6%	79,142 7.1%	174,352 4.9%	33,911 6.6%	386,364 11.7%

Source: See Table 5.6.

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While the Islamic parties in 1955 won 77.22 per cent of the votes, in 1999 the combined votes of Islamic parties were 54.55 per cent (see Table 5.6). Islamic parties still gained the majority of the votes but the secular parties such as Golkar and PDI-P also gained inroads, indicating that there was a "secularization" of Aceh voters. There is no doubt that there was an "intrusion" of secularism in Aceh. In fact, the "intrusion" took place during the New Order period when Golkar and the military became dominant in the province. This was especially the case between the 1987 and 1997 elections when Golkar eventually defeated the PPP and gained a majority (see Table 5.6).

Members of the New DPR

The 1999 election produced 462 elected members and 38 appointed members in the new Parliament (DPR, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat).[18] Of these 500 Members of Parliament (MPs), 116 or 23 per cent of the total number are members of the previous DPR, signifying that 77 per cent are new. Golkar and the PPP had the largest number of re-elected MPs. If the former DPRD I (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I) and DPRD II members are taken into account, 65 per cent of Golkar were re-elected while for the PPP it was 55 per cent. Among the military members, a high percentage, or 63 per cent, had been in the previous DPR. The PDI, an old party destroyed by the New Order, won only two seats, both occupied by re-elected MPs. Since it performed poorly in the 1999 election, it will not be qualified to take part in the next election.

Looking at the breakdown in the MPs' occupations, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and teachers form the majority of DPR members. More than half or 57.4 per cent of Golkar MPs are bureaucrats and 21.7 per cent are entrepreneurs. From the PDI-P, 47.1 per cent are entrepreneurs and 9 per cent are teachers (mainly from higher institutions of learning). Fifty-one per cent of the PKB MPs are teachers, making it a political party of teachers. (See Table 5.10.)

It is also interesting to note that there has been party-hopping. Some former Golkar MPs joined PDI-P (for example, Jacob Tobing and Tjahjo Kumolo). Former PPP MPs who became PKB MPs and

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TABLE 5.10
Last-Held Occupation of DPR Members (1999–2004)
(In percentages)

Last-held Occupation	Party/Faction													
	PDI-P (n=153)	Golkar (n=120)	PPP (n=58)	PKB (n=51)	PAN (n=34)	PBB (n=13)	PK (n=7)	PDKB (n=5)	PNU (n=5)	PKP (n=4)	PDI (n=2)	Armed Forces (n=38)	Others[a] (n=10)	Total (n=500)
DPR Member	—	57.5	36.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100.0	65.8	—	23.4
DPRD Member	—	7.5	19.0	3.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.3
Civil Servant	3.9	4.2	1.7	2.0	5.9	—	14.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.2
Retired Civil Servant	6.5	2.5	3.4	7.8	2.9	15.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.0	4.3
Members of the Armed Forces	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	34.2	—	2.5
Retired Members of the Armed Forces	3.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.2

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TABLE 5.10 (continued)

Last-held Occupation	Party/Faction													
	PDI-P (n=153)	Golkar (n=120)	PPP (n=58)	PKB (n=51)	PAN (n=34)	PBB (n=13)	PK (n=7)	PDKB (n=5)	PNU (n=5)	PKP (n=4)	PDI (n=2)	Armed Forces (n=38)	Others[a] (n=10)	Total (n=500)
Privately Employed	8.5	1.7	3.4	—	—	7.7	—	20.0	20.0	25.0	—	—	20.0	4.4
Entrepreneur	47.1	21.7	22.4	29.4	47.1	38.5	14.3	—	20.0	50.0	—	—	50.0	31.3
Teacher	9.2	3.3	6.9	51.0	23.5	30.8	42.9	80.0	60.0	—	—	—	10.0	14.4
Lawyer	7.2	0.8	1.7	2.0	2.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.0	3.6
Journalist	4.6	—	—	2.0	2.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.2
Consultant	3.9	0.8	—	2.0	5.9	—	14.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.2
Researcher	1.3	—	—	—	—	—	14.3	—	—	25.0	—	—	—	0.8
Others[b]	3.9	—	5.2	—	—	7.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

[a] Others include small parties.
[b]Others include artist, housewife, solicitor, and church minister.
Source: Kompas, Research section.

leaders are Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Matori Abdul Djalil, and Imam Churmen. The composition of the new DPR shows that there were more new MPs than re-elected ones, and old parties were represented by re-elected MPs, signifying their conservative rather than reformist stand.

What could be expected from this DPR? Since new faces were greater than old ones, and one-third of the MPs had entrepreneurial background, this DPR was expected to be pro-business. However, the substantial number of bureaucrats, at 23 per cent of the total MPs, could serve as a constraint for reforms.

There was also another problem. As no party had a majority in Parliament, and MPs tended to put their party/individual interest above national interests, this Parliament might not be efficient. This was especially so when the new President of Indonesia was from a lesser party. As such, the passage for government-initiated new laws might not be smooth.

Concluding Remarks

The thirty-two years of Soeharto authoritarian rule suppressed party politics in Indonesia. The hegemonic party system led by Golkar eventually came to an end. Although Golkar did not disappear, it was significantly weakened. Old parties such as the PPP retained their power, although not as "popular" as during the Soeharto era. A new party, the PDI-P, emerged as the most popular political organization after the fall of Soeharto.

Nevertheless, the party was far from united. It consisted of the anti-Soeharto and anti-Habibie elements with a wide range of political ideology, religious inclination, and ethnicity. There was no strong unity in the party and Megawati's leadership was being questioned after the initial euphoria ended. Personal rivalry in the party surfaced after the party victory.

New Pancasila-based "Islamic parties" such as the PKB and PAN emerged, and their performances during the elections were not as impressive as originally expected. The Islamic-based parties, such as the PBB and PK, succeeded in projecting themselves on the national scene. Nevertheless, it was not clear whether these parties would be able to consolidate their power and grow into

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strong national parties. It is worth noting that the other forty-one parties came into being after the end of the New Order. The majority may not be able to participate in the next election, as they did not obtain more than 2 per cent of the total votes. It is likely that they will have to reorganize themselves and re-register if they want to contest the election in 2004.

As many political parties were hurriedly formed for the 1999 election and their political ideologies were not very clear, there were significant cases of party-hopping. Party ideology was weak, and hence hindered the parties' development.

The post-Soeharto election law, which is based on a modified proportional system, has been criticized for its service to the interest of political parties rather than that of the electorate. This is because the party leadership was given too much power to make decisions over party representatives, and party interests often prevail over constituents' interests. There was an attempt to change the proportional system to the district system but this was strongly opposed by major political parties. It is still uncertain whether the electoral system will be different in the 2004 general election, but pressure from the people is increasing. With the implementation of the regional autonomy laws, people from other regions might demand the district rather than the proportional system.[19]

Notes

1. For the number of votes per seat, see Appendix I.
2. For interesting reports on money politics during the 1999 general election, see "Pemilu 1999: Kesempurnaan yang Retak", first published in *Tempo*, 4 July 1999, republished in *Investigasi: Dari Skandal ke Skandal*, Kumpulan Tulisan Rubrik Investigasi Majalah Berita TEMPO (Jakarta: Tempo, 1999), pp. 202–8.
3. "Amien Rais Ngaku ditawari Rp 11 miliar oleh Cendana", *Harian Merdeka*, 14 February 1999.
4. "Ada yang coba tawarkan uang kepada PDI-Perjuangan", *Kompas*, 9 March 1999.
5. For a brief but informative discussion of money politics during the 1999 election, see H. D. Haryo Sangsoko, *Pemilu '99: Komedi atau Tragedi?* (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 1999), pp. 60–71.
6. "Pengakuan 1 Miliar", *Tempo*, 7 May 2000, p. 14.; Also "KPU Perlu

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Memanggil Habibie," *Tempo*, 28 May 2000, p. 10.

7. For the detailed performance of five leading parties in the 1999 election, see Appendix I.
8. Refer to Table 4.1 for the ideological leanings of the forty-eight parties.
9. There is an interesting article on a comparison between Gus Dur and Amien Rais. The author, Ekki Syachrudin, is of the view that Gus Dur wanted to become a national leader while Amien Rais wanted to be an Islamic leader. This article was published in 1996 when both were still not yet holding high political office. See "Perbedaan Gus Dur dan Amien Rais", *Ummat*, 23 December 1996, p. 39.
10. See "Pilihan di luar pagar", *Gatra* 5, no. 31 (19 June 1999): 9.
11. Ibid.
12. Mochtar Naim, "Kekalahan Parpol Islam", *Republika*, 12 July 1999. Apparently, Dr Naim sees Islam from the *santri* perspective and considers non-*santri* as "non-Muslim".
13. "Pilihan di luar pagar", *Gatra.*
14. The term *aliran* politics has been loosely used in Indonesian writings. Some refer to political thinking (see Chapter 2) and others refer to Clifford Geertz's. Nevertheless, their understanding of Geertz's *aliran* is based on the book *Religion of Java* rather than Geertz's *A History of Javanese Town*. They talk about the *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan* rather than the four major political parties. See for instance, Anas Urbaningrum, *Ranjau-Ranjau Reformasi: Potret Konflik Politik Pasca Kejatuhan Soeharto* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 1999), p. 123, which discusses Geertz's *aliran* politics in terms of the above three variants.
15. Dwight Y. King, "The Elections of 1955 and 1999: Similarities and Continuities", Paper presented at the Inauguration and Colloquium, The Habibie Center, Jakarta on 22–24 May 2000.
16. I benefited from my discussion with Dr Vedi Hadiz on this point.
17. The Habibie group and ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) had briefly controlled the top leadership of Golkar but they never succeeded in eradicating non-ICMI leaders from the leadership. The anti-Habibie group in Golkar was growing and during the presidential election, the group was able to weaken the pro-Habibie group, forcing Habibie to withdraw. For a discussion of this split, see Leo Suryadinata, "The Decline of the Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto", Paper presented at the International Conference on "Economic and Political Development in Southeast Asia at the

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Beginning of a New Millennium", Xiamen University, China, 20–22 September 2001.
18. "Muka lama: birokrat; Muka baru: Wiraswasta dan guru", *Kompas*, 1 October 1999.
19. "Masih mungkin mengubah sistem pemilu untuk 2004", *Kompas*, 16 November 2000.

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6

Democracy and Ethnic Chinese Politics

The ethnic Chinese as an integral part of Indonesian society have also been affected by political development. This chapter examines Chinese political participation in the 1999 election. It compares their participation in the election of 1955 with that of 1999 to examine the continuity and change in their political behaviour. It also shows that there was a revival of ethnic politics but the majority of the Chinese continued to vote for multi-ethnic/national parties rather than "ethnic Chinese" parties. This approach is similar to that of the indigenous population, which focused on national rather than local/ethnic politics.

The *Tempo* Survey

The Chinese in Indonesia are a heterogeneous group. This heterogeneity was also reflected in the June 1999 general election. Prior to the election, *Tempo*, a leading Indonesian weekly news magazine, conducted a survey among the Chinese in five cities, namely Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Pontianak, and Medan to gauge their voting preferences. These five cities were selected because they have large Chinese communities. There were 753 respondents, selected from various social and economic levels

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which represent ethnic Chinese. The number of students represented 24 per cent. There were about 20 per cent respondents from each city and the majority (75 per cent) was below 40 years old. The Christian Chinese were over-represented (57 per cent) while the Buddhists (29 per cent) and Confucianists (5 per cent) were under-represented.[1]

The samples, apart from the unbalanced selection of the respondent's background, are too small in number. The *Tempo* editors were fully aware of this. They also knew that many Chinese were still afraid to express their political views as the survey was conducted between 14 December 1998 and 11 February 1999, when the situation was still uncertain for the Chinese. Therefore, only the "brave" were ready to express their political views.

They were asked, among others, which parties they were likely to vote for in the June election. Each respondent could vote for more than one party, resulting in multiple votes and the results not adding up to 100 per cent. Nevertheless, with the above limitations, it is still useful for us to study this survey, which was published on 22 February 1999.

The results were interesting: 70 per cent chose Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle), 36 per cent PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party), 24 per cent PARTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia, or Chinese Reform Party), 15 per cent PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party) and 13 per cent Golkar (Golongan Karya) (see Table 6.1).[2]

TABLE 6.1
Parties Likely to be Voted by Ethnic Chinese
(In percentages)

Party	Jakarta	Medan	Bandung	Semarang	Pontianak	Total
PDI-P	68	86	84	91	19	70
PAN	32	20	33	37	58	36
PARTI	11	54	18	7	29	24
PKB	32	20	16	23	12	15
Golkar	5	17	17	11	14	13

Source: Tempo, 22 February 1999, p. 61.

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These figures shows that the majority of the respondents selected the PDI-P, followed by PAN. Golkar got the smallest number of votes. Why did the majority of the respondents vote for the non-Chinese parties and why was Golkar left behind?

It seems that the majority of the Chinese voted for the PDI-P due to the following reasons: First, the PDI-P has the image of a nationalist party which was considered friendly towards the ethnic Chinese. They hoped that the PDI-P would come to power, and its policies would benefit the Chinese, or at least would not be harmful to them. In addition, the PDI-P had an outstanding Chinese figure, Drs Kwik Kian Gie, who was well respected by both the Chinese and non-Chinese, as a "vote-getter". The majority of the respondents rejected Golkar because they felt that they had been betrayed by Soeharto, who was the leader of Golkar. Nevertheless, there were still 13 per cent of the respondents who chose the "banyan tree" (the symbol of Golkar). This small group hoped that Golkar would win so that they would benefit. Two ethnic Indonesian parties — PAN and PKB — also gained Chinese support due to the moderate stands of their leaders towards ethnic issues. It is interesting to note that PAN, led by Amien Rais, a university professor, was very popular among students. Since about 24 per cent of the respondents in the sample were students, this was reflected in their choice. However, perhaps it is misleading to highlight that PAN was the choice of the Chinese, despite the fact that in Pontianak (West Kalimantan) only 19 per cent of the respondents in the sample voted for PDI-P and 58 per cent voted for PAN. This result might be due to the bias in the sample — too many students and Christian Chinese.

The voting for PARTI, the Chinese Reform Party, is interesting. The highest number of votes obtained was in Medan (54 per cent), followed by Pontianak (29 per cent). Both cities are known to have a high concentration of *totok* Chinese. In Semarang, the centre of Indonesian-speaking *peranakan* Chinese, PARTI only gained 7 per cent of the votes. In general, only 24 per cent of the respondents chose PARTI.

Why didn't the majority vote for PARTI? Perhaps the ethnic Chinese have been totally integrated, in the political sense. As members of the Indonesian nation, they were of the view that

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major indigenous-dominated parties would be more effective than an ethnic Chinese party. Apart from this, due to the restriction of political activities during the New Order, there were not many Chinese who emerged as national political leaders to begin with. In addition, except for Kwik Kian Gie, very few Chinese political leaders have been considered to be independent. PARTI was led by Lieus Sungkharisma, a young man who was not well known. Nevertheless, the party gained 24 per cent of the respondents' votes, showing that an ethnic Chinese party still had its supporters, albeit a small one.

Ethnic Chinese Parties and the 1999 Election

Ethnic politics is still alive in Indonesia, both among the indigenous and non-indigenous populations. The discussion in this chapter is confined to the ethnic Chinese. After Soeharto stepped down, the Chinese who did not take part in party politics during the New Order, immediately established three political parties: PARTI, the Partai Pembauran Indonesia (Parpindo, or Indonesian Assimilation Party), and the Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI, or Unity in Diversity Party). Parpindo was soon transformed into a social organization due to a lack of support from the Chinese community. Its concept of assimilation — which was the objective of the party — was unpopular among the Chinese after the fall of Soeharto. Only two Chinese parties survived — PARTI and PBI. In early March 1999, the Team of Eleven (Tim Sebelas) announced that only forty-eight political parties were qualified to contest the June election, but PARTI was not on the list. In other words, only the PBI was allowed to participate in the election. Interestingly, the PBI was not listed in the *Tempo*'s survey, although it was established on 11 June 1998.

The PBI is led by Nurdin Purnomo alias Wu Nengbin, a businessman who runs a travel company, and not generally known among the Chinese communities. In addition, the party's name does not reflect it as an ethnic Chinese organization. Indeed, with non-Chinese figures included in its leadership, it is not a "pure" ethnic Chinese party.

As stated earlier, Chinese society in Indonesia does not share

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a common view regarding ethnic Chinese political parties. Those who supported the formation of these parties felt that the Chinese interests could only be defended by Chinese political representatives. For them, Chinese parties were crucial to achieve the goal. However, there were groups who disagreed with the formation of Chinese parties because they felt that it was dangerous to get involved in party politics. Their experiences during the Old and New Order periods were devastating. Others felt that ethnic Chinese parties would not be effective because they would not get the support of the indigenous groups who form the majority in Indonesia. In addition, ethnic Chinese have different political ideologies and cannot be contained in one political party.

Non-Political Chinese Organizations after the Fall of Soeharto

Some ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were aware that Chinese sentiments were still strong and they had to be accommodated in non-political organizations. Therefore, towards this end they decided to establish ethnic and social associations, which function as "pressure groups".

A group of ethnic Chinese — both Indonesian-speaking (*peranakan*) and Chinese-speaking (*totok*) — came together in August 1998 to establish the Paguyuban Sosial Warga Tionghoa Indonesia. The president is a retired police officer (Brigadier-General) Tedy Jusuf alias Xiong Deyi. The Chinese name of the association is Baijiaxing Xiehui (Association of Hundred Chinese Surnames). However, soon after the formation, there was a split within the association. One group left the Paguyuban and formed a new Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa (Perhimpunan INTI or Chinese-Indonesian Association), which is led by Drs Eddie Lembong alias Wang Youshan (Ong Joe San), a pharmacist. These two associations have been competing for the ethnic Chinese support but which of the two will gain more support is still too early to say.

Among those Chinese who disagreed with the establishment of Chinese political parties was Kwik Kian Gie, chairman of the PDI-P. He was of the view that Chinese Indonesians have been

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integrated and to establish an ethnic party would be a setback. He wanted the ethnic Chinese to join the indigenous-dominated parties. Ethnic Chinese who were associated with Bakom (Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa or Communicating Body for Appreciation of National Unity) such as Drs Junus Jahja alias Lauw Chuan Tho and K. Sindhunatha alias Ong Tjong Hai also joined PAN.

After the fall of Soeharto, a small group of young Chinese activists who are idealists emerged. They saw injustices during the New Order, and wanted to eradicate this. However, they had different ideas on how to remove these injustices. Some were radical while others were moderate. Some wanted to maintain their ethnic identity but others wanted to merge with the indigenous groups. In short, there was no unity even among these young activists.

The 1999 Election Results

Let us return to the June 1999 election. The *Tempo* survey on the Chinese attitude towards the June 1999 election was correct in one aspect — its finding on the Chinese support for the PDI-P. Clearly many Chinese, like many indigenous Indonesians, supported the PDI-P. In towns and cities where there are a significant number of Chinese dwellers (with the possible exception of Pontianak), the PDI-P red banners overwhelmed the scene. As noted earlier, the findings of the *Tempo* survey on Chinese support for PAN was misleading.

Because PARTI did not participate in the election, it is rather difficult to know the support of Indonesian Chinese towards an ethnic Chinese party. However, if the PBI can be considered as a Chinese party, it appears that it did not win support from the Chinese in Java where the *peranakan* Chinese form the majority. The votes gathered by the PBI appear to have been in the Outer Islands where there is a large number of *totok* Chinese.

According to the final results, the PBI gained 121,950 votes in West Kalimantan, where Pontianak is located, and 47,511 votes in Riau, where there are many *totok* Chinese. Finally, the PBI got one parliamentary seat although they had thought that they would

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win in Riau as well. It is also possible that the PBI votes in West Kalimantan did not come purely from the ethnic Chinese. Some Dayaks might also have voted for the party. It is interesting to note that before the elections, the PBI leaders were talking about winning at least ten parliamentary seats!

The disappointing results of the PBI were expected due to the heterogeneous nature of the Chinese society and the small size of the Chinese community in Indonesia. To win a parliamentary seat in Java the party needed to gain between 271,858 (Jakarta) and 300,680 votes (Yogyakarta), and in the Outer Islands between 63,647 (Irian Jaya) and 235,597 votes (South Sumatra). The votes gained by the PBI (121,950) in West Kalimantan were just enough to get a remaining seat after the first distribution.[3]

The total votes gained by the PBI in this election were 364,291, about 0.34 per cent of the total Indonesian votes. What percentage of the Chinese votes did the PBI gain? In the 1999 election, there were 105,786,658 voters in Indonesia, which was about half of the country's total population. Assuming that the Chinese only formed about 3 per cent of the Indonesian population, and only half (1.5 per cent or 3,179,599) were eligible to vote, therefore, the PBI only gained 11.4 per cent (364,291) of the Chinese votes in this election. This percentage also assumes that all the PBI voters entirely came from ethnic Chinese. In reality, some might have come from non-Chinese voters, for example, in West Kalimantan.

The 1955 and 1999 Elections

At this juncture, we compare the performance of the Chinese parties in the elections in 1955 and 1999. Before doing this, it is imperative to discuss briefly Chinese politics prior to the fall of Soeharto.[4] During the colonial days, Chinese politics were divided into three groups: China-oriented, Dutch East Indies-oriented, and Indonesia-oriented. Nevertheless, the division was clearly ethnic-based. After Indonesian independence, the Indonesia-oriented group became the major stream. Ethnic-based parties/organizations were still popular although some *peranakan* Chinese joined the Indonesian-dominated parties. Before Soeharto came to power, the Baperki (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan

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Indonesia, or Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body) represented the largest ethnic Chinese socio-political organization in Indonesia.

When Soeharto assumed power, ethnic-based socio-political organizations (including Chinese "parties") were banned. Those who wanted to participate in politics had to join the three indigenous-dominated parties — Golkar, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), and the PDI — and government-affiliated multi-ethnic organizations. There was no independent socio-political group during the New Order. In fact, this was a reflection of Soeharto's authoritarian rule. To a large extent, he succeeded in de-politicizing Indonesian society — and Chinese society was part of it. Chinese activities were confined to economic rather than other fields. As a result, there was a Chinese economic élite, but no credible socio-political leaders representing the Chinese community. Some critics of the Soeharto regime — such as Yap Thiam Hien (human rights lawyer), Arief Budiman (sociologist and political activist), and later Kwik Kian Gie (economist and member of PDI) — were *peranakan* and projected themselves as Indonesians rather than leaders of the Chinese community. Most of the issues that they were concerned with were not directly related to the ethnic Chinese. Therefore, no leaders could claim to represent the ethnic Chinese. Socio-cultural division among the Chinese worsened the situation. This context has to be remembered when we compare the Chinese in the elections in 1955 and 1999.

In 1955, the Chinese-based party, Baperki, contested the election. The party gained 178,887 votes, constituting about 0.47 per cent of the total votes. At that time, the Chinese population was estimated to be 2,450,000, constituting around 2.5 per cent of the total population. If half of the Chinese population had voting rights, 1,225,000 Chinese could vote. This translates to 14.61 per cent of Chinese voters choosing Baperki. However, note that in 1999, more than 90 per cent of Indonesian Chinese were Indonesian citizens, while in 1955 many of them were still not. Therefore, the percentage of Chinese voters was lower. If we assume that in 1955 only one-quarter of the Chinese were voters (612,500), this means that about 29 per cent of ethnic Chinese voted for Baperki. This

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percentage is certainly much higher than the votes gained by the PBI in 1999.

In 1955, Baperki did not get any votes in West Kalimantan.[5] The reason behind it is not clear. It is unlikely that the number was too small to be recorded since the 116 votes obtained by another candidate, R. Soewarman Sg, was recorded.[6] More likely, in 1955 all the Chinese in West Kalimantan were not citizens and hence were not eligible to vote. The result in 1955 is in contrast to 1999 when the PBI gained the largest votes in this province.

Let us compare the similarities and differences of Baperki and the PBI. Both claimed to be multi-ethnic parties but in reality they were Chinese-dominated. However, the top leadership of Baperki was more "Chinese" than that of the PBI, as the former comprised only ethnic Chinese, while the latter has a Dayak and an Indian in its national leadership.

Baperki, led by Siauw Giok Tjhan and Yap Thiam Hien, was a *peranakan* party. Its electoral strength was in Java, especially in Central Java where it won one seat. It was a much more solid and well-established organization compared with the PBI or any other socio-political organizations formed recently. The PBI was led by Nurdin Purnomo (Wu Nengbin), a *totok* Chinese. Its leadership was also dominated by Chinese-speaking ethnic Chinese. Its electoral strength was in West Kalimantan and North Sumatra (where Medan is located) where the Chinese population is culturally more Chinese than in Central and West Java. One can therefore argue that Baperki was a Java-based *peranakan* party which gained votes from the ethnic Chinese population, while the PBI was a *totok*-led Outer Islanders party whose support came from the Chinese-speaking Chinese (see Table 6.2).

The 1999 election produced one Chinese Member of Parliament (MP) from the PBI, Lin Guanyu alias Susanto. The significance is not in its number but the revival of ethnic Chinese interests in party politics in Indonesia. It should be pointed out that the PBI, in reality, is a Chinese-led multi-ethnic party, not a Chinese party proper. The PBI member is not the only Chinese MP because in the PDI-P there are at least two ethnic Chinese MPs: Kwik Kian Gie who was later appointed by President Abdurrahman Wahid as the Co-ordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry,

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TABLE 6.2
Performance of Baperki and the PBI in the 1955 and 1999 Elections

Provinces	Baperki (1955)	Percentage of total votes in the province	PBI (1999)	Percentage of total votes in the province
Jakarta Raya	26,944	2.7	34,746	0.72
West Java	38,376	0.48	34,223	0.15
Central Java	44,743	0.48	17,241	0.09
East Java	35,489	0.33	30,673	0.15
South Sumatra	10,178	0.53	22,179	0.30
Central Sumatra	4,495	0.25	26,027	0.50
North Sumatra	4,674	0.19	49,282	0.80
West Nusa Tenggara	3,857	0.27	5,333	0.15
East Nusa Tenggara	3,784	0.32	1,476	0.08
East Kalimantan	536	0.26	2,831	0.25
West Kalimantan	Nil	Nil	121,950	6.99
South Kalimantan	2,152	0.28	2,411	0.16
North/Central Sulawesi	2,195	0.26	3.226	0.12
Southeast/South Sulawesi	1,462	0.09	14,898	0.33
Maluku	Nil	Nil	1,008	0.09
Total	178,887	0.47	364,291	0.35

Note: For the 1999 election, North Sumatra includes Aceh; Central Sumatra includes West Sumatra, Riau, and Jambi; South Sumatra includes Lampung and Bengkulu; Central Java includes Yogyakarta; and West Nusa Tenggara includes Bali.

Source: Alfian, *Pemilihan Umum 1955* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971); *Jakarta Post*, 16 July 1999.

and Tjiandra Widjaja (his Chinese surname is Wong). There is a fourth Chinese MP from PAN, Alvin Lie Ling Piao (Li Ningbiao).

It is also worth noting that initially among the sixty-five group representatives in the new People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), it was proposed that there would be one member representing the Chinese minority. This was announced by General (retired) Rudini, the chairman of the General Election Commission (KPU). Rudini maintained that this proposal was made by Dr Afan Gaffar, a government representative, and was considered as an achievement for the Commission.[7]

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During the Soeharto era, there had been two ethnic Chinese MPs: Budi Dipojuwono (former name: Lie Po Yoe, PNI, 1971–76) and Djoko Sudyatmiko (former name: Lie Giok Houw, Golkar, 1971–92). Both did not come from Chinese-dominated parties since all ethnic parties were banned then. There were also two Chinese MPR members: Jusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie, Golkar, 1972–87), and Anthony Salim (Liem Fung Sen, son of tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, 1988–93). Strictly speaking, they were not really representing "the Chinese minority" as they were appointed by the Soeharto government without consultation with the community.

The Issue of Ethnic Chinese MPR Members

After the 1999 election, the issue of appointing an MPR member to represent the Chinese invited controversy. The Chinese community was split on the decision whether such a representative was needed, and who should represent the community. One *peranakan* Chinese Muslim group represented by Jusuf Hamka and Junus Jahja disagreed with such a representation because they claim that the Chinese are already integrated and should not be considered as a minority any more. The other group of non-Muslim Chinese asserted that the Chinese minority is a reality, and hence a representative is necessary. Christianto Wibisono, an intellectual, and Eddie Lembong of INTI belong to this camp. These two views were debated in the mass media and also on television. However, no agreement was reached on the issue although the ethnic Chinese speakers appeared to favour an ethnic Chinese representative, at least for the 1999-2004 term.

Another issue to be decided was selecting the person to represent the heterogeneous Chinese group. The names of Tedy Jusuf (president of Paguyuban), Eddie Lembong (president of INTI), Ester Jusuf (Shen Meiling, a young human rights lawyer), and Susi Susanti (Wang Lianxiang, a badminton champion) were mentioned.[8] However, on 20 August, the General Election Committee (KPU) announced that there would be no ethnic minority group representatives. Chinese, Arabs, and Indians were not qualified to have representatives as they were already

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represented through other organizations. Therefore the seats were given to indigenous minority groups who live in remote areas and are not represented, or not well represented, in the political system.[9] Apparently, the majority members in the KPU disagreed with the proposal of Afan Gaffar and Rudini to include one member in the MPR to represent the Chinese minority.

Another setback for ethnic Chinese representation in the MPR was the decision not to include a representative of the Confucian religion. The Buddhists, however, were represented by Mrs Siti Hartati Murdaya (alias Fu Zou Liying), the chairperson of the Indonesian Buddhist Association. She is a businesswoman who was close to the New Order regime and Habibie. A group of Buddhists demonstrated against her appointment into the MPR as they felt that she represented the New Order and was hence unsuitable.[10] According to *Tempo*, the representative of Walubi (Council of Buddhist Communities) was replaced by Majelis Budhayana Indonesia, which was expelled from Walubi.[11] In the end Hartati remained as a representative at the MPR. The followers of the Confucian religion also demonstrated against the KPU because they were excluded from the MPR despite the fact that the Minister for Religious Affairs of the Habibie regime had stated that *Agama Khonghucu* was one of the six official religions in Indonesia.[12]

After the fall of Soeharto, some indigenous Indonesians accepted the ethnic Chinese as part of the Indonesian nation (*bangsa*). However, it appears that the majority still feel that the Indonesian nation should be defined in indigenous terms. Even the *peranakan* Chinese are still not yet accepted as "full-fledged" members of the Indonesian nation.

Concluding Remarks

After the May 1998 riots and the fall of Soeharto, Indonesian Chinese communities became more politically conscious. As a group, they had kept a low profile for three decades but have now begun to express their views and ask for their political rights as Indonesian citizens. However, the 1999 election shows clearly that their political attitude is far from united, which is a reflection of

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the heterogeneous nature of Indonesian Chinese society. The election also shows that the majority of the Chinese preferred an integrated national party rather than an ethnic party as they were aware that their interests are likely to be served by joining the mainstream. Nevertheless, ethnic Chinese organizations did not disappear.

Notes

1. "Suara Keturunan Untuk Perjuangan", *Tempo*, 22 February 1999, p. 62.
2. Ibid., p. 61
3. For the PBI performance *vis-à-vis* other parties in West Kalimantan, see Appendix I.
4. For a full discussion of ethnic Chinese politics in Indonesia, see Leo Suryadinata, "Ethnic Chinese Politics in Indonesia", *Journal of Asian-Pacific Studies*, no. 6 (March 2000), pp. 65–72.
5. See Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971), pp. 133–6. There were nineteen parties/individuals which gained votes and Baperki was not on the list.
6. Ibid., p.134.
7. *Kompas*, 19 July 1999.
8. *Lianhe Zaobao* (Singapore), 2 August 1999.
9. Five MPR members which represent the indigenous minority groups include Maliki (representing suku Kubu/Anak Dalam), H. Kasmin bin Sailan (suku Baduy), Aselmus Robertus Mecer (suku Dayak), John Onan Lanta'a (suku Sangir/Miangas) and Teddy Th. Kedeykoto (suku Irian). See *Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004* (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), pp. 276-8.
10. "Umat Budha Protes Utusan Golongan di MPR", *Tempo Interaktif*, 27 August 1999.
11. "Berkat Jatah Utusan Golongan", *Tempo*, 15 August 1999, p. 27.
12. *Lianhe Zaobao*, 20 August 1999.

7

The MPR Elects a President

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the President is still the most important figure in the political system. This chapter focuses on the election of the new President following the 1999 general election. Old and new leaders were competing for the highest position in the land and the contest was keenly observed by the political public. The process was full of intrigues and the situation was tense as Megawati's supporters expected her to be elected as President — her party, the PDI-P, had after all received the largest number of votes in the general election. The eventual election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President was a surprise but it illustrated the increasing importance of Islam. Although Islam is not the dominant force in Indonesian politics today, it has grown in significance over the years.

The Battle and the War

Casual Indonesian observers often wrongly regard the general election as the only battle fought by political parties in order to form the government. It might be assumed that the party with the largest number of votes (in this case Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan or PDI-P, albeit only 33.7 per cent to the total votes) should form the government, and the party leader should be the President. This would have happened if Indonesia was not under

the 1945 Constitution. Under the first amended 1945 Constitution, a party which won the parliamentary election would not necessarily win the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly) election. The President is elected by the MPR, not by the people directly. The leader of the party which obtained the largest votes in the MPR election, not the general election, would become the President.

Akbar Tanjung of Partai Golkar correctly noted that the party had lost the battle but not the war. Even though Golkar lost to the PDI-P in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People's Representative Council), it was the outcome in the MPR election that was to be the determinant for appointing the next President.

Politics in the MPR

Let us look at the composition of the MPR. It has 700 members, of which 500 are from the DPR. In the DPR itself, only 462 seats were contested, while 38 seats were reserved for the Indonesian military. Of the 200 seats in the MPR occupied by non-DPR members, 135 came from the DPRD I (Provincial Councils) and 65 were representatives from non-government organizations (NGOs) and other non-political organizations (NPOs). (See Table 7.1.) These 65 representatives came from 20 religious groups, 5 veterans' organizations, 9 economic organizations, 5 women's groups , 5 ethnic minority groups, 2 handicapped groups, 9 academics

TABLE 7.1
Indonesian Governmental Structure


MPR (People's Consultative Assembly)
(500 DPR Members + 135 DPRD Members + 65 Group Members)
DPR (People's Representative Council, Parliament)
(500 Members)
DPRD I (Provincial People's Representative Council)
(135 Members)

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and intellectuals associations, 5 civil servants' organization , and 5 youth/students' organizations. They were selected and appointed by the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU). The 135 members were decided by the DPRD I.

According to the DPR/MPR Law, there were 27 provinces in Indonesia and hence 27 DPRD I. Each DPRD I had between 50 and 100 members, of which 90 per cent of the members were elected while 10 per cent would be appointed from the military. From among the winning parties, each DPRD I would select 5 members to represent them at the MPR, some of whom would be from the military. According to estimates, the military would have an additional 12 to 27 seats in the MPR as representatives from the DPRD.[1] If this was the case, the military would serve as a counterbalance in the presidential election which was originally scheduled for November 1999. Between July and November 1999 was the crucial time for the presidential candidates to lobby for support from the MPR members.

Let us also examine the political groupings in the DPR, which had a bearing on the MPR configuration as DPR members formed the majority in the MPR. There were three groups: the Megawati *Reformasi* (Reform) group, the Habibie Status Quo group, and the Central Axis group (*Poros Tengah*) led by Amien Rais, which represented the Islamic interests (the Islamic parties joined this group). Amien Rais' PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party) also represented the reform group but its member parties such as the Partai Keadilan (PK) and the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) were pro-status quo.

The Megawati group was popular among the voters, especially among the urban dwellers who wanted change. The PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party), which is led by Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur), expressed its support for Megawati to be elected as President. Some small and secular parties also supported Mega (as she is popularly known among her supporters). But Islamic parties, especially the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party), were against Mega. They disliked Mega's party for having too many non-Muslims as its DPR candidates. They also accused Mega of being non-Islamic. Mega, who is an *abangan* Muslim, felt

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comfortable with other religions and did not mind joining prayers in a Hindu temple for instance. Like many Muslims in Indonesia, Mega has not performed the *hajj*. When asked why she did not become a *hajjah*, she answered that if she performed the pilgrimage then, her opponents would say that it was done for political purposes. Therefore she did not want to do it.[2]

The supporters of Megawati felt that even though she did not get more than half the votes, she had the mandate of the people as she led the polls with 33.7 per cent of the votes, the largest percentage for any single party. They also felt that Golkar was in power for too long and it was time for a change in leadership. Megawati, who did not graduate from university, was not perceived as a very "able" leader — she was neither a good speaker nor rich in ideas. However, her supporters argued that at that time Indonesia did not need a "clever" person but an "honest" one to be the President. In their view, she would be able to manage Indonesia since she had many good advisers. Some of her critics — mainly Muslim politicians — maintained that, being a woman, Megawati was unsuitable to be President. But her supporters argued that Indonesian law does not prohibit a woman from becoming the President. Her opponents also maintained that she favoured non-Muslims, as illustrated in the composition of her party and parliamentary elections candidates. From the list of DPR members, it shows that the proportion of non-Muslims in her party was larger than that of other major parties (see Table 7.2). Nevertheless, Muslims still formed the majority.

TABLE 7.2
Members of DPR who are Non-Muslims

Party	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total	Percentage of non-Muslims
PDI-P	96	57	153	37.25
Golkar	107	13	120	10.83
PPP	58	0	58	0
PKB	51	0	51	0
PAN	12	1	13	7.69

Source: Computed from *Kompas*, 1 October 1999.

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The Habibie camp included the PPP, PK, PBB, and other Islamic parties. These Islamic parties, except for the PPP, could also have joined forces with PAN. However, up to mid-August 1999, the PBB and PK still supported Golkar. Habibie's supporters argued that as a capable scientist he would be able to lead Indonesia into a new millennium. He was acceptable to the Muslims and had also held the prominent position as Chairman of ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals). But his critics argued that Habibie was a surrogate of Soeharto because he had been handpicked by the former President. Under Habibie there would be no reform. Corruption and nepotism would worsen and the country would be in chaos again.

PAN, led by Amien Rais, refused to endorse Mega on different grounds. In Amien's view, Mega was not "reformist" enough due to her compromised attitude towards the military. However, PAN also refused to endorse Habibie as he was too close to Soeharto. In an attempt to stop Mega from becoming the new President, Amien Rais, who was Gus Dur's rival, proposed Gus Dur as the presidential candidate of the Central Axis group. Gus Dur, who was close to Megawati and continued to claim that he still supported her, eventually accepted the nomination. Both Mega and Gus Dur became presidential candidates, in addition to Habibie.

PDI-P's First Encounter in the New MPR

The performance of Megawati's PDI-P in the MPR prior to the presidential election showed that it lacked effectiveness, as illustrated by the following three instances.

Soon after the general election results were finalized, the PDI-P made a number of proposals on the proceedings of the new MPR. One of them was to conduct the presidential election on 14 October instead of in November. Golkar and the Islamic groups disagreed and counterproposed 20 October as the presidential election date. When they took a vote, the results were 379 to 250 for Golkar. Two other proposals, also on the proceedings of the MPR proposed by the PDI-P, were defeated during voting. These

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demonstrate that Mega was unable to gain majority support in the MPR.[3]

Another defeat took place on 3 October 1999 when the MPR met to elect its chairman. The PDI-P supported Matori Abdul Djalil, the chairman of the PKB, while the Islamic groups and Golkar reached a deal to elect Amien Rais, the chairman of PAN. It was reported that Gus Dur, the founder of the PKB, supported Amien's candidacy. As a result, Amien got 305 votes while Matori gained 279 votes. Amien was elected.[4]

One more defeat took place on 6 October 1999, when Golkar made a deal with the Islamic groups to elect Akbar Tanjung as the speaker of the DPR. The PDI-P proposed Soetardjo Soegjogoeritno but when it was put to a vote, the PDI-P candidate was defeated. Akbar gained 411 votes while Soetardjo 54 votes.[5] It was later revealed that the PDI-P quietly made a deal with Akbar Tanjung. The PDI-P would support Akbar in return for his support for Megawati during the presidential election.[6] The PDI-P was obviously in a weak position during the pre-presidential election.

Megawati had been complacent and did not campaign to win allies. In addition, her party favoured a military man instead of an Islamic group candidate to head the Jakarta City Council, which confirmed her "anti-Islamic" image.[7] Megawati was thus facing a strong opposition in the MPR, especially from Golkar and the Islamic groups.

Megawati versus Habibie: The Battle which Never Took Place

Attention was focused on Megawati and Habibie. Gus Dur was considered to be in poor health and his party, PKB, continued to support Megawati. When the presidential election drew nearer, political analysts offered their predictions. Three scenarios are shown in Table 7.3. It was obvious that neither Megawati nor Habibie would be able to assume presidency based on their party's strength as each party did not gain enough votes. They had to gain the support of other parties and other groups in the MPR (namely the military, and regional and group representatives) to become President. The three scenarios were drawn soon after the

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TABLE 7.3
Three Scenarios of the 1999 Presidential Election

Scenario	1. Salim Said	2. Andi Mallarangeng	3. Tempo
Habibie	285 votes	208 votes	304 votes
Megawati	308 votes	218 votes	284 votes
Undecided	107 votes	276 votes	102 votes

Source: "Goyang Pendulum Habibie versus Megawati", *Tempo*, 27 June 1999, p. 22

general election, when both the DPR and MPR seats had not yet been finalized. They can be used as representative of informed opinion. They also show the outcome of the presidential election is extremely difficult to predict.

The scenarios do not show which party was likely to win the presidential election since there were too many undecided votes, ranging from 102 to 276 votes. However, the three scenarios had one thing in common — they had narrowed down the two presidential candidates to Megawati of the PDI-P and Habibie of Golkar. Other presidential candidates such as Abdurrahman Wahid of the PKB/NU, Amien Rais of PAN, and Hamzah Haz of the PPP were not seen as serious candidates who could challenge either Megawati or Habibie.

If Megawati were to win the 1999 presidential election and form a coalition government, Indonesia was likely to experience a period of relative peace since she had received considerable support from the Indonesian people, especially urban dwellers. Whether she could solve the political and economic problems of Indonesia in the long term was uncertain. On the other hand, if Habibie became the President, it was unlikely for political stability to return as Habibie represented the old regime and was unacceptable to the masses. Demonstrations would rock the country again. However, Habibie still had his supporters — more importantly, it was believed that he had inherited much money from the New Order to buy votes. He could also organize the masses to destabilize a Megawati-led government.

The situation was such that whoever became President would face major problems in the following years. Domestic political

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challenges and financial issues, especially foreign debts, had to be addressed. But if Habibie remained as President, KKN or corruption, collusion, and nepotism would surely worsen.

The role of the military was also an issue in the presidential election. The Wiranto group was closer to Habibie than to Megawati as both Wiranto and Habibie were Soeharto's appointees. However, the military was not united in its attitude towards Megawati. A group within the military, led by General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was pro-Megawati as she still accepted the social and political role of the Armed Forces, but the majority appeared to support Habibie until the last minute.

To secure the support of the military, on 13 October 1999 Habibie made an announcement that he would like General Wiranto to be his Vice-President.[8] With money and army support, Habibie seemed very likely to be elected to continue as the President of the Republic.

The Unexpected Rise of Abdurrahman Wahid

Two events shattered Habibie's dream. One was the Bali Bank scandal and the other was the East Timor disaster. In May 1999, it was reported that Habibie's men requested a large sum of money (Rp560 billion) from Bali Bank to sponsor Golkar during the general and presidential elections.[9] The money came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and was meant for re-capitalizing ailing Indonesian banks. The opposition parties highlighted the issue and Golkar eventually acknowledged that it had indeed received the money. It was reported that Rp400 billion had been spent on the elections and the balance were pocketed by Habibie's cronies. The IMF was annoyed with the Habibie administration and threatened to hold up the promised loan if the Bali Bank scandal was not resolved.

The second event was the East Timor referendum in August 1999. About 78 per cent of the East Timor population voted for independence. The Indonesian militia, supported by a group of military in Jakarta, began to terrorize the East Timor population. Hundreds of people were killed and many fled to the mountains to take refuge. East Timor became a killing field, resulting in the

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intervention of the United Nations. A peacekeeping force led by Australia was sent to East Timor. Jakarta was blamed for human rights violations. The military, who disagreed with Habibie's initial decision to give East Timor the option for independence, blamed Habibie for the loss of East Timor which was seen as a humiliation for Indonesia.

The sign that Habibie might not be re-elected surfaced on 14 October 1999 during his accountability speech to the MPR. He claimed that his administration had achieved economic stability, if not political stability, for Indonesia. He expected the MPR to endorse his speech. The MPR's reaction towards his speech varied. Golkar was lukewarm while the opposition parties, especially the PDI-P and PKB, were critical. Other factions were not particularly enthusiastic either. Since no consensus on the speech was reached, it was put to a vote on 19 October. Habibie and his "Irama Suka Nusantara" group,[10] an Outer Islanders group led by A. A. Baramuli, a Sulawesi businessman turned politician, were in for a surprise. The President's Accountability Speech was rejected by the MPR by a narrow margin (355 to 322), signifying that Habibie might not get enough support from the MPR for his presidential election. Compounding this was that on 18 October, the day before the voting, General Wiranto announced that he declined to be Habibie's running mate for the presidential election.[11] This was taken to mean that the military no longer supported Habibie. The situation in Jakarta was very tense and the anti-Habibie group had already gathered in Jakarta and other places; a riot was imminent if Habibie's speech were accepted.

In fact, there was no consensus on Habibie's candidacy within Golkar itself. The party was divided at least into three groups: the Habibie group, the Akbar Tanjung group, and the Marzuki Darusman group.[12] Akbar Tanjung had reservations about Habibie's candidacy while Marzuki Darusman was known to be against Habibie. Golkar was unable to unite during the voting and this affected the results. Perhaps equally important was the attitude of the military. Possibly, the military representatives were also against Habibie.

The period from the evening of 19 October to the morning of 20 October was crucial: an entirely new situation revealed itself

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during that time. In the early morning of 20 October, Habibie decided not to run for the presidency again, and Akbar Tanjung was asked to succeed him. Akbar reluctantly agreed to be the candidate on the condition that everyone in Golkar endorsed him. The Sulawesi group (Irama Suka Nusantara group) was resentful of Akbar as he did not openly support Habibie's speech, which resulted in the split vote. Akbar eventually withdrew his candidacy. There was no candidate for Golkar.

Only two presidential candidates were left: Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid. It was reported that Abdurrahman Wahid was reluctant to compete against Megawati as he supported her. Muslims were afraid that Abdurrahman Wahid would withdraw at the last minute, leaving Megawati to be the President by default. They were also worried that Abdurrahman was the proxy of Megawati and he would give up the presidency in mid-term. The Islamic groups actively persuaded Amien Rais to stand for election but he declined as he saw Abdurrahman Wahid as having a better chance of defeating Megawati. Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a young politician who is the chairman of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), entered the contest. But he withdrew at the last minute as he did not want to split the Muslim votes. He had joined the contest because he was afraid that Megawati would be elected unopposed. When he was convinced that Gus Dur would run for presidency and that he would not pass the position to Megawati, Yusril then withdrew from the race.[13] The situation was very tense but it was not as tense as when Habibie was still a contender. The supporters of Mega and Abdurrahman gathered in Jakarta. The results of the presidential election were eventually announced: 373 votes for Abdurrahman Wahid and 313 for Megawati. A very disappointed Mega had been defeated.[14]

It appears that the pro-Habibie group in Golkar, the military, and the Central Axis group all voted for Abdurrahman Wahid. The PKB which was supposed to back Megawati eventually had to support Abdurrahman as he was the chairman of the NU![15]

Of 700 MPR members, 691 were present, but only 686 members voted.[16] No one was sure how the members voted, but from available information, a few Indonesian newspapers and

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magazines attempted to reconstruct the voting pattern of the MPR members as shown in Table 7.4.[17]

It is clear that the élite in the MPR were divided more on the issue of Islam than *reformasi*. Megawati has the image of a "secular nationalist" while Gus Dur is a moderate "Islamic nationalist". Amien who was the rival of Gus Dur and the "father of the reformist movement", preferred a moderate *ulama* to a "radical" secularist. The Islamic reformists combined forces with conservative elements such as Golkar and the military in their efforts to stop Mega and succeeded. Prior to the presidential election, it was reported that about 40 per cent of Golkar members in the MPR who were anti-Habibie would vote for Mega.[18] This turned out to be incorrect. The actual number, according to the estimate, was less than 17 per cent (20 out of 120).

As soon as Abdurrahman Wahid was announced the winner

TABLE 7.4
Voting Pattern during the Presidential Election

Name	Votes Gained	Estimate/Source of Support
Abdurrahman Wahid	373	Golkar (100 votes) PPP (57 votes) PKB (51 votes) PAN (35 votes) PBB (12 votes) PK (6 votes) Other Islamic parties (10 votes) Regional representatives (57 votes) Group representatives (15 votes) Military (30 votes)
Megawati Sukarnoputri	313	PDI-P (154 votes) Golkar (20 votes) Other nationalist parties (17 votes) Military (3 votes) Group representatives (69 votes) Regional representatives (50 votes)
Abstained	5	Military

Source: See note 17.

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of the presidential election, he thanked Megawati and her party for not making his health condition an issue throughout the election. This was significant because if Megawati had insisted that Gus Dur was "physically unfit", he would have not been able to contest the presidential election as the Indonesian Constitution stipulates that the "Indonesian President should be a person who is mentally and physically healthy". Megawati acknowledged defeat. To calm her supporters, she said that "for the national unity I would like the Indonesian people to see the reality".[19] She noted that it was a fact that Gus Dur gained more votes than she did. Amien Rais quickly requested the entire audience to sing the national anthem. The tense situation was considerably calmed down.

Abdurrahman offered to appoint Megawati as his deputy which she initially rejected. Megawati soon realized that her supporters would not be able to accept the new government if she was not part of it, so she eventually accepted the offer to be Vice-President. However, the Islamic and non-Javanese groups did not agree to Megawati being the Vice-President. They had their own candidate — Hamzah Haz, the chairman of the PPP. Meanwhile, Golkar had nominated Akbar Tanjung as the vice-presidential candidate. When he discovered that a group in Golkar was supporting Hamzah Haz, he withdrew his candidacy.[20] General Wiranto, who was nominated by a small party to be its candidate for vice-presidency, also withdrew.[21] Mega and Hamzah were the only vice-presidential candidates at voting time. Megawati won 396 votes while Hamzah got 284 votes.[22] Some PDI-P supporters were unhappy that Gus Dur, and not Megawati, was the President. On the one hand, minor riots erupted to show support for Megawati to be President, but were soon brought under control.[23] On the other hand, Habibie's supporters demonstrated against Megawati.[24] However, with the appointment of Megawati as Vice-President, a nation-wide conflict in Indonesia was avoided.

Gus Dur and Megawati

In retrospect, the Gus Dur and Mega team was a better one than a Mega–Gus Dur team would have been, at least initially. Gus Dur

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as a moderate Islamic leader was expected to be able to meet the aspirations and expectations of the Islamic groups while Mega as the nationalist symbol would be able to render support to the Gus Dur government. In addition, Gus Dur was much more experienced in politics than Mega and she might not have been able to handle the chaotic situation which was to develop soon after the presidential election. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the Gus Dur–Mega team proved to be weak as Gus Dur was physically handicapped and very temperamental. Moreover, he was not a leader of the largest party in Indonesia!

Biographical sketches of these two leaders are useful for us to understand the future trends of the country. Gus Dur was born in 1941 in East Java. He was the grandson of the founder of NU. His father, Wahid Hasyim, was the Minister for Religious Affairs during the Sukarno time in the early fifties and was killed in a road accident in 1953. Gus Dur was brought up by his widowed mother. With his early education in both secular and religious schools in Indonesia, Gus Dur has good command of Arabic and Western languages. He is particularly interested in the English language and at the age of 15 had read Lenin's work *What is to be Done* in English.[25] In the 1960s, he received a scholarship and went overseas for further studies, first to Egypt and later Baghdad.

In Egypt, he studied in the Department of Higher Islamic and Arabic Studies at the Al-Azhar University (1964–66). Between 1966–70 he entered the Faculty of Arts at the University of Baghdad in Iraq. It was his study in the University of Baghdad which exposed him to many leading Western philosophers.[26] Imbued with Javanese tradition, Gus Dur is nationalistic. He had tried to Indonesianize Islamic teachings which often annoyed many Islamic scholars and politicians, traditionalists and modernists alike. He disagreed with Amien Rais, former chairman of Muhammadiyah, who joined ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), on many issues, especially on the nature of Indonesian society. While Amien and other Islamic leaders favoured the establishment of an "Islamic society", Gus Dur advocated the establishment of an "Indonesian society" where Islam is strong. He maintained that those who seek to establish an "Islamic Society" are in reality, seeking to establish an Islamic state.[27] Gus Dur's open

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renouncement of the establishment of an Islamic state gained the confidence of many non-Muslims.[28] His appreciation of other cultures and Western classical music, especially Beethoven, was unique among the leading Islamic clergy in Indonesia.

His idea of Indonesian Islamic nationalism is also unique. Gus Dur broke from NU tradition when he openly stated his pro-Pancasila stand, departing from the old NU stand of the 1950s when NU leaders still favoured an Islamic state for Indonesia. Under his leadership, the NU eventually established the PKB, which was for Indonesian nationalism (*kebangsaan*) rather than Islam in its orientation.[29] He introduced a new and modern concept of an Indonesian nation, based on culture and politics rather than race and religion, which included three "races" — the Malay "race", Austro-Melanesian "race" and Chinese "race".[30]

Gur Dur initiated the Democratic Forum (Forum Demokrasi) which served government critics. Many intellectuals joined the Forum. Yet he was intolerant towards some opponents in the NU and had been criticized for being intolerant within NU.[31] Those who opposed him would not be given important positions in the organization.

During the Soeharto time, when the NU joined the PPP, Gus Dur had been unable to exercise any influence in the party. After the NU left the PPP in 1984 and became more independent, Gus Dur became critical of Soeharto. In 1992, Adam Schwarz of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* asked him why his views were being disregarded. Gus Dur answered that this was due to two reasons: "Stupidity and because Soeharto does not want to see anyone he does not control grow strong."[32] When the interview was published in Schwarz's book in 1994, it created a stir in Jakarta. Soeharto was annoyed. The government later attempted to topple Gus Dur's leadership in the NU but failed. Earlier, Soeharto sponsored the ICMI to co-opt Islamic intellectuals but Gus Dur refused to join what he called "a sectarian organization".

Gus Dur managed to maintain a working relationship with the Soeharto regime and the military. Gus Dur's strategy had been described as one of "critical collaboration" — a strategy that was effective as he did not antagonize the military and Soeharto did not see Gus Dur as a threat.[33] However, such "critical collaboration"

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continued even after Soeharto stepped down. During the 1997 election Gus Dur mentioned that Soeharto's daughter, Tutut, could be the leader of the country. Gus Dur said that he would pardon Soeharto if the former President returned the wealth that he took from the country. Such pronouncements cast doubt on his capability and roused confusion. Some said that he was opportunistic while others said that he was pragmatic.

Gus Dur's deputy, Megawati Sukarnoputri, is an equally interesting personality. She is the eldest daughter of Sukarno and Fatmawati. Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia, had a Javanese father and a Balinese mother, while Fatmawati was a Sumatran from Bengkulu. Megawati therefore has a multi-ethnic identity.[34] Her husband, Taufik Kiemas, is a Sumatran. However, being the daughter of Sukarno and brought up in Java, she is often perceived as a Javanese-Indonesian.

Born in Yogyakarta on 23 January 1946 during the revolution,[35] she received a very brief university education.[36] She was nineteen years old when her father was overthrown. Sukarno was under house arrest from 1966 until his death. Initially, there was no indication that Sukarno's children were interested in politics. It was reported that Megawati was active briefly in the Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia (GMKI, or Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement, a PNI-affiliated organization), but she did not play a major role in the organization.

Apart from this, she was not known to be involved in politics. Megawati and Taufik joined the PDI in the 1980s and, in 1987, both were elected as Members of Parliament (1987–92).[37] It was reported that the growth of the PDI under the leadership of Soerjadi caused concern in the government and the military. The government decided to intervene and intended to replace Soerjadi with Budi Hardjono. But the Surabaya Congress elected Megawati instead. Members of the PDI had been resentful of constant governmental intervention.

The government initially did not accept Megawati but later changed its attitude.[38] The government wanted to control the PDI by ensuring that the leadership positions would be held by pro-government politicians. But Megawati was able to get the support of a large number of PDI members. The military, under the

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instruction of Soeharto, was eventually asked to remove her and the former PDI leader, Soerjadi, was identified by the government as a suitable replacement — in spite of their earlier misgivings. An extraordinary general meeting was held in Medan to topple Megawati. Soerjadi was successfully "re-elected" as the PDI chairman. When Megawati's supporters refused to hand over the headquarters in Jakarta, it was taken over by force in the notorious 27 June 1996 affair.[39] Understandably, Gus Dur was sympathetic towards Megawati, whom he knew when they were young. Gus Dur was also influenced by Sukarno's nationalism.

The fall of Soeharto did not lead to the restoration of Megawati's earlier position in the PDI. The Habibie regime continued to hinder Megawati's emergence as he was afraid of the challenge posed by her. His regime continued to recognize Soerjadi and later Budi Hardjono as the PDI chairman, forcing Megawati to form the PDI-Perjuangan. Sympathy towards Megawati grew. Co-operation between the NU and Megawati's group was fostered. The NU openly supported the PDI-Perjuangan and campaigned for Megawati.[40] She became the symbol of opposition to the corrupt regime. No other political leader who emerged during the New Order was able to appeal to the masses like Megawati — a major reason for her popularity was that she is Sukarno's daughter.

Megawati has her weaknesses — she is not a debater and her political thinking is not widely known. In 1993, she published a pamphlet entitled *I have flown the flag*, which consists of photographs and outlines of her political thought.[41] It contains seven points, including those relating to democracy and the dual function (*dwifungsi*) of the military. In the pamphlet, she discussed Pancasila Democracy,[42] which was the term used by the New Order, and also the dual role of the military, the ideology of ABRI. She maintained the view that: "Dual Function is not a problem if ABRI serves the interests of the people."[43] When she was criticized for not having new and clear ideas, especially on the role of the military, Mega refuted that:

> I did not talk about the dual function of ABRI on purpose, because the principle is already clear. There is a field for

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> civilians and there is also a field for the military. A policy which places these two forces in the wrong field will bring this nation to prolonged civil-military conflict.[44]

Mega has often kept silent on many issues. Her opponents have challenged her in open debates and ridiculed her for not speaking up, even after she was nominated as the President. Megawati replied that "don't ever force me to open my mouth for the sake of speaking, [I will not speak] nonsense and without clear evidence".[45] In many ways, Megawati is similar to Corazon Aquino of the Philippines. Like Cory, Megawati was the symbol of opposition to oppression during an extraordinary era. Once the era is over, people may begin to think differently about her. However, Megawati represents the largest party in Indonesia, and gained valuable political experience after assuming the vice-presidency.

Concluding Remarks

The presidential election showed that there was a bitter struggle between Habibie and Megawati, representing conservative/"Islamic" and reformist/secularist forces respectively. The unexpected developments eventually caused Habibie to withdraw and Islamic groups shifted their support to Gus Dur, a moderate Islamic preacher. He was a compromising figure who was tolerated, if not wholly accepted by both sides, as being able to save the country from further turmoil.

The presidential and vice-presidential elections showed that Islamic parties were not dominant. They needed the support of nominal and non-Islamic groups to win. When these groups refused to render support, the candidate of Islamic groups would lose. In a sense, there was Islamic unity as well as national unity in the eventual choice of Gus Dur as President and Megawati as Vice-President. During the presidential election, Islamic parties, which were deeply divided along doctrinal and ethnic lines, temporarily discarded their disagreement to vote for Gus Dur, an Islamic clergy. During the vice-presidential election, some Islamic

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parties sided with the secular nationalists and non-Muslims and voted for a nationalist party leader, Megawati, for the sake of unity.

Looking at both the general and the presidential elections of 1999, it is clear that they were carried out in a hurry to deal with the crisis situation. Many regulations were far from perfect and often reflected the situation peculiar to Indonesia. The candidate of the winning party did not automatically become President. The DPR and MPR were constituted of both appointed and elected members (appointed members are not considered as part of the democratic system). The presidential election was indirect rather than direct. The President was elected by the élites rather than by the people. He was a compromise candidate rather than the leader of the party that won the most votes in the general election. There was no consensus as to whether this system of presidential election by the MPR will be changed to a direct election by the people in future.[46] While PAN and other small parties favoured direct presidential elections, the PDI-P was against it. However, there was growing pressure for change. The PDI-P, which felt that the people were not ready for such change, was on the defensive. At the annual meeting of the MPR in November 2001, the issue of direct presidential election was raised and discussed again. This will be examined in Chapter 10.

Notes

1. Two Indonesian scholars, Dr Salim Said and Dr Hermawan Sulistyo, made this point to the Indonesian press in Jakarta soon after the general election. However, according to a KPU publication, out of 130 (without East Timor), only four members were retired military officers. See *Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004* (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), pp. 292, 314, 314, 352.
2. Two days before the presidential election, Mega was interviewed by four major newspapers and magazines (*Kompas*, *Tempo*, *DR*, and *Jakarta Post*). She acknowledged that her party only won about 35 per cent while the rest (about 65 per cent) voted for other parties, as if the 65 per cent formed a (solidly) different group. The reporters went on to ask if the 65 per cent had a new identity. This created an impression that they were divided between Islam and nationalism. Mega

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answered that she was concerned with this. Religion should not be brought into politics. In fact, the majority of the PDI-P were Muslims. However, her religious belief was questioned by some who claimed to be Muslims. She stated that she was concerned with national unity and she wanted to normalize this abnormal relationship. The reporters suggested that perhaps it was time for her to perform a pilgrimage. Mega said, "Then, people will accuse me of doing this for political purpose" (*"Lalu, nanti dituduh haji politik"*). See "Optimis Masih Berlakunya Hati Nurani", *Kompas* 19 October 1999.

3. "Pemilihan presiden dipercepat", *Kompas*, 1 October 1999; "Pemilihan Presiden 20 Oktober", *Kompas*, 3 October 199; "Masih ada waktu untuk Mega", *Tempo*, 10 October 1999, pp. 18–19.
4. *Suara Merdeka*, 4 October 1999; *Suara Pembaruan*, 4 October 1999.
5. *Suara Merdeka*, 7 October 1999.
6. "Megawati: PDI-P Hargai Hasil Kesepakatan", *Kompas*, 7 October 1999.
7. *Asiaweek*, Vol. 25, no. 41 (15 October 1999).
8. "Habibie pilih Wiranto untuk cawapres", *Republika*, 14 October 1999.
9. Many books have been published on the Bank Bali scandal in Indonesian. One of them is written by Gauzali Saydam, *Skandal Bank Bali: Tragedi Perpolitikan Indonesia* (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 1999).
10. Irama Suka Nusantara is the acronym for "Irian Jaya–Maluku–Sulawesi–Kalimantan" and "Nusa Tenggara". Sometimes it is further abbreviated as the Iramasuka (meaning: Happy Melody) group.
11. Habibie decided to invite Wiranto as a running mate on 13 October 1999 (*Republika*, 14 October 1999). It was reported that Wiranto waited till the last minute to announce this because had he done it earlier, Habibie could have replaced him with another general. See "Ketika Sang Jenderal Memilih", *Tajuk* 2, no. 18 (28 October 1999): 58–59.
12. For a description of the split in Golkar before and after the fall of Soeharto, see *Golkar Retak* (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1998).
13. "Selawat Gedung Rakyat untuk Presiden Gus Dur", *Tempo*, 31 October 1999, pp. 18–19.
14. Ibid.
15. "Ketika Gus Dur harus memilih", *Gatra*, 30 October 1999, p. 26.
16. Ibid., p. 25.
17. Some newspapers/magazines made various guesses before and after the voting. For instance, *Bangkit* (25–31 October 1999) a news magazine published in Jakarta, gave a list of both Gus Dur and Megawati supporters. *Gatra* (30 October 1999) also noted that before the election,

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some Golkar members predicted that Megawati would get 314 votes while Gus Dur would obtain 380 votes (p. 25). Table 7.4 is compiled based on various sources of information. I am indebted to Sukardi Rinakit who assembled the information (from *Bangkit*, *Panji Masyarakat*, *Kompas*, and *Tempo*) and presented a possible voting pattern during the presidential election.

18. "40 Presen Fraksi Golkar Dukung Mega", *Bangkit*, 16–22 August 1999.
19. "Mega minta rakyat melihat kenyataan", *Suara Merdeka*, 21 October 1999.
20. For an account of Indonesian presidential election in the last two days, see "Kronologi Drama Voting Gus Dur-Mega", *Tempo*, 31 October 1999, pp. 22–23.
21. Some said that Wiranto was pressurized by the United States to withdraw, but U.S. Ambassador to Jakarta denied this. See "Amerika menekan Wiranto? Sumpah, itu tidak benar!" *Tempo*, 31 Oktober 1999, p. 30.
22. "Kronologi Drama Voting Gus Dur-Mega", *Tempo*, 31 October 1999, p. 22.
23. "Pesta dan rusuh seusai pertarungan", *Forum Keadilan*, no. 30 (31 October 1999), pp. 25–28.
24. "Habibie dicita, Mega tiba", *Forum Keadilan*, no. 30 (31 October 1999), p. 26.
25. Interview with *Matra*, January 1987, cited by Ahmad Bahar, *Biografi Kiai Politik Abdurrahman Wahid: Gagasan dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: Binautama, 1999), p. 11.
26. Darmawan, *Gus Dur: Kiai Nyentrik jadi Presiden* (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Analisis Informasi, 1999), p. 35.
27. For a discussion of the views of Gus Dur and Amien Rais/ICMI regarding the Pancasila and the position of Islam in Indonesia, see Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 64. It is interesting to note that during the New Order, the Islamic group avoided the use of "Islamic state" but used instead "Islamic order", probably to reduce the impact on the nationalists and non-Muslims.
28. Note that Gus Dur repeatedly stated that the Muslims in Indonesia are not required to establish an Islamic state. See Abdurrahman Wahid, "PKB didirikan oleh PBNU", in Munib Huda Mohamad, ed., *Pro-Kontra Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Fatma Press, 1998), p. 6
29. Ibid.
30. "Indonesia ini terdiri dari tiga ras yakni: ras Melayu, Austro-Melanesia

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(yakni orang-orang Ambon, Nusa Tenggara dan Irian) dan ras Cina. Kemudian ketiga-tiganya membentuk kebangsaan kita, Indonesia." Ibid., p. 7.

31. Ahmad Bahar, *Biografi Kiai Politik Abdurrahman Wahid*, pp. 98–108.
32. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), p. 188.
33. Ibid., pp. 93–94.
34. "Megawati dan Taufik Kiemas", in *Indonesian Reading II*, edited by Liaw Yock Fang and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Editions, 1990), pp. 89–90.
35. In the memoirs written by Fatmawati Sukarno, *Catatan Kecil Bersama Bung Karno, Bagian 1* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan), p. 131, Megawati was said to have been born in 1946, but other sources said that she was born in 1947. See Arif Zulkifli, *PDI Di Mata Golongan Menengah Indonesia* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1996), p. 93; see also the KPU Publication, *Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004* (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), p. 66.
36. According to Zulfikli, she studied at the Faculty of Agriculture at Padjajaran University (Bandung) and the Faculty of Psychology, University of Indonesia (Jakarta), but did not complete either programme. While at the university, she was briefly active in the GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia), a students' organization which was the youth wing of the PNI. See Arif Zulkifli, *PDI Di Mata Golongan Menengah*, p. 93.
37. Adriana Elisabeth Sukamto, Ganewati Wuryandari, and M. Riza Sihbudi, *PDI dan Prospek Pembangunan Politik* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991), p. 82.
38. For a brief discussion of this event, see Harold Crouch, "Indonesia: An Uncertain Outlook," in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1994* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 133.
39. On a discussion of the split and the military intervention, see Imran Hasibuan, ed., *Megawati Soekarnoputri Pantang Surut Langkah* (Jakarta: Studi Arus Informasi, 1997), pp. 87–98.
40. Helmi Faisal, *Gerakan Pro-Mega: Menelusuri Jejak Pendukung Megawati* (Jakarta: Angkatan Muda Nahdlatul Ulama, 1998).
41. Megawati Soekarnoputri, *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Megawati Soekarnoputri* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1993).
42. Ibid., p. 21.
43. Ibid., p. 33.
44. *Tujuh Mesin Pendulang Suara: Perkenalan, Prediksi, Harapan Pemilu 1999* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 1999), p. 110.

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45. "Jangan pernah paksa saya untuk asal bersuara, tanpa makna dan tanpa bukti nyata", *Republika*, 8 March 1999, cited in *Tujuh Mesin Pendulang Suara: Perkenalan, Prediksi, Harapan Pemilu 1999*, p. 105.
46. "Coblos presiden, siapa takut?", *Tempo*, 4 June 2000, p. 28.

8

Challenges Facing Gus Dur

There was initial confrontation between the Abdurrahman Wahid administration and the legislators. This chapter analyses various challenges faced by his administration and its responses to them, with special reference to the relationship between the President and other institutions which emerged after the fall of Soeharto. It also examines the parliamentary session of July 2000, which questioned Gus Dur, and the annual meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [MPR]) in August 2000 which ended with a Cabinet reshuffle.

Reduced Presidential Power

It should be pointed out that the presidential power of Gus Dur was different from that of Soeharto. During the Soeharto era, the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) could not subpoena the President. The DPR and MPR Law No. 4/1999 (Article 35) however, which was passed on 1 February 1999, empowers the DPR to subpoena the state and government officials (*pejabat negara dan pejabat pemerintah*) and citizens to supply information deemed crucial for the national interest.[1] The term "state and government officials" is open to conflicting interpretations. The DPR insisted that this category

included the President and immediately used this new power to summon President Habibie who was questioned on his sudden change in the East Timor policy and the Bank Bali scandal. However, Gus Dur maintained that only the MPR had the power to summon the President.[2]

Despite his insistence that the DPR did not have the power to summon him, Gus Dur was unable to ignore the "invitation" of the DPR in mid-2000 to answer questions regarding the dismissal of his Cabinet ministers.

Indeed, after the 1999 general election, the presidential power was further curtailed. When the MPR officially appointed Abdurrahman Wahid as the President of Indonesia on 19 October 1999, it stated that he was required to give a progress report to the MPR annually and an accountability report at the end of his term.[3] The first amendment of the 1945 Constitution, also endorsed on 19 October 1999, limits the presidential term. The amended clause allows the president to hold the position for only two terms.[4] This amendment is to close a loophole in the Constitution which states that the President should be re-elected every five years, with no mention of a term limit. With a second amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the DPR was further empowered to have rights to initiate laws and the President is given thirty days to endorse them. After the deadline, the laws would be effective even without the presidential endorsement.[5]

The curtailed presidential power and the increased power of the legislature have a bearing on Indonesian politics in general and Gus Dur's performance as President in particular.

Reform Attempts

Soon after assuming the presidency, Abdurrahman announced his "national unity" Cabinet. A major characteristic of his Cabinet was the absence of the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The press welcomed the abolition of the Ministry of Information as it was often seen as a government tool for suppressing press freedom as well as a source of corruption. Kwik Kian Gie, an economist belonging to the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan), was made the Co-ordinating Minister

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for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs. He was the first ethnic Chinese to be given a high position since the New Order. Juwono Sudarsono, a university professor majoring in international relations, was offered the position of Minister for Defence, the first civilian to hold this position in thirty-two years.

Recognizing the military's role in the government, Abdurrahman included six military generals — four active and two retired — in his thirty-five-member Cabinet. This was a compromised Cabinet — all major parties were included, until he dropped Hamzah Haz, chairman of the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), from the position of Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Eradication.[6] The presence of different party representatives in the Cabinet presented a problem for Abdurrahman. Often the Cabinet faced difficulties in reaching a decision as it consisted of members with diverse political ideologies and party interests. The compromised Cabinet was meant to avoid a clash and gain temporary peace. However, disagreement intensified and opposition to Gur Dur increased over time.

Gus Dur was the first Muslim preacher to become an Indonesian President, but he was known as a nationalist and moderate Muslim. He advocated *pribumisasi* (indigenization) of Islam, i.e. adapting Islam to suit Indonesian culture.[7] For example, he suggested that mosques could deviate from Middle Eastern architecture, and Indonesian characteristics could be incorporated into their design. He also suggested that Arabic greetings could be replaced with Indonesian words, but this was strongly criticized by the more traditional leaders. As a result, he had to back down.[8] However, he continued to practise some Javanese customs, defying the fundamentalist Islamic teaching. For instance, he believes in supernatural power and claims to have the ability to communicate with the dead. He has frequently visited the graves of well-known Islamic preachers and "talked" to them. When he was invited to serve as a member of the Simon Peres Institute of Israel, he only accepted the invitation after he visited the graves of his spiritual teachers and "consulted" them.[9] He also made a point to visit the graves of his father and grandfather before and after the presidential election.

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Abdurrahman prefers the Pancasila to Islam as an Indonesian state ideology. His party, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party), is based on the Pancasila rather than Islam. He viewed the Pancasila — i.e. religious freedom and equality — as the final form of the Indonesian state ideology.[10] Soon after he became President, he went to Bali to participate in a Hindu celebration.[11] However, to keep a balance, he also performed Friday prayers at various mosques as a means of regular communication with his fellow Muslims.[12]

Gus Dur as a liberal Muslim scholar is unique. He is tolerant towards other religions and cultures, and this has made him popular among non-Muslims. His concept of *Bangsa Indonesia* or the Indonesian nation is pluralistic. Before he became President, Abdurrahman Wahid was quoted as saying that the Indonesian nation comprised at least three races: Malay, Chinese, and Austro Melanesian (Ambonese, Irianese, etc.).[13] Not only did he include the ethnic Chinese as part of the Indonesian nation, he also accepted their culture and religious beliefs. His liberal attitude was also reflected in his policy towards the ethnic Chinese where under his presidency, the government relaxed certain restrictions. The most concrete example was his abolition of the 1967 Presidential Decision that prohibited the practice of Chinese traditions in public.[14] Some pillars of Chinese culture were restored. Chinese language newspapers and magazines, and ethnic Chinese organizations were permitted; Chinese language centres were also allowed, although Chinese-medium schools remained banned.

"New Order" Legacy

Gus Dur inherited the old regime, which had not been destroyed. The "New Order", to a large extent, remained. Abdurrahman took over the helm not through a revolution but through a peaceful transition with no major structural reform. The military still held some important positions. For instance, of 329 *bupati* (district chief)/mayors, 122 had military background. (See Table 8.1.)

It is also worth noting that between 1998–99, from twenty-seven provinces/special regions, fifteen governors had military backgrounds while twelve governors were civilians. The governors

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TABLE 8.1
***Bupati* and Mayors in Indonesia with Military Background**

Province	Total of *bupati* /mayors	No. of *bupati*/mayors with military background
Jakarta	5	1
West Java	28	9
Central Java	35	17
Yogyakarta	6	2
East Java	37	19
North Sumatra	19	6
Central Kalimantan	6	2
Aceh	13	2
South Sumatra	10	5
Riau	8	2
East Kalimantan	7	3
Central Sulawesi	5	3
Irian Jaya	14	4
South Sulawesi	24	4
Lampung	9	3
West Kalimantan	8	3
West Sumatra	14	7
Bali	9	4
Maluku	6	3
Central Nusa Tenggara	13	5
South Kalimantan	11	5
West Nusa Tenggara	7	3
Jambi	6	2
North Sulawesi	5	2
East Timor	13	3
Bengkulu	4	2
North Sulawesi	7	2
Total	329	119

Source: "Daftar Nama Kepala Daerah Tingkat I dan II (1998/1999) Dan Partai Pemenang Pemilu", computed by Sukardi Rinakit.

of provinces/special regions with the largest budgets (Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, and East Java) had military backgrounds.[15]

The bureaucratic positions still seemed to be in the hands of people who could afford to pay.[16] For instance, only a few

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candidates contested the positions of *bupati* and mayor, and many had been won by those who had funds to distribute. The winners were likely to be members of the "New Order". Old and corrupt bureaucrats were still in power and corruption was still rampant. Gus Dur was unable to defeat the old forces. The pro-Soeharto/Habibie group and the military — or at least a group within it — tried to destabilize the Gus Dur government which set about to investigate abuse of power and corruption. The military was worried that with political stability under civilian rule, its traditional dual function (*dwifungsi*) doctrine would end rapidly. It is believed that the pro-Soeharto group engineered regional and religious conflicts. There were allegations that they financed and supported provocateurs to continue to destabilize the Gus Dur administration so that they would escape punishment and the military could stay in politics.

Nevertheless, the military was not united in their view regarding the role of the military. During the Gus Dur administration, the military could be divided into the pro-reform group, the pro-status quo group and the neutral group. The pro-reform group, which was pro-Abdurrahman, was led by General Agus Wirahadikusumah (then Regional Commander of Wirabuana) and General Ryamizard Ryacudu (Regional Commander of Jakarta), while the pro-status quo group, which was against Gus Dur, was led by General Wiranto (former Co-ordinating Minister of Defence and Security) and General Fachrul Rozi (former Deputy Chief of the Army). The neutral group was led by General Agus Widjojo (Head of the Territorial Affairs) and General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (former Minister of Mines and Energy and former Co-ordinating Minister for Security Affairs).[17] This last group did not oppose reform but favoured a gradual process. It seems that this was the largest group within the military. The members of this group had different attitudes towards Gus Dur but many supported him, at least initially. Gus Dur maintained that only 10 per cent of the military officers were against him but he did not name them.[18] It soon became clear, however, that Gus Dur was fighting an uphill battle with the military.

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Disengaging the Military

President Abdurrahman represented the civilian rather than military interests. He attempted to gradually disengage the military, especially the army, from politics.[19] He believed that this would eventually lead to peace and stability in Indonesia. As soon as he assumed the presidency, Gus Dur adopted a strategy to balance the army by cultivating both the navy and the air force. Initially, Gus Dur appeared to have the upper hand as he succeeded in putting a civilian (Dr Juwono Sudarsono) as the Defence Minister and an Admiral (Widodo) as the Commander of the Armed Forces. During Soeharto's rule, the Defence Minister was never held by a civilian. Indonesia also never had an Admiral as the Commander of the Armed Forces. Gus Dur also succeeded in replacing General Sudradjat, the spokesman of the Armed Forces, after Sudradjat commented that civilians should not intervene in military affairs. The position was given to a Brigadier-General in the Air Force, Graito Usodo. To further undermine the military power in politics, before his overseas tour, Gus Dur had signed a presidential instruction to force the four generals, including General Wiranto, who were in his Cabinet, to retire early, effective 1 March 2000. When the news was leaked, there was a lukewarm response from three of the generals. There was no comment from Wiranto.

Gus Dur used the support of Western countries to promote civilian supremacy. Not surprisingly, soon after he became President, he visited the United States and met with President Bill Clinton, who openly warned the Indonesian military not to stage a coup. It was not a coincidence that Gus Dur used the opportunity of the overseas trip to announce his desire for General Wiranto to resign due to his alleged involvement in the East Timor human rights atrocities. Wiranto and four other generals were implicated in the East Timor killings during his term as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.[20] However, Wiranto refused to resign insisting that he wanted to wait for Gus Dur's return to Indonesia. The pro-reform General Agus Wirahadikusumah commented that Wiranto should resign and join Golkar if he was interested in politics.[21] Other generals were restrained and discussed the differences within the military internally.

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Wiranto had the support of some regional commanders. His civilian friends in the Islamic parties, such as the PPP and the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), also expressed their support.[22] The situation in Jakarta became tense and rumours of a coup spread. However, the United States warned the military not to consider such a move. Under pressure, General Wiranto was forced to make a statement saying that he would not initiate a coup. To prove his point, Wiranto stated that the military had had two previous opportunities to take over power — when Soeharto stepped down and when the students occupied the Parliament Building — but he had not taken advantage of the situation. However, rumours of a coup continued to be circulated. Gus Dur realized that he was not powerful enough when his repeated requests for Wiranto to step down went unheeded. Instead, he praised Wiranto for saving his life when General Feisal Tanjung was Commander-in-Chief.[23]

Upon Gus Dur's return, Wiranto and others met him at the airport. Gus Dur reversed his earlier decision and allowed Wiranto to stay in the Cabinet until the completion of the East Timor investigation by the Attorney-General. However, within twelve hours, Gus Dur changed his decision again as there was a rumour that Wiranto attended a meeting with the pro-Habibie generals (one of the attendees was Feisal Tanjung).[24] Gus Dur doubted Wiranto's sincerity, and this led to his actual removal. The Minister for Home Affairs, Lieutenant-General (retired) Surjadi Sudirdja, took over the position. This incident showed that Gus Dur was weak and had to solicit support from other military generals. It seems that the generals in the neutral group eventually sided with him, at least during this period. Even Admiral Widodo A.S. who was quite close to Wiranto supported Gus Dur's decision to remove Wiranto. Gus Dur only took firm action against Wiranto after he was able to gauge the military's support.[25]

Using this advantageous position, Gus Dur immediately asked Major-General Tyasno Sudarto, the Army Chief, to summon Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah to Jakarta, leading to the purge of the Wiranto group and the promotion of the Twenty-Man Group (Kelompok-20), which was known to support the President.[26] Agus

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was promoted to be the Commander of the Strategic Command (Kostrad) while Djadja Suparman, a Wiranto supporter, was transferred to head the Military Academy.[27] Gus Dur thus won the second battle in establishing civilian supremacy. However, his victory appeared to be short-lived, because his chosen general, Agus Wirahadikusumah, was able to hold his position for only a few months. Gus Dur had to make a concession to the Wiranto and Widodo groups. Agus Wirahadikusumah was replaced by Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was still close to Gus Dur but was less controversial. Apparently, Wiranto still had a strong influence in the military. Gus Dur had been able to rely on Tyasno Sudarto, the Chief of the Army, but Tyasno had fewer supporters in the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Armed Forces), "especially in the MPR where most of them have been handpicked by former army strongman Wiranto".[28] To gain military support, it was reported that:

> the generals were able to secure guarantees that the armed forces economic interests remained untouched and the government would "go easy" on ongoing investigations into human rights atrocities in East Timor and Aceh.[29]

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that Wiranto was not listed as one of the generals who were involved in the human rights abuse in East Timor. Gus Dur's scheme in establishing civilian supremacy had thus been temporarily compromised, if not halted.

However, the President did not stop manipulating the military. Towards the end of 2000, Fachrul Razi, the Deputy Chief of the TNI who was close to Wiranto, lost his job as the position was abolished.[30] However, it is not clear why Chief of the Army (KSAD) General Tyasno Sudarto, was replaced by his deputy, Lieutenant-General Endiartono Sutarto. According to *Gatra*, Endiartono was close to Megawati and the most senior among the eligible candidates, showing her increased influence with the military.[31] It is possible that Gus Dur had no choice but to accept Endiartono as part of a reshuffle.

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Ethnic Nationalism and Religious Conflict

Apart from the military, Abdurrahman also faced the challenges of ethnic nationalism and religious sectarianism. There had been a rise of ethnic nationalism in the Outer Islands as discontent reached new heights.[32] To solve the problem, Abdurrahman visited the United States and the Middle Eastern countries to explain the Indonesian situation and gain continuing support for Indonesia's territorial integrity from these countries. His visits to the Middle East were especially to garner support from the Islamic countries for his administration; otherwise the support might go to the Acehnese separatists. However, domestically he did not take concrete measures to reduce, if not resolve, the conflicts.

The ethnic conflicts were already evident when Abdurrahman became the President but the animosity in Aceh, Maluku, and Irian Jaya intensified. In Aceh, members of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Aceh Independent Movement) refused to lay down their arms and continued to clash with government forces. In Maluku, Muslims and Christians clashed, resulting in bloodshed. In Irian Jaya, the Papuans who formed the Gerakan Papua Merdeka (GPM, or Papua Independent Movement) fought with government troops. These conflicts stemmed both from socio-economic and political reasons. It appears that there are common factors in all these provinces — they are resource-rich yet their "indigenous" migrant groups are economically better off than their locals. In addition, during the last decade of Soeharto's rule, the military introduced repressive measures to stem dissent in these provinces. Furthermore, the central government took away the lion's share of their local revenues, leaving meagre sums for local development needs. In order to pacify their grievances, Gus Dur introduced a soft policy towards these provinces. He even promised an East Timor style referendum to the Acehnese — but this was later withdrawn. His promise to allow the Acehnese to retain 75 per cent of their local revenues was not kept either.[33] Nevertheless, he allowed the Acehnese to practise Islamic laws within their domain. Gus Dur also permitted the Papuans of Irian Jaya to raise the Papuan flag and agreed to attend a Papuan Congress — but reversed the decision upon realizing its wider implications.

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The ethnic and religious problems Indonesia faces are complex and not easy to solve. The long-term distrust towards Jakarta among the Outer Islands cannot be eradicated overnight. Gus Dur attempted to redress the grievances of the various ethnic groups in the Outer Islands by immediately implementing a package for autonomy in January 2001, but this turned out to be far from satisfactory. The package was ambiguous, requiring more detailed regulations prior to its implementation.[34] Moreover, Gus Dur's "soft" strategies were not favoured by either the military or many hard-core nationalists. There was also a split among the Jakarta élite. Religious and ethnic tensions continued and the situation deteriorated further. Gus Dur mentioned that some generals worsened the situation in Aceh. It was also reported that in Maluku, the military supported the Christians in their massacre of Muslims and attacks on mosques. Later, the miliary turned its back on the Christians and sided with the Muslims.[35]

Islamic Hard-liners

Gus Dur was also faced with the problem of controlling his Islamic hard-liners and radical colleagues from pushing Indonesia into becoming an Islamic state. Although Abdurrahman was supported by the Muslim groups in the MPR in his bid to become the President, this co-religious solidarity was short-lived. Some Islamic leaders, including Amien Rais who supported him during the presidential election, became critical of his policy on the religious conflict. When Muslims were reported to have been murdered by Christians in Maluku in February 2000, Amien Rais joined the rally of Muslims in Jakarta criticizing the government. He even agreed to merge his party with three other Islamic parties — the PPP, the PBB, and the Partai Keadilan (PK) — to contest the next election.[36] Amien Rais changed his view on the Pancasila and wanted to establish an Islamic state. When Gus Dur was asked about this by the press, he firmly answered that he would stick to the concept of a Pancasila state opposing "Amien Rais's intention to create an Islamic state".[37] (Amien later changed his position again.)

The fundamentalist group did not let up in their efforts to

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push for an Islamic state. In an MPR session held in August 2000 when the Indonesian Constitution underwent a second amendment, this group, represented by the PPP, insisted that the Jakarta Charter be restored in the Constitution. That Charter included a clause that Muslims are "obliged to carry out the *syariat* [Islamic law]". However, the motion was defeated in the MPR as the government argued that the state should not meddle with religious matters. The government's position was also supported by various major parties. Nevertheless, Islam had grown tremendously after the fall of Soeharto and any non-Islamic government would have to face the Islamic challenge in the future.

Amien Rais' Challenge

At this juncture, it is important to discuss briefly Amien Rais' relationship with Abdurrahman as Amien was a major challenger to the President's position. Amien Rais, who was then the MPR chairman, became increasingly critical towards Abdurrahman. When Gus Dur proposed the abolition of the 1966 Regulation No. 66 banning communism, Amien mobilized Muslims and anti-communist groups to counter Gus Dur's suggestion. When the President fired his two ministers in charge of economic matters, political parties with which the ministers were affiliated were offended. Amien took the opportunity to attack Gur Dur again. Amien seemed to be aiming for the presidential position in the next election.

Let us look briefly at Amien's background. Among the three top leaders in Indonesia at that time, there is no doubt that Amien had the highest academic qualification. He was awarded a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago after submitting a dissertation on "The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt" in 1984.[38]

However, he was perceived by some quarters to be the most sectarian among the three leaders before he became a national figure. He was born into a Muhammadiayah family and educated in Muhammadiyah institutions from primary to high school level. His grandfather and his parents were leaders of Muhammadiyah. From the time of his birth in 1944 until his graduation from high school, Amien had never left Solo (Surakarta). He only left his

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birthplace when he attended tertiary education in Yogyakarta. He studied at the Gadjah Mada University and an Islamic College.

His attitude towards non-Muslims appeared to be intolerant — at least this was the case before his rise to a national position. He urged the Muslim community not to subscribe to or read *Kompas* as this was the "Priests' Paper" (*Koran Pastur*).[39] However, his attitude changed after he gained the top leadership position in the Muhammadiyah. (In 1994, he was acting president of Muhammadiyah and from 1995–2000, the president.) The change was particularly obvious when he was involved in the *Reformasi* (Reform) movement at the time of the fall of Soeharto — mobilizing the masses required being accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. When he established the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party) in 1998, he was thus able to project himself as a national rather than a Muhammadiyah leader. He has accepted Christians and Chinese into his party leadership. For example, one of the PAN chairmen, K. Sindhunata, is a Chinese Catholic; Alvin Lie, a Member of Parliament representing PAN, is also a Catholic.

Many Islamic leaders want to establish an Islamic state for Indonesia, but Amien has argued that there was no concept of an Islamic state in the Qur'an — but that the state has to be guided by Islamic teachings. He favoured the establishment of an Islamic society for Indonesia, which brought him to clash with Abdurrahman Wahid. Abdurrahman considered an "Islamic society" to be another name for an Islamic state. Gus Dur wanted a Pancasila state for Indonesia; Amien was prepared to accept the Pancasila, provided that it did not come into conflict with Islam. For Amien, Islam is supreme and is, therefore, higher than the state. Nevertheless, it was Amien who proposed that Gus Dur be the President, yet it was also Amien who became a severe critic of the man.

The Economic Crisis

A great challenge faced by Gus Dur was the economic problem which remained unresolved. Up to April 2000, the rupiah was maintained at Rp7,000 per U.S. dollar, due largely to the

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International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. However, Gus Dur was inexperienced in handling economic matters and his economic team was seen as lacking in effectiveness. It was proving difficult, if not impossible, to correct the mistakes made by Soeharto in thirty-two years over a short period of time.

As a nationalist, Gus Dur wanted Indonesia to be independent of the IMF. But to achieve this, Indonesia needed to revitalize its economy, especially through new foreign investments. However, new capital did not come in as much as expected. Although many Chinese Indonesians had returned to Indonesia after fleeing during the May 1998 riots, the capital that had left the country had not yet returned. This was due to the unstable political situation in the country. If the Chinese capital did not return, other foreign private investment might also have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. This caused a severe delay in Indonesia's economic recovery.

Equally important was the recapitalization of banks and the repayment of Indonesian debt in the private and public sectors. Gus Dur moved slowly in this field as he lacked the expertise in economic matters. Compounding the problem, members of his economic team, which comprised many rival groups, were unable to co-operate, resulting in confusion and delay in implementing urgent economic programmes. Gus Dur often changed his decisions when faced with strong opposition regarding certain economic policies. However, resolving the economic problems was essential for bringing about political stability. Unfortunately, Gus Dur was plagued with scandals (involving in particular Bulog [National Logistics Board] and funds from the Sultan of Brunei), and the value of the rupiah plunged to an all-time low of Rp11,600 to the U.S. dollar since he came to office (see Table 8.2). The economy continued to suffer.

Cronyism and Abuse of Power

Yet another great challenge to Gus Dur was cronyism. After assuming power, he was drawn into money politics and the world of cronyism. In an attempt to consolidate power, he began to put his people in key positions. For instance, he dismissed State Secretary Ali Rahman and replaced him with his confidant, Bondan

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TABLE 8.2
Rupiah's Slump during Gus Dur's Tenure (Monthly Average against US$1)

Month	Rupiah
October 1999	6,825
January 2000	7,440
April 2000	7,925
July 2000	8,935
January 2001	9,440
February 2001	9,855
March 2001	10,425
April 2001	11,600
May 2001	11,305

Source: *Straits Times*, 31 May 2001.

Gunawan. In May 2000, he appointed his brother, Hasyim Wahid, as the adviser of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to help speed up its collection of debts. This resulted in a lot of criticism.[40] Hasyim was pressured to resign. Gus Dur also used his prerogative to dismiss Laksamana Sukardi (Minister for Investment and State Enterprises, of the PDI-P) and Jusuf Kalla (Minister for Trade, of Golkar), and replaced them with his men. He was criticized for these dismissals and the Parliament wanted to question him.[41]

What eventually tainted his reputation were the scandals involving Bulog and the donation from the Sultan of Brunei. His friends (one of them was Suwondo, who is known as Gus Dur's masseur) made use of Gus Dur's name to obtain Rp35 billion (US$3.9 million) from Bulog for unknown purposes. It was later revealed that the bulk of the money went into personal pockets.[42] With regard to funds from the donation of the Sultan of Brunei, Gus Dur was accused of mishandling them. His close associate, Bondan Gunawan, took the blame and resigned from the State Secretariat, but this did not stop the criticisms. Abdurrahman Wahid suddenly discovered that some of his old allies were distancing themselves from him.

In June 2000, Gus Dur was questioned by the Parliament about the dismissal of the two Cabinet ministers and the Bulog

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scandal involving his men. He became arrogant and defied the Parliament by quoting his prerogative as the President to dismiss his ministers and refused to furnish an explanation. He aggravated the situation by falling asleep during the DPR session, resulting in further attacks by the Members of Parliament. One of the major critics in the Parliament was his ally, the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan). Islamic parties also joined forces. Realizing that he had angered the Members of Parliament, Gus Dur eventually apologized to the DPR, the law-making body.

His troubles were not yet over: he had to attend the annual session of the MPR in August 2000 to explain what his administration had done in the past ten months. However, he learned from his mistake during the DPR session and began to be more compromising. He formed a team to draft his speech. (The team was led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the newly retired general who was then his Minister for Mines and Energy.) By this stage, Gus Dur was fending off criticisms that he was unable to perform his duties effectively. In response, Gus Dur stated that he was willing to hand over the day-to-day administration of government to Megawati. This was taken to mean that Gus Dur was ready to share power with Megawati but towards the end of the MPR session, it became clear that he was unwilling to do so. Indeed, in order to give away some of the presidential power, the Constitution had to be amended — but this was not done.

During the MPR session, Gus Dur also agreed to reshuffle the Cabinet. He wanted a leaner and more effective team, 60 per cent from the professional groups and only 40 per cent from political parties. But when the new Cabinet was announced, the new team of ministers was seen to be less capable than the previous team.[43] The Cabinet was trimmed from 35 to 25 but the economic team consisted of people with questionable experience. It was very clear that Gus Dur's new Cabinet included people who were either close to him, or were beholden to him. Again, Gus Dur showed that he was a master of political intrigue — he appeared to have compromised with the MPR but in reality he strengthened his personal power and position. However, he had to compromise with the military by appointing Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to be the Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs.

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Concluding Remarks

Gus Dur inherited the problems left by Soeharto and Habibie. Initially he began to undertake reforms, which included introducing "civilian supremacy", with some success. He was also interested in promoting democracy, insisting on having a secular Pancasila state rather than a Muslim/Islamic state. As a Muslim scholar, his neutral attitude towards religion was welcome by many moderate Muslims and non-Muslims. The people had high expectations of him but he was unable to deliver, due partly to the presence of the old forces and partly to his own actions. Political instability persisted and the economy did not improve. The President was later involved in money politics and cronyism, resulting in increased attacks on him by his opponents.

As a leader of a medium-sized party, Gus Dur was unable to gain enough support in the legislature, but he believed that he had wider powers under the 1945 Constitution, and would be able to stay in power without making real compromises. His own behaviour eventually pushed him closer to the road leading to eventual impeachment.

Notes

1. "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 4 Tahun 1999 Tentang Susunan Kedudukan MPR, DPR dan DPRD", in *UU Politik Buah Reformasi Setengah Hati,* edited by Thamrin Sonata (Jakarta: Yayasan Pariba, 1999), p. 279.
2. See "Amien Sarankan Gus Dur Penuhi Undangan Pansus Bulog", *Tempo Interaktif*, 19 January 2001.
3. "Ketetapan MPR Nomor I/MPR tentang Perubahan Pertama atas Ketetapan MPR Nomor II/MPR/1999 tentang Peraturan Tata Tertib MPR RI", see *Pokok-Pokok Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPR Tahun 2000 dan Proses Pembahasannya* (Jakarta: Badan Pekerja MPR Republik Indonesia, September 2000), p. 9.
4. *Perubahan Pertama dan Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945* (Jakarta: Badan Pekerja MPRS RI, September 2000), p. 16.
5. Ibid., p. 33.
6. See Appendix III for the list of Cabinet ministers and their affiliation.
7. For a discussion on Gus Dur's *pribumisasi* of Islam, see Ahmad

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Bahar, *Biografi Kiai Politik: Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta: Binautama, 1999), pp. 20–29; "Abdurrahman Wahid dan Islam", in *Essential Indonesian Reading: A Learner's Guide II*, edited by Liaw Yock Fang and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Edition, 1999), pp. 168–69.

8. Liaw and Suryadinata, *Essential Indonesian Reading*.
9. For a description of Gus Dur's habits and religious beliefs, see "Tiga Radar Gus Presiden", *Tempo*, 31 October 1999, p. 28.
10. For an analysis of Abdurrahman's political ideology, especially his idea of Pancasila and Islam, see Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), especially pp. 45–74. Gus Dur had long argued that Muslims should embrace the Pancasila. He regarded the Pancasila as the precondition for democratization and the healthy spiritual development of Islam in a national context. Ramage argued that "This is a position that contrasts with many of the 'modernists' who seek to'Islamize' Indonesia." (p. 52). See Abdurrahman Wahid, *Islam, Negara dan Demokrasi: Himpunan Percikan Perenungan Gus Dur* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga), pp. 13–24. After becoming President, Gus Dur continued to reject the concept of an "Islamic state" for Indonesia; see "Gus Dur Tak Ingin Dirikan Negara Islam", *Suara Merdeka*, 15 January 2000.
11. "President attends Hindu mass prayers", <www.thejakartapost.com>. 25 October 1999.
12. "Presiden Gunakan Masjid Untuk Komunikasi", *Tempo Interaktif*, 30 October 1999.
13. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Prolog: PKB didirikan oleh PBNU", in *Pro-Kontra Partai Kebangsaan*, edited by Munib Huda Muhammad (Jakarta: Fatma Press, 1998), pp. 7–8.
14. For a detailed discussion of Gus Dur's policy towards the Chinese, see Leo Suryadinata, "Chinese Politics in Post-Suharto's Indonesia: Beyond the Ethnic Approach", *Asian Survey*, May–June 2001.
15. "Data Latar Belakang Gubernur dan Penerimaan Asli Daerah 1998/1999", courtesy of Sukardi Rinakit.
16. Information given by two persons who participated in the local elections for either mayor or *bupati* position.
17. Since the end of the Soeharto regime, the military has been divided into at least three groups: the reformists, the conservatives, and the neutralists. The division remains but the personnel within this group changes. During the Habibie presidency, Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono belonged to the neutralist group, and General Subagjo belonged to the conservative group. But during the Abdurrahman

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presidency, they split and Wiranto became the leader of the conservative group. Below is the list of generals (identified with their positions then) and the groups they belonged to:

Conservative (anti-reform)	*Neutralist (the middle group)*	*Reformist*
Wiranto (Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security, removed in February 2000)	Agus Widjojo (Head of Territorial Affairs Section)	Agus Wirahadikusumah (Regional Commander, Wirabuana) (Army)
Fachrul Rozi (Deputy Commander-in-Chief)	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Minister for Mines and Energy)	Graito Usodo (Military spokesman) (Air Force)
Syamsul Ma'arif (Governor of the Military Academy)	Tyasno Sudarto (Chief of the Army)	Ryamizard Ryacudu (Jakarta Regional Commander) (Army)
Sudi Silalahi (Regional Commander, Brawijaya)	Agum Gumelar (Minister for Communications)	Ian Santoso Perdanakusumah (Director of Intelligence Service) (Army)
Djadja Suparman (Head of the Strategic Command)		Romulo Simbolon (currently no formal position)

Source: "Siapa dilorot setelah Wiranto", *Tempo*, 13 February 2000, p. 24; "Babak Akhir Jenderal Wiranto", *Tempo*, 20 February 2000, p. 24; "Ini Dia Kelompok-20", *Tempo*, 12 March 2000, pp. 30–31, and discussions with informants. *Tempo* argued that the pro-Gus Dur group included Tyasno Sudarto, but I was informed that Tyasno was closer to the Middle Group in terms of his ideas.

18. "Siapa dilorot setelah Wiranto", *Tempo*, 13 February 2000, p. 24. "Gus Dur Reveals Coup Attempt", *Jakarta Post*, 15 March 2000.
19. For a collection of essays and reports on Gus Dur's strategies to weaken the military, see *Supremasi Sipil? Agenda Politik Militer Gus*

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Dur, edited by F. X. Bambang Irawan (Yogyakarta: Lembaga Studi Resistensi Bangsa, 2000).

20. On 31 January 2000, the Indonesian human rights committee released a report implicating Wiranto and four other generals for abuse of human rights. (These four generals are: Major-General Adam R. Damiri, Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, Brigadier-General F. X. Tono Suratman, and Brigadier-General [Police] Timbul Silaen.) On 1 February Gus Dur who was then in Davos, Switzerland, was asked to comment on the report and he said he would like Wiranto to step down. He made the same statement again in London and also during the whole duration of his trip. Nevertheless, his words became less harsh as time passed but he insisted that Wiranto step down. He returned to Indonesia on 13 February. For the development of the events leading to Wiranto's stepping down, see "Militer dalam tarik ulur Gus Presiden", *Tempo*, 20 February 2000. For the list of the military figures who were implicated in the abuse of human rights in East Timor, see "Mereka Baru Tersangka", *Tempo*, 13 February 2000, p. 23.
21. "Pak Nas menyesalkan silang pendapat di TNI", *Suara Merdeka*, 19 February 2000.
22. "Peta militer pasca-Jenderal Wiranto", *Suara Merdeka*, 19 February 2000.
23. "Nyawa saya dan Mega pernah diselamatkan", *Kompas*, 7 February 2000.
24. "Babak akhir Jenderal Wiranto", *Tempo*, 20 February 2000, p. 24.
25. In an interview with *Far Eastern Economic Review* during the climax of the event, Gus Dur appeared to have a grand strategy towards the military. See "Wahid Promises to Shake Up the Brass", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 February 2000, p. 10.
26. The Twenty-Man Group refers to a group of Military Academy graduates of 1973 who were in favour of the concept of a professional military rather than a political military. "Ini Dia-Kelompok-20", *Tempo*, 12 March 2000, pp. 30–31.
27. Ibid.
28. Derwin Pereira, "Deals will weaken Gus Dur, but he will survive", *Straits Times*, 5 August 2000.
29. Ibid.
30. "Udara jadi Panglima", *Gatra*, 30 September 2000, p. 40.
31. "Agus Hilang Tono Terbilang", *Gatra*, 14 October 2000, p. 26.
32. For a short account and the chronology of the conflicts, see Erwin H. Al-Jakartaty, *Tragedi Bumi Seribu Pulau: Mengkritisi Kebijakan Pemerintah*

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dan Solusi Penyelesaian Konflik (Jakarta: Gubuk Kajian Muitara Nasional, 2000).

33. Leo Suryadinata, "Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying: The Challenge of Globalization in Indonesia", in *Nationalism and Globalization: East and West*, edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 55.
34. Trevor Buising, "A Century of Decentralization", *Inside Indonesia*, No. 63 (July–September 2000), pp. 8–9.
35. Tim Penyusun Al-Mukmin, *Tragedi Ambon* (Jakarta: Yayasan Al-Mukmin, 1999); *Straits Times*, 26 January 2000.
36. "PPP, PAN dan PBB Capai 'Kesepakatan Monas' untuk Bergabung", *Kompas*, 7 January 2000.
37. *Suara Merdeka,* 15 January 2000.
38. The information on Amien in this section is based on Ahmad Bahar, *Amien Rais: Gagasan dan Pemikiran Menggapai Masa Depan Indonesia Baru* (Yogyakarta: Pena Cendekia, 1998).
39. The two founders of *Kompas*, Ojong P. K. and Jakob Oetama, are Indonesian Catholics. But *Kompas* is the largest newspaper in Indonesia and its readership is not confined to the Christian community.
40. "Gus Dur's brother joins bank agency as an expert", *Straits Times*, 11 May 2000.
41. "Gunung Es di bawah Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid", *Tempo*, 28 May 2000.
42. "Misteri Penadah Dana Jarahan Bulog", *Tempo,* 28 May 2000, pp. 18–19.
43. See Appendix III for the list of the new Cabinet.

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9

The Rise of Mega

The conflict between President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and the legislators resulted in his impeachment despite his attempts at various strategies to avoid such a fate. Both the President and the legislators claimed that they had acted according to the Indonesian Constitution. The Cabinet ministers and political parties had offered a last minute compromise, but it was rejected by Gus Dur. He was eventually ousted. The roles of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) and MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly) give insight into the way Indonesia's system of government handled the unique and critical situation, including a parliamentary censure, a state of emergency, use of executive powers, different interpretations of the Constitution, and eventual impeachment proceedings.

The DPR Censure

Gus Dur's "crony Cabinet" had angered many political party leaders, especially those who did not have Cabinet positions. The DPR which was dominated by Gus Dur's opponents, continued to pursue the two scandals. This law-making body formed a Special Committee, known as the "Pansus Bulog dan Brunei", which subpoenaed Gus Dur in January 2001 to explain his possible

involvement in the Badan Urusan Logistik, or National Logistic Board (dubbed as Buloggate) and the Sultan of Brunei's donation (dubbed as Bruneigate) scandals. Some DPR members pressured Gus Dur to resign and thousands of students demonstrated against him. Initially Gus Dur refused to comply with the subpoena as he argued that it was unconstitutional, and only the MPR had the power to summon him. However, he eventually agreed to meet the Special Committee on 22 January 2001 at the Jakarta Convention Centre, not in the Parliament Building. He told the Committee that it was illegal, and accused it of being politically motivated to remove him.[1] After making the statement, Gus Dur refused to answer questions concerning the two scandals and left the meeting abruptly.

The Special Committee was dismayed. Without Gus Dur's co-operation, the Committee decided to submit its findings on the Buloggate and Bruneigate scandals to the DPR. Before the Committee's thirty-four-page report had been officially released, the contents were already "leaked" to the press. According to a newspaper report, Gus Dur had apparently known Suwondo since 1986 and the latter had introduced the former deputy chief of Bulog, Sapuan, to the President. Several witnesses also said that the President gave a Rp5 billion cheque, forming part of the Bulog foundation funds, to his businesswoman friend, Siti Farikha.[2] The Special Committee Report mentioned that the disbursement of the funds was related to presidential-planned humanitarian aid to Aceh. "But it is strange that the funds disbursed from the Bulog foundation were given to four persons who have no connection with the planned humanitarian aid to Aceh."[3] The report further argued that:

> the testimony of former Bulog officials and former Police Chief indicated that the President helped Suwondo to disburse the funds and the President played a role in spending them.[4]

Regarding the Brunei scandal, the report said that the Special Committee found an inconsistency in the use of the donation from the Sultan of Brunei, which the President claimed to be a personal gift.

> The president claimed the funds were distributed to Aceh, West Kalimantan, Ambon, and Irian Jaya while according to the President's friend (Musnah) who admitted managing the funds, they were only distributed to Aceh and Riau.[5]

The Special Committee also found that the President had not included this donation in the 2000 state budget as required by the 1997 law.

On 1 February 2001, the Special Committee Report was accepted by the majority of the Members of Parliament (MPs), except for fifty-one members of the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party) and four members of the PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa). The MPs representing the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Armed Forces) and the police force also accepted the report, indicating their displeasure towards Gus Dur. Outside the Parliament Building, students demonstrated, albeit on a small scale. Some students supported the President, while others demanded his resignation. The demonstrators who were against Gus Dur were said to have been hired. After hours of negotiations, the Parliament eventually reached a consensus to issue a memorandum, rather than a demand, on having a special MPR session to impeach the President, further prolonging the political crisis. The DPR issued a memorandum which reads:

> Parliament hereby decides to issue a memorandum to reprimand Abdurrahman Wahid in that he has indeed violated the state guidelines, namely the 1945 Constitution article on professional oaths, and a People's Consultative Assembly decree on good governance.[6]

Gus Dur had three months to reply. Amien Rais, the chairman of the MPR and Nurcholish Madjid, a respected Muslim scholar, urged him to resign. Nurcholish later changed his mind while Amien pursued the matter. However, Gus Dur was defiant. He refused to accept the Report. Instead, he decided to gather a 100-lawyer defence team, intending to sue those whom he considered to have defamed him. It was also reported that his aides threatened to expose his opponents for corruption.[7]

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Meanwhile the pro-Gus Dur forces began to take action against Golkar (Golongan Karya) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party). In East Java, the base of the NU (Nadhlatul Ulama), violent conflicts between the supporters of the two groups took place.[8] The conflicts escalated. Amien Rais organized a campaign to gather the signatures of DPR members to force Gus Dur to step down immediately. However, Megawati instructed her party members in the DPR not to take part, fearing that it would trigger further instability.

Gus Dur continued to claim that Megawati and the military still supported him. Megawati herself remained silent, with the military appearing to be supporting her. Megawati was reluctant to take over the helm from Gus Dur, especially when the President had refused to hand over power. It is also possible that Megawati wanted to prevent bloodshed between the pro- and anti-Gus Dur groups; both sides had mobilized their masses to demonstrate in the streets and to destroy the offices of their opponents. However, Megawati later changed her mind when Gus Dur became arrogant and refused to make any compromise. She had no choice but to take the helm from Gus Dur.

Gus Dur was under pressure but he remained defiant. On 27 March 2001, he eventually replied to the memorandum. Gus Dur claimed his innocence on the Buloggate affair, insisting that he had not violated the State Direction as asserted in the memorandum. He also asserted that the funds received from the Sultan of Brunei were a personal gift, and not a donation to the state. He maintained that he was the one who provided the information to the public. Had he not volunteered the information, no one could have known about the donation.[9] The DPR was hostile to Gus Dur's response. Many MPs wanted to send a second memorandum but the majority preferred to wait until the 30 March deadline. On that date, a vote was taken in Parliament and the majority decided to serve Gus Dur a second memorandum. The MPs of the PKB walked out before the voting while their counterparts from the military/police abstained. The latter wanted to show a neutral attitude towards Gus Dur, although by this time the military had already favoured Megawati. With the second censure of the DPR, Gus Dur had another two months, up to

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30 May 2001, to respond before the DPR could ask the MPR to start the impeachment process.

The PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan) and Golkar, the two largest parties in the Parliament, wanted Gus Dur to make compromises. Akbar Tanjung suggested that Gus Dur keep the presidency but transfer the presidential power, in part or in full, to Megawati. Akbar also proposed that Megawati be given the power to form her own Cabinet. However, Gus Dur was unwilling to give up power. According to *Tempo*, in early May, Gus Dur's Cabinet ministers, namely Chief Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Defence Minister Mahfud MD, Justice Minister Burhanuddin Lopa, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, Interior Minister Surjadi Soedirdja, Chief Economics Minister Rizal Ramly, and Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, favoured a compromise between the President and the political parties.[10] These ministers were later known as the Team of Seven which had attempted to bridge the gap between Gus Dur and the head of political parties, particularly Megawati. After protracted negotiations, the Team of Seven eventually proposed a draft solution to the Indonesian political crisis, which was endorsed by Megawati.[11] The draft suggested the separation of functions between the head of state and the head of government:

> Almost all of the authority of [the] head of government would be transferred to Megawati, although legally speaking, the functions were still in the hands of the President. This would prevent constitutional complications. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution does not permit breaking up these two functions. It states that both are in the hands of the President. If agreed, this formula will be enshrined through a presidential decree and then strengthened through an MPR decree passed in an MPR special session.[12]

The draft also states one important note:

> There must be agreement that the special session will be called only to discuss the one agenda item, not others, such as replacing the President.[13]

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According to the same source, the draft was presented to Gus Dur by the Team of Seven. Megawati also handed the same draft to Gus Dur at the presidential palace on 9 May 2001. Had it been accepted, Gus Dur could have remained as President but without executive powers. However, Gus Dur rejected it.

Gus Dur Fights Back

On 30 May 2001, the Indonesian Parliament voted to hold an MPR special session on 1 August 2001, initiating the impeachment process against Gus Dur.

The majority of parliamentarians charged Gus Dur with corruption and erratic leadership, forcing him to transfer his power to his deputy, Megawati. Gus Dur, on the other hand, continued to deny any wrongdoing in the Buloggate and Bruneigate scandals. Instead, he claimed that there was a political conspiracy to overthrow him. He refused to step down and insisted on completing his presidential term, scheduled to end in 2004.

The Parliament had censured Gus Dur twice before initiating a motion to call for a special session of the MPR. Gus Dur had used a number of strategies in order to stay in power; one of which was to claim that the country would disintegrate if he were to step down as President. There was no strong evidence on this but he continued to use it as his reason for staying on.

Secondly, violence had been used as a political weapon to warn his opponents that if the Parliament forced him to quit, his supporters would retaliate by staging violent protests. Although Gus Dur was against violence, he did not stop his supporters from resorting to this move in order to defend him.

The third strategy was to gain the support of the other members of the Sukarno family. Gus Dur succeeded in winning over Rahmawati, Megawati's younger sister, to his side. Rahmawati openly warned her sister to remain as Gus Dur's deputy and not to "topple" him.

The fourth strategy used by Gus Dur was to persuade his Cabinet ministers and the military to support him. However, this support was not forthcoming. Gus Dur wanted to issue a decree declaring a state of emergency. His Cabinet ministers disagreed,

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and the top military brass, those retired and in active duty, were also against it. As a result, Gus Dur dismissed the Police Chief Suroyo Bimantoro.

His fifth strategy was to reshuffle his Cabinet. He had refused to reshuffle what was then his second Cabinet until the Parliament decided to initiate the impeachment process in May. Within two weeks, he reshuffled his Cabinet twice. On 1 June 2001, he dismissed five ministers, including the Co-ordinating Security Minister, General (Retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Attorney General Marzuki Darusman.[14] The dismissal of Yudhoyono was significant as he had recently been handed a specific executive order (*maklumat*) to ensure security in anticipation of political unrest as a result of the political impasse. Two factors accounted for Yudhoyono's ouster: he opposed the declaration of a state of emergency and the dissolution of Parliament.[15] He was also not close to Megawati. His successor was another retired general, Agum Gumelar (then Minister for Communications and Telecommunication).

In the next reshuffle on 12 June, Gus Dur eventually sacked his controversial Finance Minister Prijadi Praptosuhardjo and brought in Burhanuddin Abdullah, the Deputy Director of Bank Indonesia, to the Cabinet as the Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry. This Cabinet reshuffle was seen as another desperate move to secure Gus Dur's position, but it failed to stop the DPR from pursuing him.

It was obvious that the strategies were unsuccessful, but this did not mean that he would not use them again.

Some politicians were still hopeful that Gus Dur would eventually agree to share power with Megawati. However, Gus Dur was adamant. Under pressure, he made a vague proposal which seemed to transfer some power to Megawati, but in reality, he continued to retain real power. This was unacceptable to Megawati and the other opposition parties. Meanwhile, Gus Dur ordered his new Attorney-General Burhanuddin Lopa to conduct graft investigations on opposition leaders, including Akbar Tanjung (Speaker of the House) and Arifin Panigoro (chairman of the PDI-P faction in the Parliament).[16] This was intended to put pressure on them so that they would stop the impeachment process

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and force Megawati to accept whatever conditions Gus Dur offered. When this did not work, he gave the Parliament an ultimatum. He threatened to issue a decree proclaiming a state of emergency on 20 May if the DPR did not abandon its intention to impeach him.

However, on 20 May, Gus Dur failed to carry out his threat to declare a state of emergency. Instead, he appointed the Deputy Police Chief, Chaeruddin Ismail to be the caretaker police chief, taking over the duties of the incumbent Police Chief Suroyo Bimantoro, whom he had sacked. He intended to split the police force as Bimantoro, who was supported by the DPR, refused to step down. According to the National Assembly Decision (No. 7/2000), the President needed the permission of the DPR before he could dismiss the national police chief and appoint a new one.[17] The MPR reacted quickly and decisively. On the same day, Amien Rais announced that the MPR would call for an extraordinary meeting on the following day and the special session might be brought forward because Gus Dur had violated the law further. Gus Dur was subpoenaed to present his accountability report to the MPR. The situation became tense again.

Impeachment

On 21 July 2001, Gus Dur stated that he would not attend the MPR session and accused the DPR and MPR of acting unconstitutionally.[18] On 22 July, Gus Dur made the last attempt to persuade the military faction in the MPR not to support the impeachment; he summoned Major-General Budi Harsono (head of the military faction in the DPR) and Lieutenant-General Hari Sabarno (one of the Chairmen of the MPR). He ordered them to withdraw their support for the MPR special session, failing which they were told to resign.[19] However, the generals refused to co-operate.

When Amien Rais decided to hold the MPR meeting as scheduled, Gus Dur eventually used his trump card: he declared a state of emergency at 1.05 a.m. on 23 July 2001. He stated that there were people who wanted to overthrow him:

> If I were forced to step down, a few provinces would leave the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. In fact I was sworn in to look after the territorial integrity of

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> Indonesia. Therefore with sadness, I, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, proclaim this decree.[20]

Gus Dur further stated that:

> I have already instructed the TNI and the police to implement this decree by tomorrow morning. The TNI and police force have the responsibilities to hinder the opening of the MPR special session because no rival government is allowed.[21]

The decree, known as a *maklumat* (executive order), froze both the DPR and MPR, and banned Golkar in order to safeguard *reformasi*. Gus Dur, however, miscalculated the situation. He had no support from the military and police. His declaration of a state of emergency was ignored. On the contrary, the police and the military were safeguarding the MPR session at the Parliament Building. The session went on without interruption.

Gus Dur's *maklumat* was rejected by the Mahkamah Agung (the Supreme Court) which asserted that it was declared without sufficient reasons. The MPR, in a special session, also rejected the *maklumat*. Gus Dur was thus impeached and the MPR mandate in 1999 to appoint him as the President was revoked. The MPR elected Megawati as the fifth President of Indonesia, serving the remainder of Gus Dur's term (up to October 2004). Meanwhile Gus Dur refused to acknowledge the decision of the MPR and continued to regard himself as the legitimate President of Indonesia. He refused to leave the presidential palace.

It is worth noting that unlike the situation during the 1999 presidential election, there was no tension or major conflict between the supporters and opponents of Gus Dur. There was also no declaration of independence from the provinces. The people of Indonesia went about their businesses as usual, as if nothing had changed.

The Poros Tengah (Central Axis) group in the Parliament, which championed Islam and Gus Dur during the 1999 presidential election supported Megawati. Even Golkar, which was hostile towards Megawati, changed sides. There was a semblance of

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unity in the MPR and that was sufficient to effect a smooth leadership change.

What were the reasons for this change? For the Central Axis, Gus Dur's leadership appeared to have excluded them from sharing power. They also felt that the NU became stronger under Gus Dur's presidency at the expense of other Islamic parties. Gus Dur's erratic leadership also embarrassed some Islamic leaders, especially Amien Rais who was instrumental in putting Gus Dur in the presidential seat. Amien admitted his mistake and wanted to remedy it.[22] Thus, he supported Megawati to replace Gus Dur.

Golkar, under the chairmanship of Akbar Tanjung, had wanted to share power with the Gus Dur administration, but was rebuffed. Akbar found Gus Dur difficult to deal with.

The military/police also shifted their support to Megawati because they saw Gus Dur as a President who wanted to undermine their power in favour of civilian supremacy. However, Megawati's attitude towards the military has been ambiguous. There are a few retired military officers in her party, and this gives the impression that Megawati accepts the dual role (*dwifungsi*) of the Indonesian military — that is, the security as well as socio-political roles of the armed forces. Ideologically, it seems that Megawati is closer to the military than Gus Dur was. With military support, Megawati may be able to stay in power for some time.

The Law and the Constitution

During the confrontation between Gus Dur and the DPR/MPR, both sides asserted that they had acted in accordance with the law and the Constitution of the country. The root of the problem lies in the ambiguity of the Indonesian Constitution which was hurriedly drafted in 1945 and meant to be temporary at that time. However, a new Constitution was never produced. A partial amendment only took place in 1998, and it is still in progress. Although the Constitution has not been drastically amended, the National Assembly Decisions (Ketetapan MPR) existed to curb the presidential power.

As correctly pointed out by Tim Lindsey, Director of the Asian Law Centre at the University of Melbourne, the legal authority for

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impeachment of the President stems from the Elucidation (Explanatory Memorandum) to the current 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.[23] The Constitution states that the President is not responsible to the DPR, but if the DPR considers that the President has "truly violated state policy" (*sungguh melanggar haluan negara*) or national will, then the DPR can call the MPR into session in a special sitting to ask the President to account for his actions.

More specific regulation of the impeachment process is contained in MPR Decision III of 1978 and in Decision II of 1999. Lindsey also maintains that Decision II of 1999 added "the violation of the Constitution" as an additional ground for convening the special session of the MPR.[24]

However, Gus Dur had argued that there was no "true violation" of national policy as the Parliament had only managed to find that it was "reasonable to suspect" the President as having been involved in acts of corruption in the Bruneigate and Buloggate scandals. Therefore, Gus Dur considered that there had been insufficient grounds to impeach him. To Gus Dur, the proof should be in a criminal conviction.

However, Lindsey argued that:

> There is no requirement in either the Constitution or the MPR Decisions that the President must have committed or have been tried and convicted of a criminal act.[25]

Members of Parliament and the MPR also argued that the President should be removed because he was incompetent. Again, there was no specific clause on this, except for Article 8 of the Constitution which states that when the President "resigns, dies or cannot carry out his responsibilities", the Vice-President will replace him.

Gus Dur claimed that he did not resign and had carried out his responsibilities well, and hence, could not be removed. He wanted to remain in office until 2004. Although there was ambiguity in the Indonesian Constitution and laws, the MPR is seen to be "the repository of Indonesian sovereignty". According to the 1945 Constitution, the President is appointed by the MPR and is, therefore, subordinate to and responsible to the MPR. It

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has the right to convene a special session and summon the President on matters of accountability. Years earlier, President Sukarno had been removed when his account was rejected by the MPR. Therefore, in Indonesian political history, there was a precedent for the MPR to remove a President before the end of his term.

The Vice-Presidential Election

After the election of the President, the vice-presidential election followed immediately. Unlike the 1999 vice-presidential election where there were only two candidates, this time there were five: Hamzah Haz of the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), Akbar Tanjung of Golkar, two ex-military men — Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (former Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs) and Agum Gumelar (also former Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs) — and Siswono Yudhohusodo, a businessman who represented secular nationalism in Golkar.[26] The focus was only on the first three as serious contenders.

These three figures represented three political ideologies: Hamzah Haz represented Islam (or even "fundamentalism"), Akbar Tanjung and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono represented "secular nationalism", but in different degrees. Akbar's nationalism is linked to Islam, while Yudhoyono is more "secular" than Akbar. Apart from their different ideologies, these candidates represented "old forces".

The Vice-President was to be decided by the MPR. Since the MPR consists of major parties and regional representatives, no candidate was able to command a majority vote, going by their party strengths. Even if each party were to vote unanimously, Akbar would only be able to gain 120 votes, and Hamzah 58 votes. Hamzah had the support of the Central Axis, the alliance of the Islamic groups in the MPR which sanctioned Gus Dur in the 1999 presidential election.[27] However, the combined votes from these parties would not reach more than half of the total votes that were needed to win the election. The votes from other parties, including the largest party, the PDI-P, would be crucial. Prior to

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the voting, it was reported that Akbar claimed to have 120 votes, but he urged the PDI-P to vote for him. Hamzah claimed to have 134 votes from the Islamic groups in the MPR.[28] Yudhoyono was a dark horse as he was not a member of any political party. There was much manipulation behind the scenes. It was reported that Hamzah criticized Akbar and called him "greedy" (*serakah*) because in Hamzah's view, Golkar already obtained important positions, including Akbar's position as the Speaker of the DPR.[29] However, Akbar refused to withdraw.

When the first round of voting was conducted in the afternoon of 25 July, no candidate had gained more than 300 votes, the number needed to be the winner (see Table 9.1). According to analysts, the Islamic groups voted for Hamzah; Golkar members were divided, with some voting for Akbar, and many, who belonged to the Irama Suka Nusantara group, appeared to have voted for Hamzah; non-Muslims and MPs from the PDI-P voted for Yudhoyono.[30] The votes of the TNI and police went to Agum.

As there was no simple majority, a second round of voting was conducted. Agum and Siswono were dropped from the list. The results of the second round did not produce decisive results either (see Table 9.2).

Again, Hamzah was unable to get enough votes to be declared the winner. Akbar gained more than the first round as some military votes might have gone to him, but the majority of the members from the PDI-P and the military voted for Yudhoyono. Since there was no clear winner again, a third round of voting was

TABLE 9.1
Results of the First Round Vice-Presidential Election

Candidate	Votes Obtained
Hamzah Haz	238
Akbar Tanjung	177
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	122
Agum Gumelar	41
Siswono Yudhohusodo	31
Abstained	4
Total	613

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TABLE 9.2
Results of the Second Round Vice-Presidential Election

Candidate	Votes Obtained
Hamzah Haz	254
Akbar Tanjung	203
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	147
Abstained	3
Spoilt votes	2
Total	609

taken on the following day. This was to be the last round and was only between two candidates. There was once again behind-the-scene activities, and vote-buying was believed to have taken place.[31] The results were as shown in Table 9.3.

The 147 votes obtained by Yudhoyono in the second round were now split into two, but it is thought that most of the PDI-P votes went to Hamzah, while the military votes went to Akbar.[32] The PDI-P considered that Hamzah was a "lesser threat" compared with Akbar who was not only very experienced, but was likely to dominate the scene should he have been elected as Vice-President. In addition, the masses of the PDI-P might not have been able to accept Akbar, the leader of Golkar, to be Megawati's partner. Before the election, it was reported that Megawati preferred to have Yudhoyono to be her deputy. Her second choice was Hamzah but she had told Hamzah not to bring up the subject of an "Islamic State" if he were to become Vice-President.[33]

TABLE 9.3
Results of the Third Round Vice-Presidential Election

Candidate	Votes Obtained
Hamzah Haz	340
Akbar Tanjung	237
Abstaintees	29
Spoiled votes	4
Total	610

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Vice-President: Hamzah Haz

Hamzah Haz was born in Ketapang, West Kalimantan, on 15 February 1940.[34] He was active in the student movement in his high school days. After finishing secondary school in 1960, he worked as a newspaper reporter in Pontianak for a year. His father, a member of a local co-operative, was sent to Yogyakarta to study at the State Academy of Co-operatives. Hamzah followed his father and also studied in the same school. It was there that he formed the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (PPMI), and was later elected as its chairman. In 1965, after obtaining a Bachelor's degree, he returned to Pontianak to continue his postgraduate studies in the faculty of economics at the University of Tanjung Pura, where he later became a lecturer.

Hamzah showed a keen interest in politics; he joined the students movement and was elected the president of the Student Action Front (KAMI), Pontianak branch, and represented the 1966 Generation in the Regional Parliament (DPRD) in West Kalimantan. In 1968, he was elected as the chairman of the Regional Parliament which brought him to Jakarta. He joined the NU and represented the organization in the "New Order" Parliament. After 1973, the NU formed part of the PPP and Hamzah represented it in Parliament. He served as the deputy head of the Parliamentary Commission on State Revenue and Budget in 1985. When B. J. Habibie became President, he was appointed as the Minister for Foreign Investment.

Hamzah was regarded as an Islamic fundamentalist by his critics; he performs the five daily prayers diligently. During the 1999 presidential election, he was against the nomination of Megawati because "a woman is unfit to be the president of Indonesia".[35] When Gus Dur was elected as President, Hamzah contested the vice-presidential election against Megawati but was defeated. However, he was appointed by Gus Dur as the Co-ordinating Minister for Welfare and Poverty Eradication. This lasted only for a short period before he was dismissed. During the Second Constitutional Amendment in the MPR, Hamzah once again raised the issue of the Jakarta Charter to be included in the amended Constitution. The Charter required all Muslims to practise *syariat* laws. However, his party's proposal was rejected.

In the special session of the MPR to elect a Vice-President,

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Hamzah changed his stand and supported Megawati, expressing his willingness to serve as the assistant to a woman President. Many saw this as a temporary alliance which might not stand the test of time since the two leaders have different and conflicting ideologies.

The New Cabinet and Megawati

Megawati has been perceived as a weak leader. Will she be able to hold on to the presidency until October 2004? Much depends on her ability simply to stabilize both the political and economic situations in Indonesia. When Gus Dur became President, market response was positive. The market's reaction to Megawati was similar. The Indonesian rupiah became stronger. There are two important conditions for Megawati's survival: she must have the right person in the right place, and she must combat corruption. If she is able to seek the help of professionals and set a good example, in the short term, the Indonesian economy might be able to improve. The continuing support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is imperative. Investors will watch out for the IMF's attitude towards Indonesia, and they will react accordingly.

Megawati was elected on 23 July 2001, but the new Cabinet was only announced more than two weeks later. During these two weeks, she was silent and Hamzah Haz did most of the talking. She was seen as weak and unable to make independent decisions. However, her supporters maintained that she was trying to reach a consensus with political parties which elected her into the position.[36] There were differences between the President and the political parties, resulting in the postponement of the announcement. Megawati wanted to have a "lean" Cabinet of twenty-seven positions, but it was reported that Golkar preferred to have a larger Cabinet so that its MPs stood a chance to be Cabinet ministers. Megawati's PDI-P had also asked for numerous Cabinet posts.

When the new Cabinet was eventually formed and announced on 9 August, it was a coalition Cabinet of professionals and party representatives. The Cabinet was increased from twenty-six to thirty-one, slightly larger than Gus Dur's second Cabinet but

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smaller than his first one. However, in the new Cabinet, Golkar gained fewer posts than it had asked for. Each Islamic party got at least one position, ensuring Islamic support for Megawati, at least for the time being. The new Cabinet was also military-friendly as it included four retired generals. However, the Minister for Defence was a civilian — Matori Abdul Djalil, the leader of the PKB who had been sacked by Gus Dur. By offering this position to a civilian, Megawati conveyed that she was not a captive of the military.

Unlike in Gus Dur's Cabinet, the new one has a strong economics team, led by Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, a professor of economics and former Indonesian ambassador to Washington.[37] Dorodjatun was given the position of Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry. Boediono, an economist who was a former deputy governor of the Bank of Indonesia, was appointed as the Minister for Finance. The Ministry of Trade and Industry went to Rini Soewandi, the former director of ASTRA International. Laksamana Sukardi, the former Minister of State for Investment and State Enterprises[38] who was tipped to lead the economics team, was reappointed in his former position. Kwik Kian Gie, the PDI-P leader who was the former Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry, was appointed as the Minister of State for National Development Planning (Bappenas). Both Laksamana and Kwik are party men who are also professionals. Retired General Yudhoyono was reinstated as the Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, signifying that the military is not out of politics.[39] The position of Foreign Minister, which was contested by Golkar and the PDI-P, was given to a career diplomat, Hassan Wirayuda.

If the economic situation improves, the political situation may also stabilize. President Megawati has yet to be tested. However, she has been given a clear mandate to lead Indonesia. Her performance in the first 100 days was considered to be dismal, but the MPR was willing to give her Cabinet more time as the MPR members did not have any alternative then. Even the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) agreed to extend a US$3.14 billion credit to the Megawati government in early November 2001 in order to avoid the Indonesian economy from collapsing.[40]

The political situation in Indonesia turned for the worse in the

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wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001, about two months after Megawati assumed presidential office. In an attempt to express her firm support for the U.S. policy against terrorism, Megawati visited the United States on 17 September. In return, Washington promised to give assistance amounting to US$1.06 billion to Jakarta.[41]

While Megawati was in the United States, radical Islamic militia groups organized anti-American demonstrations in Indonesia.[42] Her Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, also criticized the U.S. decision to attack the Taliban.[43] The Indonesian Ulama Council was equally critical of the United States and disapproved of the U.S. action against Afghanistan.

On her return, Megawati had to modify her stand. While still condemning terrorism, she urged the Americans to stop bombing Afghanistan. She encountered a serious challenge regarding the American "war against terrorism". Indonesian Muslims were divided on the bombing of Afghanistan: some supported the campaign against terrorism but disapproved of the continuous bombing; others simply opposed the Americans and urged Jakarta to sever ties with Washington.[44] They blamed the U.S. foreign policy for the rise of terrorism. Anti-American demonstrations continued, endangering the troubled and precarious Indonesian economy further. However, Islamic leaders from both within and outside the government, including Hamzah Haz, appeared to have realized the danger of anti-American demonstrations to the debt-ridden Indonesian economy. They repeatedly appealed to the radical groups to stop the demonstrations, which had caused Americans in Indonesia to flee the country.

The pro-Megawati military eventually took action against those who destabilized the political situation. The situation was temporarily under control but the Islamic factor remains as a destabilizing force in the Megawati government.

Concluding Remarks

The confrontation between the executive and the legislators ended with the removal of President Abdurrahman Wahid and the rise

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of Megawati. Gus Dur had miscalculated his strength, was arrogant, and out of touch with practical realities. He had become President through the support of the Islamic groups, Golkar, and the military in the MPR. When he lost their support he was unable to survive.

Nevertheless, both the President and the legislators in the DPR and MPR, in their struggle for power, claimed to adhere to the Constitution. There were different interpretations to the Constitution because its clauses are often unclear. Nevertheless, the MPR is the highest authority of Indonesia, hence, its decision is supreme. This tussle over constitutional issues during the Gus Dur–MPR confrontation has led to the re-examination of the Constitution and laws regarding the extent of the presidential power.

Notes

1. "Soal Pertemuan Presiden–Pansus DPR: Segera Ambil Langkah Hukum", *Kompas* (News by E-mail), 24 January 2001.
2. "House confirms Gus Dur's role", <www.thejakartapost.com>, National News, 4 February 2001.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Derwin Pereira, "Parliament censures embattled Gus Dur", *Straits Times*, 2 February 2001.
7. Derwin Pereira, "Gus Dur: I won't resign", *Straits Times*, 3 February 2001.
8. "Mendukung Presiden, Membakar Golkar", *Tempo*, 18 February 2001, pp. 25–26.
9. Derwin Pereira, "Gus Dur to Face Hostile MPs", *Straits Times*, 28 March 2001; also *Suara Merdeka*, 29 March 2001 and 30 March 2001.
10. "Compromise or 'God Knows What?'", *Tempo*, 21 May 2001, pp. 16–18.
11. For the detailed information of the draft, see *Tempo*, 21 May 2001, p. 18.
12. Ibid., p. 17.
13. Ibid.
14. "President fires five ministers, Attorney General", *Jakarta Post*, 1 June 2001 <www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?fileid=

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20010601173135&irec=5>.

15. "I won't resign, Gus Dur says", *Jakarta Post*, 1 June 2001 <www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatenews.asp?fileid = 2001060110108 &irec =11>.
16. Burhanuddin Lopa denied that he was instructed by Gus Dur. See "Burhanuddin Lopa: Gus Dur gives no orders", *Tempo*, 25 June 2001, p. 20.
17. Clause 7 no. 3 stipulates that "… Indonesian national police head is appointed and dismissed by the President with the agreement of the Parliament". See "Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor VII/MPR/2000 tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Negara Republic Indonesia".
18. "Presiden Bekukan MPR, TNI Tolak Dekrit", *Media Indonesia Online*, Berita Utama, 23 July 2001, 00:42 WIB.
19. "Minggu Penuh Kejutan (22 Juli 2001 sampai Pukul 23.30 WIB)", *Jawa Pos Online*, 23 July 2001, 21:32 WIB <www.jawapos.co.id/detail.php?u_kat=28759&u_arsip=1>.
20. "President Berlakukan Dekrit", *Kompas*, 23 July 2001 <www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0107/23/UTAMA/pres01.htm>.
21. Ibid.
22. Derwin Pereira, "Jakarta's keeper of democracy or ambitious politician?", *Straits Times*, 24 July 2001.
23. See Tim Lindsey, "Constitutional Law and The Presidential Crisis in Jakarta: Some Preliminary Observations", in <Indonesia_Forum, indonesianists_australia, 2/6/01 10:28 AM+1000, Fwd: Impeachm>.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Martian Damanik, "Proses pemilihan Wapres sedang berlangsung", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 25 July 2001.
27. The Central Axis, excluding the PKB, comprised of PPP (58 votes), PAN (34 votes), PK (7 votes), PBB (13 votes), and PNU (5 votes), making a total of 117 votes.
28. "Akbar Ngotot Wapres", *Jawa Pos Online*, 25 July 2001 <www.mediaindo.co.id/aktual/news.asp?id=7262>.
29. Ibid.
30. Interviews with some political observers in Jakarta. Courtesy of Sukardi.
31. It was reported that when the ballots were read, the names of the candidates were written differently on the ballots. It was said that these were codes used by the voters to communicate with the

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candidates. For instance, nicknames and other words were also included on the ballots. "Yinni fu zongtong xianju hao 12 xiaoshi", *Lianhe Zaobao*, 27 July 2001.

32. Ibid.
33. "Akbar Ngotot Wapres", *Jawa Pos Online*, 25 July 2001. (www.mediaindo.co.id/news.asp?id=7262>.
34. Hamzah's biography is based mainly on the following sources: *Apa dan Siapa Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1985–1986* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1986), pp. 303–4; Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas, ed. *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi, Strategi dan Program* (Jakarta: Kompas, 1999), p. 171.
35. Marrianne Kearney, "Best political partners now, but …", *Straits Times*, 27 July 2001; "Cen fandui nuren dang zongtong", *Lianhe Zaobao*, 27 July 2001.
36. Hamzah announced that the Cabinet would be made known on 3 August and be sworn in on the following day. However, it was postponed until 9 August as the political parties involved were unable to reach an agreement. In the morning of 2 August, all leaders of major and medium-sized political parties went to see Megawati to discuss their "proposals".
37. When Gus Dur reshuffled his Cabinet, the name of Dorodjatun was proposed but he was not offered any position.
38. "Laksamana Sukardi Berpeluang Pimpin Ekonomi", *Tempo Interaktif*, 2 August 2001.
39. For the complete line up of the Megawati Cabinet, see Appendix III.
40. "CGI setuju pinjaman 3.14 milyar dollar AS", *Kompas*, 9 November 2001.
41. "Menangguk Janji Pasca Trajedi", *Forum Keadilan*, 8 October 2001.
42. "KISDI Minta Pemerintah Memutuskan Hubungan Diplomatik dengan AS", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 8 October 2001.
43. Some maintained that a conflict existed between Megawati and Hamzah Haz over the U.S. war against terrorism. See "Signs of rift between Mega and V-P Growing", *Straits Times*, 9 October 2001. However, others maintained that there was a "division of task" between Mega and Hamzah, in order to gain Islamic support. See Bahtiar Effendy, "WTC, Afghanistan, dan Mega", *Forum Keadilan*, 15 October 2001.
44. "KISDI Minta Pemerintah Memutuskan Hubungan Diplomatik dengan AS", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 8 October 2001.

10

Democracy, Indonesian Style?

From the forty-eight parties allowed to contest the 1999 elections, five major parties emerged. For discussion purposes, I have divided these parties into two categories: "Pancasila-*abangan*" parties and "Islamic-*santri*" parties. This is, of course, an over-simplified categorization, merely showing the socio-religious division and not the socio-economic one. It also does not show overlapping possibilities between the two categories. Some writers simply divide Indonesian political parties into Islamic and non-Islamic parties, or Islamic and secular parties.[1] However, it is clear that there are other categories of Indonesian political parties. At this juncture, it will be useful to look at some of them, especially the category used before the fall of Soeharto.

Political Thinking and Political Clusters

In Chapter 2, I mentioned Herbert Feith's five streams of political thinking which influenced the four major parties: communism, radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism, Islam, and democratic socialism.[2] Using these five streams as clusters, Feith grouped the four major parties in the 1950s as illustrated in Figure 10.1. He placed the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian

FIGURE 10.1
Political Parties and Streams of Political Thinking



Source: Reprinted from Herbet Feith and Lance Castle, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1970), p. 14. Copyright © 1970 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.

Communist Party) on the left within the cluster of communism. Next on the right was the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian Nationalist Party) which subscribed to radical nationalism, and followed by the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). On the extreme right was Masyumi. Both Masyumi (modernist) and the NU (traditional) were within the Islamic cluster. Nevertheless, there was one cluster — Javanese nationalism — which cut across three clusters: communism (PKI), radical nationalism (PNI), and Islam (NU), although its deepest association was with the PNI. Because of traditional influences, this cluster was placed at the bottom. Placed on top was another cluster — democratic socialism — which also cut into Masyumi and the PNI. Feith illustrated that

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FIGURE 10.2
Political Clusters



Source: Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas, ed., *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi, Strategi dan Program* (Jakarta: Kompas, Edisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), p. 36.

the four major parties had been exposed to five kinds of political thinking as well as different cultural influence, traditional and Western.

Influenced by Herbert Feith, Daniel Dakhidae, the former editor of *Prisma* and a Ph.D. holder from Cornell University, developed a modified model to analyse the political thinking of seven parties during the post-Soeharto era. He identified clusters referring to socialism, *agama* or religion (mainly Islam), nationalism, and developmentalism.[3] Like Feith, he introduced a diagrammatic representation of the five political clusters (see Figure 10.2). On the extreme left was socialism, represented by the PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, or Demokratik People's Party). The middle cluster consisted of the PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National

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Mandate Party), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party), and PUDI (Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Union Party)[4] without a label. The top cluster was religion, represented by the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party), while the lowest cluster termed nationalism (*kebangsaan*) was represented by the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan). The middle cluster cuts across the clusters of religion, socialism, and nationalism. The only cluster on the right, which is developmentalism, represented by Golkar, stood in isolation. Dhakidae argued that the horizontal division was class ideology while the vertical division was "*aliran*" ideology. Unlike Feith, he no longer identified the contradictory influences of the West and Javanese traditionalism but instead identified an external force of globalism. This globalism affected all political ideas. Dhakidae published this article as a chapter of a handbook on political parties prior to the 1999 election. From the results, it is clear that the ideas of socialism represented by the PRD exercised little electoral appeal in the 1999 election.[5] This cannot be compared with PKI support in the 1950s.

An interesting point to note from Dhakidae's classification is the attitude adopted by the various parties towards the Indonesian military. The socialist-oriented party, PRD, and the PPP rejected the dual function (*dwifungsi*) role of the military, while other parties showed degrees of acceptance. The PDI-P never clearly expressed its stand on the military's dual function concept, while the developmentalist party, Golkar, continued to favour it.

I view the major parties after the fall of Soeharto to be ideologically weak. It is not clear which class they represent. Except for the religious groups that some parties represent, major parties still need time to develop their own identity. I am not sure whether these parties can survive political challenges in the future due to the divisions within the parties themselves.

Golkar

The Partai Golkar has been divided into at least three groups: the Akbar Tanjung group, the Marzuki Darusman group, and the so-

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called Irama Suka Nusantara Group led by A. A. Baramuli. The last group is pro-Habibie and Soeharto, which may be weakened as Soeharto and Habibie become historical figures. Since the party is closely linked to the New Order, and thus corruption, it would have difficulty in regaining its influence in the future. However, the party has not disappeared as it is still the best organized political machine — it had thirty-two years of history and is much better off than other parties financially. The Akbar Tanjung faction appears to be stronger than the other two, and is a force to be reckoned with in future Indonesian politics.

A brief sketch of Akbar Tanjung is imperative at this juncture. A Muslim Batak by ethnicity, he married a Javanese woman, Ray Krisnina Maharani, from Solo. In fact, many non-Javanese Cabinet ministers during the Soeharto era have Javanese wives. Born on 14 August 1945 in Sibolga (Sumatra), Akbar was educated at the University of Indonesia.[6] During his student days, he was active in student movements. He was president of the Faculty of Technology at the University of Indonesia. Between 1972 and 1974, he was the president of the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), the most influential Muslim students association in Indonesia. Many Muslim national leaders originated from the HMI. Akbar also joined the Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI), a Golkar-affiliated youth organization.

Towards the end of the 1980s, with the eroding support from the military and the rise of Islam, Soeharto began to court Muslims. With the modern Islamic background as his political capital, Akbar formally joined Golkar. The chairman of Golkar, Sudharmono, a retired general who was also "Islamic-inclined", recognized Akbar's tremendous credentials and began to delegate important duties to him. Akbar was the deputy secretary-general of Golkar who helped Sudharmono to become the Vice-President of Indonesia (1988–93).[7] In 1993, Akbar was appointed the state minister in charge of people's housing. In the last Cabinet before Soeharto stepped down (16 March–21 May 1998), Akbar was given the same position. When Habibie succeeded Soeharto, Akbar was appointed Cabinet Secretary (Minister of State) from 23 May 1998 to 10 May 1999.

Akbar began to show his influence in Golkar as well as national

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politics during the 1998 political crisis. Although he was closely associated with the Soeharto regime, he managed to project an image of being independent. Using the Islamic group as a base in Golkar, Akbar succeeded in gaining the chairmanship of the new Golkar by defeating Sudharmono, after Soeharto stepped down. Together with Habibie, he was able to dominate Golkar before the June 1999 election. However, during the presidential election of 1999, he began to have his reservations about Habibie, reflecting his personal ambition. Although he did not contest the presidential election, Akbar was able to maintain his grip over Golkar and worked with the military. In 199l, through negotiations and politicking, he eventually became the Speaker of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People' Representative Assembly), a very powerful position. In the presidential crisis involving Gus Dur, he also played his game well. After the removal of Gus Dur and the election of Megawati as President, Akbar decided to contest the vice-presidential election but was eventually defeated by Hamzah Haz of the PPP. Unlikely to become a "king" in the near future, Akbar is likely to play the role of kingmaker.

The PPP, PDI-P, PAN, and PKB

The PPP was linked to the New Order and was also tarnished by accusations of corruption. Its leadership was divided along ethnic and organizational lines. The split between Java-based leaders and Outer Islands-based leaders still exists, but whether this division will rock the party is yet to be seen. Hamzah Haz, a member of the NU leads the party. However, with the election of Hamzah as the Vice-President of Indonesia in the special session of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly) in July 2001, the PPP may have a chance to consolidate its position.

The nationalist PDI-P has also been dragged down by personality and ideological problems. The party was divided into at least two groups: one led by Taufik Kiemas, Megawati's husband; the other led by Dymyati Hartono. The Dymyati group was purged from party positions, and the "Taufik" Group prevailed, but is now led by Arifin Panigoro, a businessman. There is a third group

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which consists of professionals such as Kwik Kian Gie (considered more nationalistic), Laksamana Sukardi (considered more liberal), and Mochtar Buchori. These professionals are not involved in group-forming and can co-operate with any group within the party (despite an earlier split between Kwik and Sukardi who have since reconciled).[8]

The PAN also faced similar problems of factionalism. However, it is less serious now as one group has gained victory. There were at least two groups: one led by Faisal Basri, an economist who is Pancasila-oriented, and the other led by an Islamic clergy, Fatwa, who wanted to change the party foundation to Islam. In the 2000 congress in Yogyakarta, the two groups contested their strengths. The Basri group won more support as their leader is moderate and more intellectual than Fatwa. Amien Rais was caught in between, but during the congress he sided with Basri. Fatwa, using his Islamic appeal, gained more support from the rural Islamic masses. Fatwa's group grew in strength in 2001, making the PAN move closer to being an Islamic party instead of a Pancasila party.[9] Basri and his supporters were thus outmanoeuvred, and he eventually resigned. It is unclear whether the PAN will remain as a Pancasila-based party.

Although Gus Dur is not the chairman of the PKB, it is clear that he still controls the party. However, under his leadership, the PKB had been unable to develop freely. The PKB and NU might have benefited from Gus Dur's presidency as their leaders had been cultivated by Gus Dur and, thus, had gained influence. The party did not have strong figures except for Gus Dur. Matori Abdul Djalil, the former PKB chairman, was said to be powerless in the party. During the MPR special session in 2001 in which he attended as one of the its chairmen, Matori disagreed with Gus Dur who sacked him immediately, giving his position to Alwi Shihab, then Gus Dur's foreign minister. After the downfall of Gus Dur, the PKB also encountered many problems. As the party had boycotted the MPR special session, there was a debate whether it would rejoin the DPR and the MPR. Some members felt that it was more effective to fight in the Parliament. Others supported Gus Dur's decree which considered the Parliament as "outlawed".[10] However, the PKB eventually rejoined the MPR. With regard to

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the party ideology, the NU-based PKB has a problem in striking a balance between Islam and Pancasila as many NU members are strong *santri*.[11] The split may come when Gus Dur no longer wields influence within his party.

Shaking Off the Legacy

Abdurrahman was a transitional figure. He came to power under special circumstances — he was a compromise candidate during the contest between the secular and Islamic factions. However, he had legitimacy as he was popularly elected by the post-Habibie MPR, which came into being consequent to the 1999 election. Initially, the people had high expectations of him because as a moderate Islamic leader he was expected to have been able to solve religious conflicts and unify the divided communities. With political stability, many people had also hoped that the Indonesian economic situation would improve.

After assuming the presidency, Gus Dur had to face tremendous challenges and he disappointed those who had high expectations of him. Although he was intelligent and appeared to have won the initial battles with the military,[12] victory was far from decisive. Towards the end, he lost the support of the police and the military. The old forces represented by Partai Golkar were still around although they were not as strong as they had been in the Soeharto era. They continued to be influential inside and outside the Parliament. Furthermore, Gus Dur was also abandoned by his Islamic brothers who had earlier elected him to the presidency. He miscalculated the strength of the rival political forces and the military, thinking that he would gain the support of the people and the military. However, the support was not forthcoming.

The Gus Dur government was weak and he was unable to control the security apparatus. Since he came to power, at least five major bombings took place in Jakarta: at the Philippine ambassadorial residence, the Attorney-General Building, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Building (Bursa Efek Jakarta), on churches during Christmas's eve, and also on churches on the eve of the

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MPR special session. It was said that the bombs used during these incidents were of the same kind used in Indonesian military operations.[13] Even then Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman claimed that TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) elements were involved, but the government was unable to make any arrests. Tommy Soeharto who was tried and found guilty during Gus Dur's presidency was still at large, creating an impression that the Gus Dur government was indeed weak.[14] Assuming that some military elements were behind the bombings, this further enforces the fact that the Gus Dur government had limited control over the military. An even worse fate awaited Gus Dur as the military completely ignored his declaration of the state of emergency in late July 2001.

Political unrest continued throughout Gus Dur's presidency. Sectarian conflict never ceased, the bombing incidents did not end, and the culprits were never arrested. In addition, Gus Dur was not free from cronyism and corruption. After a brief period, the political élite got together and overthrew him. Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded him as the fifth President of Indonesia, in accordance with the 1945 Constitution. Under the presidency of Megawati, the military has again played a manipulative role behind the scenes. The military looks set to be a strong political force behind her. However, a military coup may take place if law and order collapse totally in Indonesia, or if another major economic crisis erupts which could lead to political chaos beyond civilian control. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States had a major impact on the world economy, including that of Indonesia. The sluggishness in the U.S. economy and world recession made the Indonesian economic recovery more difficult. Another major economic crisis may develop if the world economy deteriorates further.

Althought the role of the military has been reduced, it is still significant. Because of the weakness of civilian rule and conflicts between the civilian élite, the military (including the police) remain in the DPR. In August 2000, an MPR decree extended military representation in the Parliament to 2009, five years longer than what had been agreed upon earlier.[15] This indicated that the military

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has not disappeared from the political scene. Megawati's nationalistic policy towards the provinces also requires the support of the military.

Assuming that there is no military coup in Indonesia, the present pattern of politics is likely to continue. However, it does not mean that the present political parties will survive. As noted earlier, of forty-eight parties which contested the election, only the six parties which won more than 2 per cent of the total votes would be allowed to participate in the general election of 2004. The remaining forty-two parties would not be able to contest. However, even the major parties, such as the PDI-P, Golkar, and the PAN, are divided into factions and they are far from united. Many leaders within the same political party had different ideologies but they joined forces temporarily to contest the 1999 election. Cross-party lines or even party splits are possible in the near future. In addition, new parties will be formed to contest the 2004 election.

Political parties in Indonesia continue to be divided along the *abangan* and *santri* lines, or more correctly, between secular nationalism and Islamic nationalism, but *santri* parties will grow in strength. On one hand, the a*bangan* and non-Muslims will continue to take part in politics but they will not be able to dominate the scene as they did during the height of the New Order. On the other hand, the *santri* are likely to exercise more restraint in order to be accepted by the *abangan* and non-Muslims — a more "Islamized" Pancasila ideology rather than an "Islamic state" ideology would be adopted by these *santri*.

DPR and Future Elections

The military role had declined following the fall of Soeharto. As a force, however, it has not been eliminated. In the foreseeable future, it appears that Indonesia will continue to have a political system with military representation. Can a political system where the military still has "political representation" be called democratic? Indeed, the Indonesian political system has not yet reached the liberal democracy stage, but there is no doubt that it is much more democratic than in the past. The presence of the Indonesian military

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in the Parliament is directly relevant to the Indonesian election law. We will return to this point later.

From the thirty-two years of authoritarian rule, Indonesia eventually entered a democratic phase. Is the democratic system — Indonesian style — working? Some have argued that it is working, as evidenced by the peaceful 1999 general election and the smooth change of presidency from Gus Dur to Megawati in 2001. Nevertheless, there is still regional unrest and sectarian conflict. The political system is competitive: all DPR members, except for thirty-eight, were elected. The MPR also consists of both elected and appointed members, but the latter category is smaller.

The Indonesian political arena is still very élitist. The Jakarta élites are more concerned with their own personal gains and benefits than those of the people whom they represent or claim to represent. There is no chance for the people to "recall" their representatives as the proportional system, not the district system, is adopted. However, even under the district system, they can only remove their representatives in the following election.

The 1999 election adopted a modified proportional system. With the implementation of regional autonomy, there was a need to adopt the district system instead of the proportional system. The proportional system gave too much power to the political parties, and the Members of Parliament (MPs) have their party interest, not that of the constituents, at heart.

Prior to the 1999 election, there were discussions on the election system. It was eventually decided that the proportional system would be used. The new DPR would, however, study the election laws and make proposals to amend them. Some sectors have expressed their desire to use the district system in the 2004 election.[16] However, the election commission in the DPR has not yet made any decision.

There are also problems pertaining to the MPs. Many students and political leaders favoured the system where all the MPs are directly elected. With this system, there would be no appointed members. This would affect the military representatives in the Parliament as they are appointed, not elected.

Apart from the electoral system for the MPs, there has also

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been discussion on the presidential election system. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution stipulates that the President is elected by the MPR. The first amended Constitution still retains this clause. However, Mulya Lubis, a human rights lawyer, maintains that the Constitution could be amended further.[17] Indeed, many political parties preferred a direct presidential election. The PAN, Amien Rais's party, also agreed with the proposal, but wanted the presidential candidates to be nominated through the MPR.

The presidential election system was again debated during the annual MPR session of 2001. All political parties generally agreed that in principle it should be a direct presidential election. However, they could not agree on the actual implementation.

It was unanimously agreed that the political parties would nominate their presidential and vice-presidential candidates before the general election. The candidates of the party that gained a simple majority would automatically be the President and Vice-President of Indonesia.[18]

However, a problem would arise when no party gained a simple majority (i.e., more than 50 per cent of the votes). The majority of MPR members were in favour of a second round of direct presidential election. However, members of the PDI-P and the military decided that a second round of election at the MPR was more suitable. They argued that conducting a second direct presidential election might lead to chaos, and a high expenditure would be incurred.[19] Many MPR members maintained that carrying out the presidential election through the MPR was not democratic. There was a deadlock and the issue was postponed to the next Annual Session of the MPR in 2002. Many observers criticized the MPR for failing to reach an early agreement and hence increasing the responsibilities of the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission).[20]

The democratization process in Indonesia is ongoing, but it is not a smooth one. The political parties are conservative and do not favour rapid change. Any drastic amendment of the Indonesian Constitution and election laws may not take effect soon as old forces are still strong. The old political party system is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

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Notes

1. Sahar L. Hassan, Kuat Sukardiyono, and Dadi M. H. Basri, eds., *Memilih Partai Islam: Visi, Misi dan Persepsi* (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 1998); Al Chaidar, *Pemilu 1999:Pertarungan Ideologis Partai-Partai Islam versus Partai-Partai Sekuler* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999).
2. Democratic socialism was represented by the Partai Sosialis Indonesia of Sutan Sjahrir. However, it was excluded from the diagram because it ceased to be a major party after the 1955 election. As pointed out by Feith, its ideology was very influential among the leaders of the PNI and Masyumi.
3. Daniel Dhakidae, "Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Kisah Pergerakan dan Organisasi dalam Patahan-Patahan Sejarah", in *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia,* edited by Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas (Jakarta: Kompas, Edisi Pemilihan Umum, 1999), especially pp. 34–40. Also in Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al., *Tentara Mendamba Mitra* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 210. The term developmentalism is not clearly defined in the paper. Perhaps it means an ideology of pro-capitalist development, which emphasized rapid economic growth rather than equity. In this sense, Golkar is indeed a developmentalist party. However, the PDI-P and to a lesser extent, the PKB, are not against developmentalism but if there is a conflict between Indonesian nationalism and developmentalism, nationalism prevails.
4. PUDI is led by veteran politician Sri Bintang Pamungkas. The party obtained only 140,980 votes during the 1999 election, constituting 0.13 per cent of the total votes.
5. The PRD only obtained 78,727 votes during the 1999 election, constituting 0.07 per cent of the total votes.
6. The information on Akbar is based on the following books: Ateng Winarno and Martin Sallis Say, eds., *Kabinet Pembangunan: Riwayat Para Menteri* (Jakarta: Suara Karya, 1993), pp. 91–93; *Wajah Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik IndonesiaPemilihan Umum 1999* (Jakarta: Penerbit Harian Kompas, July 2000), p. 167.
7. Winarno and Say, *Kabinet Pembangunan*, p. 92.
8. Laksamana Sukardi castigated Kwik's son publicly for his sale of the Humpuss Terminal (owned by Soeharto's son) to a Hong Kong-based company, Hutchison Holdings. But Kwik's son denied this, arguing that he only served as a consultant. See Derwin Pereira, "Politics gets in the way of Indonesian economy", *Straits Times*, 3 April 2000.
9. "Flashes in the PAN", *Tempo*, 29 January 2001, p. 23.

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10. Angelina Maria Donna, "Alwi Shihab Bantah Perpecahan di Tubuh PKB", in *Kompas Cyber Media*, 24 July 2001, 15:53 WIB.
11. Ibid.
12. Gus Dur noted in mid-March that "I know that several Pangdam (territorial military commanders) are working to mobilize anti-Gus Dur forces. It is really happening. However, I don't worry about it because I believe that the people are behind me …". See "Gus Dur reveals coup attempt", *Jakarta Post*, 15 March 2000.
13. "Meruntuhkan Wibawa Gus Dur", *Suara Merdeka Cyber News*, 24 January 2001.
14. In September 2000, the Supreme Court sentenced Tommy Soeharto to eighteen months in jail for his role in a US$11 million land scam involving his company and Bulog. His plea for clemency was turned down. However, he refused to serve the sentence and went underground. Some reports state that Gus Dur made a deal with him but this was denied by Gus Dur. See "'Borobudurgate', Peluru Terakhir Tommy", *Tempo*, 3 December 2000, pp. 20–22. After the fall of Gus Dur, the Supreme Court reopened Tommy's case and overturned the conviction. However, Tommy is still wanted for questioning about the bombings and the murder of Judge Syafiuddin Kartasasmita who sentenced him to jail. The whole episode shows that the Indonesian justice system is problematic and that the Old Order is still very influential. See Lee Kim Chew, "Tommy's acquittal puts justice system in the dock", *Straits Times*, 6 October 2001; "Membebaskan Tommy atau Mengintai Gus Dur?", *Forum Keadilan*, 15 October 2001.
15. John McBeth and Dini Djalal, "The Puppet President", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 August 2001.
16. "Masih mungkin mengubah sistem pemilu untuk 2004", *Kompas Cyber Media,* 16 November 2000.
17. Ibid.
18. "Mayoritas Fraksi Sepakat Langsung", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 5 November 2001.
19. "Fraksi-fraksi di MPR Terbelah", *Republika Online*, 3 November 2001; "Serahkan Pemilihan Presiden Putaran II Kepada MPR", *Republika Online*, 9 November 2001.
20. "'Deadlock', Soal Pemilihan Presiden Langsung", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 8 November 2001; "MPR Beratkan Tanggung Jawab KPU", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 13 November 2001.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

The 1999 General Election Results for DPR by Province

	Province	Aceh	N. Sum.	W. Sum.	Riau	Jambi
	Registered voters	**1,486,294**	**5,831,247**	**2,364,404**	**2,543,575**	**1,372,710**
	Votes counted	**988,622**	**5,168,042**	**1,944,592**	**2,127,809**	**1,155,140**
	Invalid votes	**51,509**	**122,062**	**97,579**	**99,412**	**85,198**
	Voter turnout (%)	**69.98**	**90.72**	**86.37**	**87.56**	**90.36**
	No. of seats	**12**	**24**	**14**	**10**	**6**
	Votes per seat	**82,385**	**215,335**	**138,899**	**212,780**	**192,523**
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**
1	PIB	5,062	10,963	6,146	8,132	7,313
2	Krisna	1,414	56,450	2,284	6,276	2,105
3	PNI	2,446	36,814	4,816	8,587	5,230
4	PADI	1,163	4,868	2,836	2,851	2,535
5	Kami	6,267	11,946	20,617	7,255	5,114
6	PUI	12,714	24,650	20,928	7,494	2,870
7	PKU	9,728	3,179	2,254	3,451	2,313
8	New Masyumi	4,814	7,224	11,069	5,365	4,752
9	PPP	285,014	520,121	400,649	295,924	126,621
10	PSII	2,288	15,566	6,057	4,328	3,846
11	PDI-P	126,038	2,052,680	212,347	583,583	286,042
12	Abul Yatama	16,607	6,231	6,057	6,060	3,532
13	PKM	1,598	3,738	3,538	2,806	1,836
14	PDKB	1,598	134,896	7,194	5,244	2,021
15	PAN	177,069	465,543	430,880	216,688	88,721
16	PRD	611	2,926	1,358	1,269	543
17	PSII-1905	1,520	4,891	4,368	2,319	1,438
18	PKD	306	56,242	903	2,195	474
19	Pilar	346	6,084	774	546	690
20	Pari	627	5,842	2,198	1,715	1,562
21	PPIM	9,149	28,987	3,023	13,162	10,457
22	PBB	30,628	78,556	115,678	49,495	27,141
23	PSP	509	3,406	1,283	1,018	956
24	PK	16,251	43,673	56,020	26,496	9,773
25	PNU	21,131	19,179	5,083	27,950	8,442
26	PNI-FM	1,781	26,317	2,560	6,136	5,790
27	IPKI	1,364	13,958	8,514	6,224	4,636
28	Republik	2,705	18,199	6,016	2,825	3,605
29	PID	1,367	2,357	971	4,537	696
30	PNI-M	1,854	19,925	2,357	4,831	4,831
31	Murba	727	4,433	2,566	830	1,220
32	PDI	8,007	39,846	9,418	15,022	8,248
33	Golkar	154,373	1,128,529	459,528	632,609	400,495
34	United	13,928	20,726	17,209	15,931	16,136
35	PKB	11,750	57,296	17,083	62,851	55,024
36	PUDI	7,346	6,684	4,167	2,595	1,163
37	PBN	1,143	15,352	4,209	3,364	3,308
38	MKGR	2,107	7,972	6,264	8,783	3,720
39	PDR	8,040	16,095	10,660	14,058	4,614
40	PCD	4,125	32,147	3,709	6,691	1,218
41	PKP	19,651	80,996	23,118	16,427	16,904
42	PSPSI	692	3,836	1,132	990	860
43	PNBI	721	3,402	2,821	3,636	2,027
44	PBI	1,771	47,511	979	23,672	1,376
45	Suni	2,642	1,549	1,051	1,211	10,726
46	PND	329	8,920	578	1,480	1,240
47	PUMI	1,088	999	676	840	682
48	PPI	3,236	6,338	646	1,877	1,294

Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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	Province	S. Sum.	Bengkulu	Lampung	Jakarta*	W. Java
	Registered voters	**4,071,504**	**808,064**	**3,676,301**	**5,072,249**	**25,333,464**
	Votes counted	**3,533,962**	**660,693**	**3,285,317**	**4,853,546**	**23,049,039**
	Invalid votes	**178,326**	**56,307**	**90,823**	**184,220**	**862,052**
	Voter turnout (%)	**91.18**	**88.73**	**91.84**	**99.32**	**94.39**
	No. of seats	**15**	**4**	**15**	**18**	**82**
	Votes per seat	**235,597**	**165,173**	**219,021**	**269,641**	**281,052**
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**
1	PIB	11,459	2,530	7,342	5,499	38,703
2	Krisna	4,698	1,697	5,721	10,724	25,054
3	PNI	21,289	7,436	19,511	4,424	55,498
4	PADI	4,984	1,575	3,185	2,151	19,608
5	Kami	16,329	3,545	9,713	7,783	48,403
6	PUI	14,686	1,934	9,186	7,303	75,188
7	PKU	5,530	2,090	11,497	4,806	52,142
8	New Masyumi	7,691	3,773	5,537	3,835	29,473
9	PPP	299,779	53,939	265,503	806,298	3,513,348
10	PSII	24,827	3,799	14,028	4,281	105,677
11	PDI-P	1,378,668	198,512	1,322,032	1,895,964	7,507,503
12	Abul Yatama	11,637	3,223	8,201	3,337	36,346
13	PKM	4,490	1,224	4,659	2,411	22,070
14	PDKB	6,259	1,145	5,360	5,539	25,823
15	PAN	279,104	51,794	173,491	797,766	1,707,252
16	PRD	2,648	507	2,483	8,271	14,995
17	PSII-1905	6,456	1,423	6,439	3,841	68,536
18	PKD	3,094	347	4,298	5,141	8,654
19	Pilar	8,269	434	1,139	916	6,162
20	Pari	3,380	500	2,049	1,438	9,536
21	PPIM	26,247	5,396	18,385	9,258	95,501
22	PBB	103,389	12,473	31,185	95,265	806,293
23	PSP	2,944	375	2,359	993	8,987
24	PK	54,501	17,173	61,887	231,545	537,897
25	PNU	25,940	5,793	64,346	20,573	152,641
26	PNI-FM	19,416	3,386	19,840	4,459	62,615
27	IPKI	13,448	2,765	11,385	4,210	51,558
28	Republik	7,942	4,296	5,417	3,655	36,310
29	PID	5,276	1,895	2,986	1,376	11,718
30	PNI-M	20,930	3,990	24,307	3,454	60,231
31	Murba	2,462	416	2,594	2,342	9,217
32	PDI	34,021	7,538	21,278	16,583	79,169
33	Golkar	781,517	190,731	636,570	541,346	5,439,334
34	United	22,386	4,614	12,343	45,795	157,133
35	PKB	174,352	24,128	386,364	174,661	1,622,124
36	PUDI	8,892	3,431	5,518	10,602	28,325
37	PBN	6,243	1,520	3,716	2,175	13,177
38	MKGR	8,924	3,613	6,966	3,274	43,367
39	PDR	9,700	3,532	18,586	5,434	68,530
40	PCD	5,354	681	3,350	5,502	24,495
41	PKP	44,190	13,106	38,188	45,004	242,755
42	PSPSI	2,966	417	2,451	1,358	9,263
43	PNBI	6,214	1,641	5,305	1,741	27,163
44	PBI	13,935	2,008	6,236	34,746	34,223
45	Suni	3,983	1,479	6,454	1,095	20,352
46	PND	5,972	1,533	3,200	1,915	16,708
47	PUMI	1,577	392	1,034	1,524	8,859
48	PPI	6,054	944	1,693	1,933	11,123

*Includes votes by 252,324 Indonesians abroad.
Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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	Province	C. Java	Yogya.	E. Java	W. Kal.	C. Kal.
	Registered voters	**18,720,597**	**1,929,404**	**21,811,625**	**2,074,557**	**995,057**
	Votes counted	**17,231,911**	**1,804,082**	**19,828,663**	**1,742,526**	**799,084**
	Invalid votes	**620,750**	**56,811**	**722,620**	**108,270**	**43,874**
	Voter turnout (%)	**95.36**	**96.45**	**94.22**	**89.21**	**84.71**
	No. of seats	**60**	**6**	**68**	**9**	**6**
	Votes per seat	**287,198**	**300,680**	**291,597**	**193,614**	**133,180**
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**
1	PIB	19,371	4,545	18,820	2,953	2,029
2	Krisna	25,901	3,559	30,989	5,298	7,315
3	PNI	67,898	8,556	52,696	10,483	3,661
4	PADI	7,451	1,311	9,261	2,037	695
5	Kami	53,334	15,714	42,697	3,447	2,195
6	PUI	22,841	3,280	30,255	2,439	2,244
7	PKU	48,850	5,355	109,033	2,881	2,812
8	New Masyumi	16,831	2,745	16,370	3,293	1,405
9	PPP	1,899,390	87,865	1,026,862	209,792	88,824
10	PSII	44,453	3,383	24,540	2,466	1,223
11	PDI-P	7,380,900	643,202	6,703,699	405,543	283,564
12	Abul Yatama	28,015	5,575	33,619	5,899	2,357
13	PKM	13,781	1,807	14,043	3,536	891
14	PDKB	30,341	6,938	26,718	56,699	3,433
15	PAN	1,197,643	311,619	940,342	47,734	38,198
16	PRD	16,964	3,429	13,038	896	458
17	PSII-1905	11,191	1,545	9,801	2,185	655
18	PKD	12,380	3,883	6,848	9,993	606
19	Pilar	2,682	504	3,151	1,197	168
20	Pari	6,512	1,146	6,555	2,148	468
21	PPIM	54,868	9,784	53,885	9,653	3,619
22	PBB	154,628	27,027	175,516	23,327	13,167
23	PSP	6,500	1,305	5,707	858	341
24	PK	133,886	27,808	84,517	10,250	2,407
25	PNU	59,355	4,572	103,587	11,172	13,346
26	PNI-FM	82,332	14,050	59,697	7,422	2,726
27	IPKI	42,169	10,704	42,534	9,255	2,680
28	Republik	18,544	2,733	14,248	6,138	1,111
29	PID	7,052	1,176	9,287	588	587
30	PNI-M	85,345	7,200	59,580	6,509	4,977
31	Murba	6,995	1,173	10,107	621	994
32	PDI	57,512	5,544	40,749	131,909	8,037
33	Golkar	2,300,625	258,745	2,510,025	511,513	221,940
34	United	58,796	6,204	42,068	15,534	7,163
35	PKB	2,953,511	257,240	7,034,707	47,098	47,501
36	PUDI	15,816	1,700	15,678	4,380	1,674
37	PBN	13,966	3,219	13,314	1,944	1,732
38	MKGR	20,349	5,089	23,519	3,770	4,960
39	PDR	27,457	3,317	63,611	3,152	2,136
40	PCD	14,787	3,048	31,710	1,647	1,238
41	PKP	97,576	15,867	151,747	17,870	7,745
42	PSPSI	8,431	1,611	8,729	2,363	695
43	PNBI	21,559	5,953	25,566	5,798	970
44	PBI	15,858	1,383	30,673	121,950	1,432
45	Suni	36,070	4,025	59,063	1,645	886
46	PND	18,045	2,167	18,453	3,442	959
47	PUMI	4,361	927	5,311	484	663
48	PPI	8,789	4,280	7,738	1,315	197

Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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	Province	E. Kal.	S. Kal.	Bali	West NT	East NT
	Registered voters	**1,335, 342**	**1,745,113**	**2,040,162**	**2,082,267**	**2,001,790**
	Votes counted	**1,134,214**	**1,486,031**	**1,898,364**	**1,744,39**	**1,859,134**
	Invalid votes	**49,854**	**86,641**	**106,959**	**162,186**	**68,781**
	Voter turnout (%)	**88.67**	**90.12**	**98.29**	**91.56**	**96.31**
	No. of seats	**7**	**11**	**9**	**9**	**13**
	Votes per seat	**162,030**	**135,093**	**210,929**	**193,815**	**143,010**
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**
1	PIB	2,943	7,255	690	4,837	1,469
2	Krisna	13,731	2,233	952	1,500	27,884
3	PNI	4,576	4,336	19,689	10,260	12,096
4	PADI	900	956	698	4,372	3,330
5	Kami	1,757	5,722	873	5,899	2,020
6	PUI	2,581	8,199	445	5,441	1,054
7	PKU	2,162	7,288	634	3,840	388
8	New Masyumi	1,589	2,938	493	8,192	905
9	PPP	117,868	251,182	17,630	198,429	43,100
10	PSII	1,848	1,960	771	18,783	3,770
11	PDI-P	383,168	316,565	1,500,050	231,654	714,312
12	Abul Yatama	1,980	3,196	2,039	7,203	3,717
13	PKM	1,198	1,835	554	4,213	1,517
14	PDKB	2,789	1,354	3,465	6,214	73,551
15	PAN	75,424	137,110	25,006	71,520	29,270
16	PRD	567	639	850	1,210	395
17	PSII-1905	2,508	2,079	331	5,520	856
18	PKD	1,055	402	381	603	26,439
19	Pilar	774	1,473	251	433	333
20	Pari	365	928	414	1,256	490
21	PPIM	3,803	11,009	3,329	22,260	2,559
22	PBB	28,913	60,344	4,238	66,571	8,118
23	PSP	406	969	238	1,776	422
24	PK	18,433	17,732	1,753	17,498	2,837
25	PNU	6,847	64,286	1,622	34,375	1,776
26	PNI-FM	2,160	3,007	7,631	9,922	11,688
27	IPKI	2,064	4,645	4,071	13,541	14,546
28	Republik	1,581	2,879	17,535	5,275	5,516
29	PID	290	1,232	380	1,536	388
30	PNI-M	2,122	3,205	7,673	7,803	5,162
31	Murba	794	1,616	262	642	1,319
32	PDI	8,734	9,798	5,966	21,666	27,026
33	Golkar	336,629	357,278	196,984	735,733	759,156
34	United	11,337	15,760	1,708	10,796	2,412
35	PKB	56,086	131,050	32,253	52,094	7,147
36	PUDI	1,971	1,495	716	5,815	760
37	PBN	1,532	1,197	688	2,697	4,514
38	MKGR	3,305	4,557	1,100	10,000	5,306
39	PDR	4,984	2,664	2,943	52,684	3,139
40	PCD	3,072	1,849	1,321	12,275	400
41	PKP	12,507	15,034	23,862	20,934	39,340
42	PSPSI	762	902	790	4,325	499
43	PNBI	981	1,927	1,387	9,488	4,278
44	PBI	2,831	2,411	1,277	4,056	1,476
45	Suni	470	5,784	321	14,499	248
46	PND	975	2,560	1,515	2,288	1,477
47	PUMI	222	2,698	184	10,831	360
48	PPI	620	493	401	1,580	369

Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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	Province	E. Timor	S. Sul.	C. Sul.	N. Sul.	SE. Sul.
	Registered voters	**420,096**	**4,229,606**	**1,202,792**	**1,738,421**	**900,831**
	Votes counted	**346,477**	**3,732,399**	**1,072,328**	**1,640,928**	**801,223**
	Invalid votes	**48,559**	**290,277**	**82,748**	**50,215**	**46,649**
	Voter turnout (%)	**94.03**	**95.11**	**96.03**	**97.28**	**94.12**
	No. of seats	**4**	**24**	**5**	**7**	**5**
	Votes per seat	**86,619**	**155,516**	**214,465**	**234,418**	**160.244**
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**
1	PIB	644	10,552	3,352	2,567	1,137
2	Krisna	3,376	16,820	22,652	61,434	1,547
3	PNI	1,779	3,426	1,285	4,476	1,524
4	PADI	992	2,829	395	770	312
5	Kami	981	8,441	1,413	2,457	2,296
6	PUI	331	5,362	1,545	874	1,182
7	PKU	180	15,313	1,344	244	1,855
8	New Masyumi	394	4,950	2,472	502	706
9	PPP	2,211	313,903	114,660	122,567	53,765
10	PSII	773	29,022	22,277	28,303	781
11	PDI-P	119,908	247,112	154,640	364,043	109,708
12	Abul Yatama	2,976	7,762	1,914	1,241	2,350
13	PKM	1,067	4,730	1,012	3,154	1,073
14	PDKB	1,007	34,130	9,752	19,011	929
15	PAN	9,618	129,712	26,737	34,124	17,747
16	PRD	423	1,374	1,240	747	234
17	PSII-1905	271	7,832	3,108	2,257	401
18	PKD	1,842	9,845	3,597	19,741	280
19	Pilar	139	2,960	148	548	114
20	Pari	426	2,015	502	204	1,573
21	PPIM	1,619	12,957	4,526	1,874	3,507
22	PBB	1,078	52,099	20,142	10,984	29,183
23	PSP	76	2,899	406	783	534
24	PK	133	24,539	5,899	4,029	5,496
25	PNU	227	10,970	4,367	5,146	3,742
26	PNI-FM	1,520	3,335	2,188	1,852	846
27	IPKI	1,568	47,485	2,486	4,657	3,952
28	Republik	377	16,650	5,215	3,582	2,951
29	PID	259	3,637	425	248	458
30	PNI-M	1,785	2,135	1,508	1,614	748
31	Murba	169	2,714	738	1,156	162
32	PDI	11,309	9,546	6,985	13,776	7,768
33	Golkar	168,592	2,481,914	585,592	811,899	505,345
34	United	578	22,704	6,328	5,773	3,576
35	PKB	629	58,876	17,692	13,152	15,365
36	PUDI	248	4,821	2,095	928	840
37	PBN	2,380	3,796	635	891	533
38	MKGR	440	12,414	3,554	5,414	2,709
39	PDR	1,452	35,893	8,858	27,779	4,141
40	PCD	348	4,685	3,283	340	155
41	PKP	724	30,364	10,015	50,778	4,776
42	PSPSI	211	4,593	342	1,003	409
43	PNBI	428	7,906	2,348	1,343	1,568
44	PBI	366	8,441	1,460	1,766	645
45	Suni	158	3,947	229	105	212
46	PND	188	714	190	219	673
47	PUMI	85	3,017	368	158	1,015
48	PPI	192	1,268	409	415	400

Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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	Province	Maluku	Irian Jaya	National	
	Registered voters	**1,025,728**	**1,001,853**	**117,815,053**	
	Votes counted	**1,070,777**	**827,416**	**105,786,658**	
	Invalid votes	**50,169**	**41,653**	**4,422,851**	
	Voter turnout (%)	**109.28**	**86.75**	**93.54**	
	No. of seats	**6**	**13**	**462**	
	Votes per seat	**178,462**	**63,647**		
No	**Party**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Total%**
1	PIB	5,486	733	192,712	0.18
2	Krisna	14,339	13,776	369,719	0.35
3	PNI	2,011	2,334	377,137	0.36
4	PADI	1,799	2,064	85,838	0.08
5	Kami	1,740	1,531	289,489	0.27
6	PUI	3,544	739	269,309	0.25
7	PKU	471	424	300,064	0.28
8	New Masyumi	4,827	444	152,589	0.14
9	PPP	191,014	23,647	11,329,905	10.71
10	PSII	5,708	1,162	375,920	0.36
11	PDI-P	296,793	270,843	35,689,073	33.74
12	Abul Yatama	1,732	1,173	213,979	0.20
13	PKM	1,034	570	104,385	0.10
14	PDKB	31,978	44,771	550,846	0.52
15	PAN	21,564	27,280	7,528,956	7.12
16	PRD	314	338	78,727	0.07
17	PSII-1905	741	308	152,820	0.14
18	PKD	11,054	26,072	216,675	0.20
19	Pilar	109	173	40,517	0.04
20	Pari	422	249	54,790	0.05
21	PPIM	6,696	1,205	456,718	0.43
22	PBB	19,649	4,621	2,049,708	1.94
23	PSP	1,963	1,804	49,807	0.05
24	PK	21,224	2,908	1,436,565	1.36
25	PNU	868	1,843	679,179	0.64
26	PNI-FM	1,242	1,258	365,176	0.35
27	IPKI	2,222	1,923	328,564	0.31
28	Republik	8,733	4,119	208,157	0.20
29	PID	1,980	199	62,901	0.06
30	PNI-M	1,136	1,508	345,720	0.33
31	Murba	136	5,601	62,006	0.06
32	PDI	13,605	27,992	655,052	0.62
33	Golkar	326,115	308,632	23,741,749	22.44
34	United	11,957	2,133	551,028	0.52
35	PKB	11,879	3u,069	13,336,982	12.61
36	PUDI	2,117	1,203	140,980	0.13
37	PBN	845	3,249	111,629	0.19
38	MKGR	2,030	698	204,204	0.19
39	PDR	12,009	12,386	427,854	0.40
40	PCD	334	323	168,087	0.16
41	PKP	19,954	6,254	1,065,686	1.01
42	PSPSI	994	481	61,105	0.06
43	PNBI	1,121	1,844	149,136	0.14
44	PBI	1,008	801	364,291	0.34
45	Suni	1,748	215	180,167	0.17
46	PND	983	261	96,984	0.09
47	PUMI	1,362	122	49,839	0.05
48	PPI	187	143	63,934	0.06

Source: General Elections Commission/National Election Committee.

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APPENDIX II.1

Profile of MPR Members (who are from DPR) (1999–2004)

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	T. Zulfikar Thaib Aly	36	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Aceh Timur
2.	Karimun Usman	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Sabang
3.	R.k. Sembiring Meliala	61	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Retired Military Officer	Kab. Deli Serdang
4.	Nuah Torong	50	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Journalist	Kab. Karo
5.	Syahrul Azmir Matondang	59	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Langkat
6.	Erwin Pardede	56	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Simalungun
7.	Sahala Benny Pasaribu	41	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Researcher	Kab. Labuhan Batu
8.	Pandapotan Simanjuntak	67	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Tapanuli Utara
9.	Indira Damayanti Bambang Sugondo	48	Female	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Asahan
10.	Firman Jaya Daely	31	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Researcher	Kab. Nias
11.	Irmadi Lubis	47	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Privately Employed	Kab. Mandailing Natal
12.	Zulfan Z.b. Lindan	43	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Medan
13.	Marah Simon Mhd. Syah	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Padang Panjang
14.	Johanes Lukman	53	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Payakumbuh
15.	Djahar Harahap	49	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bengkalis
16.	Tandjojo Putro	59	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Kepulauan Riau
17.	Pataniari Siahaan	53	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Consultant	Kod. Pekan Baru
18.	Mohamad (Max) Junus Lamuda	65	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Bungo Tebo
19.	Agnita Singedekane Irsal	49	Female	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Kod. Jambi
20.	Surya Chandra Surapaty	48	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Musi Banyuasin

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
21.	Dudhie Makmun Murod	37	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Ogan Komering Ulu
22.	M. Nazaruddin	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Muara Enim
23.	M. Yamin P. Mangkunegara	34	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Ogan Komening
24.	Gusti Basan Burnia	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Palembang
25.	M. Taufik Kiemas	57	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kod. Palembang
26.	Mishal Yofthie	34	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Bengkulu Selatan
27.	Poltak Sitorus	56	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Lampung Selatan
28.	Matt Al Amin Kraying	60	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Lampung Tengah
29.	Suparlan	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Lampung Barat
30.	Sukowaluyo Mintorahardjo	50	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Tulangbawang
31.	Paulus Widyanto	49	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Journalist	Kab. Tanggamus
32.	Reniyanti Hoegeng	52	Female	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Bandar Lampung
33.	Aberson Marle Sihaloho	61	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Retired Civil Servant	DKI Jakarta
34.	Achmad Aries Munandar	47	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	DKI Jakarta
35.	Julius Usman	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	DKI Jakarta
36.	Kwik Kian Gie	64	Male	Buddhist	Graduate	Teacher	DKI Jakarta
37.	Roy B.b. Janis	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	DKI Jakarta
38.	Sabam Sirait	63	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Retired Civil Servant	DKI Jakarta
39.	Syaifullah	35	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	DKI Jakarta
40.	Tubagus Suwond0	59	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Serang
41.	Tumbu Saraswati	51	Female	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Pandeglang
42.	Mamas Chaerudin	61	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lebak

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
43.	Arifin Panigoro	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tangerang
44.	Wowo Ibrahim	57	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tangerang
45.	Amris Hassan	41	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Bogor
46.	Noviantika Nasution	36	Female	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Bogor
47.	Laksamana Sukardi	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Sukabumi
48.	Dadang Rukmana Mulya	47	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Cianjur
49.	Potsdam Hutasoit	53	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Bekasi
50.	Djadjang Kurniadi	63	Male	Islam	High School	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Karawang
51.	Zainal Arifin	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Subang
52.	Didi Supriyanto	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Bandung
53.	Megawati Soekarnoputri	52	Female	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bandung
54.	Muchtar Budhiana	55	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bandung
55.	Soebarna	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Garut
56.	Tarto Sudiro	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Tasikmalaya
57.	Endang Karman S.	59	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Privately Employed	Kab. Ciamis
58.	Yoseph Umar Hadi	41	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Journalist	Kab. Cirebon
59.	Sambas Soerjadi	65	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kuningan
60.	Sidarto Danusubroto	63	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Military Officer	Kab. Indramayu
61.	Agus Mulya Djumhana	64	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Kab. Majalengka
62.	Jusep Purwasuganda	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Bandung
63.	Mangara Monang Siahaan	52	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Artist	Kod. Bandung
64.	Wisnu Kuncoro	58	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Tangerang

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
65.	Panda Nababan	55	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Journalist	Kod. Bekasi
66.	Rusman Lumbantoruan	55	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/ College	Privately Employed	Kod. Depok
67.	Ismangoen Notosapoetro	60	Male	Islam	High School	Retired Military Officer	Kab. Semarang
68.	Don Murdono	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kendal
69.	Tjahjo Kumolo	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Consultant	Kab. Grobogan
70.	Bambang Pranoto	48	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Consultant	Kab. Pekalongan
71.	Agus Condro Prayitno	39	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Batang
72.	R.S. Sastoro	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tegal
73.	Mochtar Buchori	73	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Brebes
74.	Budhi Ningsih	42	Female	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pati
75.	Ramson Siagian	42	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pemalang
76.	Susaningtyas N.H. Kertopati	35	Female	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab Blora
77.	Hadi Wasikoen	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Banyumas
78.	Dimyati Hartono	67	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Lawyer	Kab. Cilacap
79.	Soepjan Rahardjo	56	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Teacher	Kab. Purbalingga
80.	N.G. Sembiring	57	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Banjanegara
81.	Jacob Tobing	56	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Temanggung
82.	Sudarsono	59	Male	Islam	High School	Retired Military Officer	Kab. Purworejo
83.	Rustriningsih	32	Female	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kebumen
84.	Gunawan Wirosaroyo	53	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Klaten
85.	Sumaryoto	53	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Boyolali
86.	Suratal H.W.	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Sragen

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
87.	Gray Koes Moertiyah	40	Female	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sukoharjo
88.	Daniel Budi Setiawan	43	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Karanganyar
89.	Sri Oetari Ratna Dewi	43	Female	Catholic	Graduate	Housewife	Kab. Wonogiri
90.	Willem M. Tutuarima	49	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kod. Semarang
91.	Widjanarko Puspoyo	50	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Civil Servant	Kod. Pekalongan
92.	Slamet Suryanto	55	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Kod. Surakarta
93.	Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno	65	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Sleman
94.	Parte Tarigan Sibero	51	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kod. Yogyakarta
95.	Mindo Sianipar	64	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Mojokerto
96.	Soetrisno	58	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Sidoarjo
97.	Amin Aryoso	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Jombang
98.	Imam Soeroso	57	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Banyuwangi
99.	Imade Dangin G.	58	Male	Hindu	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Jember
100.	Marsudi Fandinegara	63	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Malang
101.	Abdul Madjid	82	Male	Islam	High School	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Lumajang
102.	Sukono	50	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kediri
103.	Pramana Anung W.	36	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tulungagung
104.	Suwignjo	56	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Nganjuk
105.	Muhammad Guruh Irianto Soekarno Putra	46	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Blitar
106.	Permadi	59	Male	Mysticism	Graduate	Consultant	Kab. Madiun
107.	W. Batara-goa	60	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Ngawi
108.	Sadjarwo Sukardiman	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Magetan
109.	Heri Achmadi	46	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Consultant	Kab. Ponorogo
110.	Zoned Moesni	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bojonegoro

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
111.	Hariyanto	56	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tuban
112.	Haryanto Taslam	45	Male	Islam	High School	Journalist	Kod. Surabaya
113.	Sutjipto	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Surabaya
114.	Peni Suparto	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Malang
115.	Rutji Gunung Muljono	60	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Blitar
116.	Soewarno	59	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Kediri
117.	Meilono Soewondo	54	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Madiun
118.	Octavius Riam Mapuas	56	Male	Catholic	High School	Retired Military Officer	Kab. Pontianak
119.	Max Moein	57	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pontianak
120.	Agustin Teras Narang	44	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Kapuas
121	Tjiandra Widjaja	42	Male	Catholic	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kotawaringin
122.	Emir Moeis	49	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Berau
123.	Imam Mundjiat	54	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kod. Samarinda
124.	Subagio Anam	66	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Balikpapan
125.	Akhmad Havizi Kurnain	45	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod Banjamasin
126.	Royani Haminullah	58	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Banjar Baru
127.	I Ketut Bagiada	40	Male	Hindu	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Buleleng
128.	Ni Gusti Ayu Eka Sukmadewi	41	Female	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Klungkung
129.	I Made Rajeg	77	Male	Hindu	High School	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Gianyar
130.	I Nyoman Gunawan	47	Male	Hindu	Postgraduate	Notary	Kab. Karangasem
131	I Gusti Ngurah Sara	65	Male	Hindu	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Badung
132.	I Made Urip	40	Male	Hindu	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Tabanan
133.	Anak Agung Sagung Hartini	52	Female	Hindu	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Denpasar
134.	Mudahir	58	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Mataram
135.	Vb Da Costa	72	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Sikka
136.	Paulus M Saul De Ornay	47	Male	Catholic	High School	Journalist	Kab. Flores Timur

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
137.	Jacob Nuwa Wea	55	Male	Catholic	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Ngada
138.	Julius Bobo	40	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Manggarai
139.	Matheos Pormes	45	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Klupang
140.	Jakobus Kamarlo Mayong Padang	44	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Journalist	Kab. Tana Toraja
141.	Sophan Sophiaan	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Artist	Kod. Pare-Pare
142.	Fauziah Abdullah	47	Female	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Palu
143.	Theodoro/Us Francisco Toemion	43	Male	Catholic	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Manado
144.	Engelina Andaris Pattiasina	49	Female	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Bitung
145.	Theo Syafei	58	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Retired Military Officeri	Kod. Kendari
146.	J.E. Sahetapy	66	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Maluku Tenggara
147.	Alexander Litaay	51	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Ambon
148.	Parlin Sinaga	38	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Biak Numfor
149.	Fredrick Hendrick Toam	44	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Church Minister	Kab. Fak-fak
150.	Paul S. Baut	45	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Merauke
151.	Nathanael Anthonius Maidepa	58	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Mimika
152.	Rekso Ageng Herman	52	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Consultant	Timor Timur
153.	Rony B. Sabar Hutagaol	56	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Entrepreneur	Timor Timur

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Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Armen Desky	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Aceh Tenggara
2.	TM Nurlif	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Aceh Singkil
3.	Agusman ST Basa	63	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Deli Serdang
4.	M. Syarfi Hutauruk	40	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Tapanuli Tengah
5.	Baharuddin Aritonang	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Tapanuli Selatan
6.	Edi Ramli Sitanggang	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Pematang Siantar
7.	Rambe Kamarul Zaman	43	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kod. Tanjung Balai
8.	Rusydi Zen	56	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pasaman
9.	Azwir Dainy Tara	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Solok
10.	Datuk Labuan	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Sawahlunto
11.	Darul Siska	45	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Sawahlunto
12.	Rosnaniar	57	Female	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Kampar
13.	Darwis Rida Z.	61	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Indragiri Hulu
14.	Mohamad Akil	64	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Indragiri Hilir
15.	Tjarda Muchtar	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Batanghari
16.	Usman Ermulan	48	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Tanjung Jabung
17.	Harry Salman Farizi Sohar	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Musi Banyuasin
18.	Ahmad Hafiz Zawawi	50	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Consultant	Kab. Ogan Komering Ulu
19.	Ridwan Mukti	36	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Musirawas
20.	Marzuki Achmad	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ogan Komering Ilir
21.	Rully Chairul Azwar	46	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Rejang Lebong
22.	Sri Redjeki Sumaryoto	49	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Lampung Selatan
23.	Ariady Achmad	45	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member	Kab. Lampung Tengah
24.	Agusman Effendi	45	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Bandar-Lampung
25.	Akbar Tanjung	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	DKI Jakarta

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
26.	Gunariyah Ratna Mirah	52	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	DKI Jakarta
27.	Eldie Suwandie	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Serang
28.	Eki Syachrudin	60	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Lebak
29.	Mohamad Aly Yahya	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Tangerang
30.	Mohammad Hatta	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bogor
31.	Awal Kusumah	47	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bogor
32.	Djadja Subagdja Husein	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Sukabumi
33.	Arifin Yoesoef	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Cianjur
34.	Mohamad S. Hidayat	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bekasi
35.	Wasma Prayitno	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Karawang
36.	Ade Komaruddin	34	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Purwakarta
37.	Tubagus Haryono	43	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Subang
38.	Ferry Mursyidan Baldan	38	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bandung
39.	Paskah Suzetta	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bandung
40.	Agus G. Kartasasmita	30	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sumedang
41.	Asep Ruchimat Sudjana	46	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member	Kab. Garut
42.	Ferdiansyah	34	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tasikmalaya
43.	Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ciamis
44.	Djahidin	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Indramayu
45.	Happy Bone Zulkarnain	41	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kod. Bandung
46.	Evita Asmalda	38	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Sukabumi
47.	Mohamad Fathoni	54	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Semarang
48.	Daryatmo Mardiyanto	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Brebes
49.	Bambang Sadono	42	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Blora
50.	Slamet Effendy Yusuf	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bayumas
51.	Priyo Budi Santoso	33	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Cilacap
52.	Soeharsojo	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Boyolali
53.	Nikentari Musdiono	60	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Wonogiri
54.	Hajriyanto Y. Thohari	39	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kod. Semarang
55.	Gbph Joyokusumo	44	Male	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Gunung Kidul

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
56.	Hardisoesilo	54	Male	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Banyuwangi
57.	Azhar Muchlis	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Malang
58.	Ridwan Hisyam	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Nganjuk
59.	M. Yahya Zaini	35	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ngawi
60.	Bambang W. Soeprapto	45	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ponorogo
61.	Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi	59	Female	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Tuban
62.	Sarwoko Soerjohoedojo	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Lamongan
63.	Iris Indira Murti	45	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kod. Malang
64.	M. Irsyad Sudiro	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Probolinggo
65.	Arsen Rickson	50	Male	Catholic	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Sanggau
66.	Akil Mochtar	39	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Kapuas Hulu
67.	Husni Thamrin	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ketapang
68.	Chairun Nisa	41	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Barito Selatan
69.	Abdullah Zainie	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Kotawaningin Barat
70.	Eka Komariah Kuncoro	52	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Pasir
71.	Andas Patombongi Tantri	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tarakan
72.	Syamsul Muarif	51	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member	Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan
73.	Hasanuddin Murad	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Banito Kuala
74.	Ahmad Noor Supit	42	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kota Baru
75.	Sylvia Ratnawati	44	Female	Hindu	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Jembrana
76.	Effendi Jusuf	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lombok Tengah
77.	Adi Putra Darmawan Tahir	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lombok Timur
78.	Djamaluddin Sahidu	61	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Bima
79.	Burhan Djabir Magenda	53	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Dompu
80.	Charles Jones Mesang	47	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Kupang
81.	Marthin Bria Seran	51	Male	Catholic	Diploma/College	Civil Servant	Kab. Belu
82.	J.M. Nailiu	60	Male	Catholic	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
83.	Cornelis Tapatab	61	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan
84.	Immanuel Ekadianus Blegur	36	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Alor
85.	Umbu Mehang Kunda	48	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Sumba Timur
86.	Mariani Akib Baramuli	54	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Pinrang
87.	Paturungi Parawansa	62	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Gowa
88.	Syamsul Bachri	43	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Wajo
89.	Andi Mattalatta	47	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bone
90.	Fachri Andi Leluasa	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Luwu
91.	Hamka Yandu Y.r.	42	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sinjai
92.	Idrus Marham	37	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bulukumba
93.	Ibnu Munzir	39	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bantaeng
94.	Nurhayati Yasin Limpo	64	Female	Islam	High School	DPRD Member	Kab. Takalar
95.	Malkan Amin	51	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bamu
96.	Yasril Ananta Baharuddin	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Sidenreng Rappang
97.	Fachruddin	65	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Pangkajene Kepulauan
98.	Marwah Daud Ibrahim	43	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Soppeng
99.	A.M. Nurdin Halid	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Polewali Mamasa
100.	Ibrahim Ambong	50	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Luwu Utara
101.	Anwar Arifin	52	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kod. Ujungpandang
102.	Pedy Tandawyua	67	Male	Protestant Christian	Diploma/College	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Poso
103.	Yetje Lanasi	59	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Donggala
104.	Muhammad Sofhian Mile	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bangai
105.	Achmad Hoesa Pakaya	59	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Gorontalo

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
106.	Berny Tamara	48	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Minahasa
107.	Djelantik Mokodompit	45	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bolaang Mongondow
108.	Henky Baramuli	60	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sangihe Talaud
109.	Rustam E. Tamburaka	58	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Kendari
110.	La Ode Djeni Hasmar	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Buton
111.	Anwar Adnan Saleh	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kolaka
112.	Moh. Yamin Tawary	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Maluku Utara
113.	Hasanuddin Mochdar	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Halmahera Tengah
114.	Marthina Mehue Wally	43	Female	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Jayapura
115.	S.M. Tampubolon	58	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Manokwari
116.	Jacobus Perviddya Solossa	51	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Sorong
117.	Ruben Gobay	44	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Paniai
118.	Simon Patrice Morin	53	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Jayapura
119.	Setya Novanto	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Timor Timur
120.	Natercia Do Menino Jesus Osorio Soares	50	Female	Catholic	Graduate	Civil Servant	Timor Timur

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Nurdahri Ibrahim Nain	53	Female	Islam	Graduate	Housewife	Kab. Aceh Besar
2.	Tgk. H. Nashiruddin Daud	57	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Aceh Selatan
3.	A.R. Rasyidi	61	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Aceh Barat
4.	Tgk. H. Baihaqi	70	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Aceh Tengah
5.	Amaluddin Nasution	57	Male	Islam	High School	DPRD Member	Kab. Deli Serdang
6.	Bachtiar Chamsyah	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Medan
7.	Danial Tandjung	65	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Sibolga
8.	Aisyah Aminy	68	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Limapuluh Koto
9.	M. Djamal	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Padang Pasiman
10.	Syahruji Tanjung	48	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pesisir Selatan
11.	Abduh Paddare	61	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member	Kab. Kampar
12.	Razali Yahya	67	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Bengkalis
13.	Abdul Kadir Ismail	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Sarolangun Bangko
14.	Djabaruddin A.R.	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Muara Enim
15.	Alimarwan Hanan	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Palembang
16.	Achmad Farial	43	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bengkulu
17.	Syafri Zuman	52	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lampung Selatan
18.	Hamzah Haz	59	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Cabinet Minister	DKI Jakarta
19.	Rusydi Hamka	64	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	DKI Jakarta
20.	Munzir Tamam	60	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	DKI Jakarta
21.	Sa'adun Syibromalisi	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Serang
22.	Sjaiful Rachman	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Pandeglang
23.	Zarkasih Nur	59	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Tangerang
24.	Syaiful Anwar Hoesein	67	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bogor
25.	Endang Zaenal Abidin	57	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Teacher	Kab. Sukabumi

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	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
26.	Chairul Anwar Lubis	57	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Kab. Cianjur
27.	Zain Badjeber	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bekasi
28.	Nu'man Abdul Hakim	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Bandung
29.	Maksum Zaeladry	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Garut
30.	Endin Akhmad Jalaluddin Soefihara	39	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Tasikmalaya
31.	A. Chozin Chumaidy	51	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Ciamis
32.	A.M. Saefuddin	59	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Cabinet Minister	Kod. Tangerang
33.	Ali Hardi Kiaidemak	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Cilegon
34.	Akhmad Muqowam	39	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kudus
35.	Surya Dharma Ali	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Pemalang
36.	Achmad Karmani	67	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Jepara
37.	Abdullah Ubab Maemon Zubair	45	Female	Islam	High School	Teacher	Kab. Rembang
38.	Abdullah Syarwani	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Cilacap
39.	Chodidjah H.M. Soleh	57	Female	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Magelang
40.	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kod. Tegal
41.	Moh. Husnie Thamrin	60	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bantul
42.	Moh. Ismail Muzakki	59	Male	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Gresik
43.	Ahmad Bahri Bakir	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Pamekasan
44.	Nadhier Muhammad	50	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member	Kab. Bangkalan
45.	Tosari Widjaja	59	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Probolinggo
46.	Urai Faisal Hamid	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Pontianak
47.	Rusnain Yahya	52	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPRD Member	Kod. Palangkaraya
48.	M. Dja'far Siddiq	65	Male	Islam	High School	DPR Member	Kab. Kutai
49.	Muh. Aunul Hadi Idham Chalid	32	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Banjar
50.	Syafriansyah	68	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member	Kab. Hulu Sungai Utara
51.	M. Izul Islam	30	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lombok Barat

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
52.	Abdul Kadir Aklis	58	Male	Islam	High School	DPRD Member	Kab. Ende
53.	Arsjad Pana	73	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member	Kab. Maros
54.	Noer Namry Noor	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Majene
55.	Mohammad Nawir	64	Male	Islam	High School	DPRD Member	Kod. Pare-pare
56.	Sukardi Harun	65	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Gorontalo
57.	Habil Marati	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Kendari
58.	Mohammad Thahir Saimima	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Maluku Tengah

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Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Aris Azhari Siagian	40	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Binjai
2.	Erman Suparno	49	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepeneur	Kod. Dumai
3.	Awaluddin Burhanan	64	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepeneur	Kod. Palembang
4.	Imam Mawardi Sanjaya	42	Male	Islam	High School	Lawyer	Kab. Way Kanan
5.	Umar Anshori	31	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepeneur	Kab. Lampung Timur
6.	Noor Muhammad Iskandar	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	DKI Jakarta
7.	Ma'ruf Amin	56	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Teacher	Kab. Tangerang
8.	Moh. Dawam Anwar	61	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Bekasi
9.	Agus Suflihat Mahmud	57	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepeneur	Kab. Sumedang
10.	Imang Mansur Burhan	59	Male	Islam	High School	Teacher	Kab. Garut
11.	Ustman Yahya	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepeneur	Kab. Cirebon
12.	Abdul Khaliq Ahmad	38	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Tangerang
13.	Z. Arifin Junaidi	40	Male	Islam	Graduate	Consultant	Kab. Kendal
14.	Hanif Muslih	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Demark
15.	Abdul Wachid	46	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Teacher	Kab. Grobogan
16.	Matori Abdul Djalil	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Tegal
17.	A Najmi Fuaidi	31	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepeneur	Kab. Brebes
18.	Imam Churmen	68	Male	Islam	High School	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Paati
19.	Musa Abdillah	73	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Banyumas
20.	Mohammad Cholil Bisri	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Magelang
21.	Alwi Shihab	53	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Wonosobo
22.	Noer Iskandar Al Barsani	45	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Kebumen
23.	Aliy As'ad	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Kulon Progo
24.	A. Effendy Choirie	36	Male	Islam	Graduate	Journalist	Kab. Gresik
25.	Ach. Anshor Cholil	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Mojokerto
26.	Abd. Muhaimin	33	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sidoarjo
27.	Amanulloh A.R.	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Jombang

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
28.	Ahmad Mubasyir Mahfud	42	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Teacher	Kab. Sampang
29.	Moh. Tsabit Khazin	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Sumenep
30.	Fuad Amin	51	Male	Islam	High School	Teacher	Kab. Bangkalan
31.	Susono	36	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bondowoso
32.	Amin Said Husni	33	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Situbondo
33.	Umroh Machfudzoh	63	Female	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Banyuwangi
34.	Yusuf Muhammad	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Jember
35.	Muhyiddin Suwondo	57	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Jember
36.	Mudjib Musta'in	36	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Malang
37.	Rodjil Ghufron Agus Hardjono	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Pasuruan
38.	Tari Siwi Utami	37	Female	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Probolinggo
39.	Nur Hasan	39	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lumajang
40.	Abdul Wahid Aziz Bisri	45	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kediri
41.	Ali Masykur Musa	37	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Tulungagung
42.	Ibrahim Soejoto	61	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Trenggalek
43.	M. Sofwan Chudhorie	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Blitar
44.	Ida Fauziyah	<30	Female	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Bojonegoro
45	Taufikurrachman Saleh	50	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Lamongan
46.	Khofifah Indar Parawansda	34	Female	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kod. Surabaya
47.	Ahmad Syatibi	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kod. Pasuruan
48.	Syaifullah Adnawi	36	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Barito Utara
49.	Khalilurrahman	54	Male	Islam	High School	Teacher	Kab. Tanah Laut
50.	Machrus Usman	60	Male	Islam	High School	Civil Servant	Kab. Bangli
51.	M. Mokhtar Noer Jaya	53	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Enrekang

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Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Hasballah M. Saad	51	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Pidie
2.	T. Syaiful Ahmad	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kod. Banda Aceh
3.	Ahmad Sanoesi Tambuan	63	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Doctor	Kab. Asahan
4.	Amri Husni Siregar	55	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Medan
5.	Herman L Dt. Rangkayo Bandaro	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Journalist	Kab. Agam
6.	Patrialis Akbar	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kod. Padang
7.	Ambia B. Boestam	38	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Solok
8.	Radja Roesli	73	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Batam
9.	Zulkifli Nurdin	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Kerinci
10.	Tibrani Basri	62	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bangka
11.	Zainul Karim	64	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bengkulu Utara
12.	Suminto Martono	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Metro
13.	Mohammad Amien Rais	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	DKI Jakarta
14.	A.M. Fatwa	60	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	DKI Jakarta
15.	Afni Achmad	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	DKI Jakarta
16.	Muhammadi	67	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Tangerang
17.	A.M. Luthfi	64	Male	Islam	Graduate	Consultant	Kab. Bogor
18.	Muchtar Adam	60	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Majalengka
19.	M. Hatta Rajasa	46	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Bandung
20.	Rosyid Hidayat	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Bekasi
21.	Samuel Koto	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Depok
22.	Munawar Sholeh	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Tegal
23.	Djoko Susilo	38	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Journalist	Kab. Jepara
24.	Achmad Arief	69	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Klaten
25.	Alvin Lie Ling Piao	38	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Semarang
26.	Akhmad Risaf Iskandar	40	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sieman
27.	Imam Addaruqutni	40	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Pacitan
28.	Masfuk	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Surabaya

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
29.	M. Wahyudi Indrajaya	47	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Mojokerto
30.	Nurdiati Akma	49	Female	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab. Bulungan
31.	Noor Adenan Razak	59	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tabalong
32.	Hatta Taliwang	45	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Sumbawa
33.	Moh. Askin	54	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Mamuju
34.	Rachman Sulaiman	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Yapen Waropen

Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)

1.	Mawardi Abdullah	45	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Aceh Utara
2.	Nurbalqis	51	Female	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kod. Tabingtinggi
3.	M.S. Kaban	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kod. Bukit Tinggi
4.	Darmansyah	45	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Belitung
5.	Sumargono	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	DKI Jakarta
6.	Yusril Ihza Mahendra	43	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bekasi
7.	Hartono Mardjono	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Cirebon
8.	Jusuf Amir Feisal	65	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Cirebon
9.	Muhammad Amanullah	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Doctor	Kod. Salatiga
10.	Nadjih Ahjad	63	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Gresik
11.	M. Qasthalani	57	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Tapin
12.	Hamdan Zoelva	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Lombok Barat
13.	M. Zubair Bakry	61	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Seleyar

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Partai Keadilan (PK)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Irwan Prayitno	36	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Tanah Datar
2.	Rokib Abdul Kadir	42	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Lampung Utara
3.	Nur Mahmudi Ismail	38	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	DKI Jakarta
4.	T.B. Soenmandjaja	42	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	Kab Bogor
5.	Zirlyrosa Jamil	34	Female	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Karawang
6.	Mutammimul 'Ula	43	Male	Islam	Graduate	Consultant	Kab. Banjamegara
7.	Mashadi	46	Male	Islam	High School	Researcher	Kab. Sumenep

Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB)

1.	K. Tunggul Sirait	65	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Toba Samosir
2.	Gregorius Seto Harianto	50	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Sambas
3.	Manasse Malo	58	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Sumba Barat
4.	Arnold Nicolaas Radjawane	63	Male	Catholic	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Nabire
5.	Astrid Sunarti Susanto	63	Female	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Ternate

Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Tgk. Muhibbuddin Waly	63	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	Kab. Kepulauan Simeulue
2.	A.M. Mucharor	53	Male	Islam	High School	Teacher	Kab. Lampung Utara
3.	Abdullah Alwahdi	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Sukabumi
4.	Achmad Sjatari	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Malang
5.	Yunani Hashar	44	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan

Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP)

1.	Sutradara Gintings	47	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Researcher	Kod. Tebing
2.	Tjetje Hidayat Padmadinata	64	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Privately Employed	Kod. Bogor
3.	Ismawan D.S.	54	Male	Catholic	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Salatiga
4.	Indra Prayitno	68	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kod. Surabaya

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)

1.	Sebastian M. Kaphat	54	Male	Catholic	Graduate	DPRD Member	Kab. Sintang
2.	Athonius Rahail	48	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Jayapura

Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (PBI)

1.	L.T. Susanto	57	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Bengkayang

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Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Marcus Mali	55	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Teacher	Kab. Puncak Jaya

Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR)

1.	Mudahan Hazdie	41	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Lombok Timur

Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)

1.	Amaruddin Djajasubita	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Tasikmalaya

Partai Nasional Indoneia Massa Marhaen (PNI-M)

1.	F.X. Sumitro	60	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Lawyer	Kab. Sragen

Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis (PNI-FM)

1.	Probosutedjo	69	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	Kab. Demak

Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (New Masyumi)

1.	Sayuti Rahawarin	37	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Kab. Kuningan

Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU)

	Name	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Constituency
1.	Asnawi Latief	63	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Kab. Pasunuan

Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)

1.	Hamid Mappa	62	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Kab. Jeneponto

Military/Police

	Name	Force	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation
1.	B.G. Supriadi	Police	49	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
2.	Col. Rukmini	Air Force	50	Female	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
3.	Maj. Gen. Hendi Tjaswadi	Air Force	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member
4.	B.G. Ronggo Soenarso	Air Force	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Pati Mabes TNI(?)
5.	Maj. Gen. Suparno Muanam	Air Force	53	Male	Islam	Graduate	Pangkoopsau II(?)
6.	B.G. Siwitno Adi	Air Force	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	Sahil Kasau(?)
7.	Maj. Gen. Benyamin Balukh	Navy	56	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Pati Mabes TNI
8.	Col. Christina M. Rantetana	Navy	44	Female	Catholic	Postgraduate	DPR Member
9.	Maj. Gen. Deddy Sudarmadji	Army	52	Male	Islam	High School	Pati Mabes TNI
10.	Maj. Gen. Ferry Tinggogoy	Army	55	Male	Catholic	Diploma/College	DPR Member
11.	Col. Inf. Prayogo	Army	50	Male		Graduate	DPR Member
12.	Lieut. Gen. Achmad Roestandi	Army	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
13.	B.G. Ignatius Mulyono	Army	54	Male	Catholic	Diploma/College	DPR Member
14.	Adm. Sutanto	Navy	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Pati Mabes TNI
15.	B.G. Rudy Supriatna	Army	54	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member
16.	Maj. Gen. Soeyatno	Army	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member
17.	B.G. Ngatmin Nanto	Army	54	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member

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	Name	Force	Age	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation
18.	Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono	Army	53	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Pati Mabes TNI
19.	B.G. Suwadji M.	Army	52	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
20.	Maj. Gen. Tayo Tarmadi	Army	56	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
21.	Col. Zawiah Ramlie	Army	47	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member
22.	B.G. Int. Aryasa	Navy	54	Male	Hindu	Postgraduate	Pati Mabes TNI
23.	Brig. Gen. Sudiyotomo	Army	53	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member
24.	Maj. Gen. Sangiang Makmur Siregar	Army	56	Male	Protestant Christian	High School	Pati Mabes TNI
25.	Lieut. Gen. Hari Sabarno	Army	55	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member
26.	Maj. Gen. I Ketut Astaa	Police	54	Male	Hindu	Graduate	DPR Member
27.	Rear-Adm. Soenarto	Navy	58	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
28.	Vice-Adm. Mardiono	Navy	54	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	Pati Mabes TNI
29.	Vice-Adm. Poerworo Setyo Handojo	Navy	55	Male	Islam	Akademi(?)	DPR/MPR Member
30.	Vice-Adm. I Gusti Ngurah Sebudhie	Navy	54	Male	Hindu	Diploma/College	Pati Mabes TNI
31.	B.G. Wulang Trinur Widodo	Air Force	54	Male	Islam	Graduate	Pati Mabes TNI
32.	Vice-adm. Ishak Latuconsina	Navy	51	Male	Islam	Diploma/College	DPR Member
33.	B.G. Uddy Rusdilie	Army	48	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
34.	B.G. Sri Hardjendro	Army	54	Male	Islam		Pati Mabes TNI
35.	B.G. Paiman	Police	50	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
36.	B.G. Taufiequrochman Ruki	Police	53	Male	Islam	Graduate	DPR Member
37.	B.G. Posma Lumban Tobing	Police	51	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	DPR Member
38.	B.G. Sudirman	Air Force	52	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	DPR Member

Source: *Kompas*, 1 October 1999; Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004*, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 1–255.

APPENDIX II.2

Profile of MPR Members (who are not from DPR) (1999–2004)

Group Representatives (Utusan Golongan)

Religious Groups

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
1.	Nasri Adlani	1938	Male	Islam	Graduate	Secretary-General, MUI	MUI
2.	Afandi Ridhwan	1922	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	DDII
3.	K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid	1940	Male	Islam	Graduate	Chairman, NU	NU
4.	H.A. Rosyad Sholeh	1940	Male	Islam	College	Retired	Muhammadiyah
5.	Valina Singka Subekti	1961	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	Religious Teacher	PP WSI
6.	Habib Syech Bin Ali Aljufri	1940	Male	Islam	Religious Education	Religious Teacher	Itthadatul Mubaligqhin
7.	Harun Kamil, SH	1943	Male	Islam	Law School	Notary	KAHMI
8.	H. Ali Innur	1933	Male	Islam		Privately Employed	Al Irsyad Al Islamiyah
9.	H. Aziddin, S.E.	1942	Male	Islam	College		PB Al Jami 'Atul Wasliyah
10.	H. Kusnadi Abdul Hafid	1929	Male	Islam		Entrepreneur	Barmus Ulama Dan Umat
11.	KH.M. Nahid Abdurrahman	1938	Male	Islam	Islamic College		Matlaul Anwar
12.	Hj. F. Titi Vharmana	1965	Female	Islam	Medical School	Privately Employed	DPP Al Itthidaiyah
13.	H. Atifah Hasan L.C.	1954	Female	Islam	Graduate	Religious Teacher	BKMT
14.	H. Hamim Thohari	1963	Male	Islam	College	Religious Teacher	Hidayatullah
15.	K.H. Shiddiq Aminullah	1955	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Teacher	(Persis)
16.	A. Djoko Wiyono		Male	Catholic	Graduate	Researcher	KWI
17.	Ishak Parmumbu Lambe	1946	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Minister	PGI

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	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
18.	Markus Daniel Wakkary	1943	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Minister	PGPI
19.	Siti Hartati Murdaya	1946	Female	Buddhist	Graduate	Company Director	Walubi
20.	Gedong Bagoes Oka	1921	Female	Hindu	High School	Retired	PHDI
Veterans (Golongan Veteran, Perintis Kemerdekaan, Pejuang)							
21.	Rais Abin	1926	Female	Islam	Graduate	Chairman	LVRI
22.	Suyitno Hardjoesoediro	1921	Male	Islam	Graduate		PPKI
23.	Haji Andi Sose	1930	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	DHN 45
24.	Mulyono Herlambang	1930	Male	Islam	College	Entrepreneur	PKBPPK
25.	H. Arief Biki	1949	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	IKBLA-ARH
Economic Group (Golongan Ekonomi dan Badan Kolektif Lain)							
26.	Sutrisno Iwantono	1958	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Co-operative Manager	DEKOPIN
27.	Federick Batong	1958	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Director-General of Regional Co-operative	INKUD
28.	H. Mod. Iqbal	1955	Male	Islam	Graduate	Adviser to Indonesian Co-operative	KOPINDO
29.	Siswono Yudo Husodo	1943	Male	Islam	Graduate	Chairman, Farmers Association/ Entrepreneur	HKTI
30.	Tuk Setyohadi	1928	Male	Islam		Retired Military Officer	HNSI

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
31.	Ny. Sunarti	1964	Female	Islam	High School	Functionary at the Labour Association	SBSI
32.	Adiwarsita Adinegoro	1946	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	KADIN
33.	Sutjipto, S.H.	1950	Male	Islam	Graduate	Notary	PPAT
34.	Hariyadi B. Sukamdari, M.M.	1965	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Businessman	HIPMI

Women's Group (Golongan Perempuan)

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
35.	Inne E.A. Soekaryo, Apt	1935	Female	Islam	Graduate	Pharmacist	KOWANI
36.	Ny. Sulasmi Bobon Tabroni	1948	Female	Islam	High School	Unknown	PERWARI
37.	Hj. Azizah Sri Wedari Imam	1945	Female	Islam	—	Housewife	BMOIWI
38.	Hj. Sri Sjamsiar Issom	1943	Female	Islam	Postgraduate	Dosen IKIP Jakarta(?)	PP Wanita Islam
39.	Marry B. Harun	1956	Female	Protestant Christian	Foreign Language Academy	Entrepreneur	PWKI

Ethnic Minority Group (Golongan Etnis Minoritas)

40.	Maliki	1945	Male	Islam	Middle School	Farmer	Suku Kubu/ Anak Dalam
41.	H. Kasmin Bin Sailan	1958	Male	Islam	Primary School	Entrepreneur	Suku Baduy
42.	Aselmus Robertus Mecer	1944	Male	Catholic	College	Retired Civil Servant	Suku Dayak
43.	John Onan Lanta'a	1938	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	Suku Sangir/ Miangas
44	Teddy Th. Kedeykoto	1953	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Student Advisor	Suku Irian

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Handicapped Group (Golongan Penyadang Cacat)

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
45.	Fikri Thalib, SM. HK	1962	Male	Islam	College	Entrepreneur	DN PCI
46.	Siswo Muhsin	1946	Male	Unknown	Graduate		BPOCP

Academics and Intellectuals (Golongan Budayawan, Ilmuwan, Cendekiawan)

47.	G.M. Tampubolon	1933	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Privately Employed	PATI
48.	Marzuki Usman	1943	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Former Minister	ISEI
49.	Djoko Mursito Hoemardani	1947	Male	Islam/ Mystic	College	Privately Employed	HPKYME
50.	Rmh Heroe Syswanto NS	1956	Male	Islam	Arts Institute	Entrepreneur	PARFI
51.	Achmad Mubarok	1945	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Lecturer	BKS PTIS
52.	Achmad Zacky Siradj	1952	Male	Islam	Islamic Institute	Director	ICMI
53.	Sabam Pandapotan Siagian	1932	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Editor	PIKI
54.	Mohamad Assegaf	1940	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	IKADIN
55.	H. KI Boerhanoedin Lubis	1934	Male	Islam	Teachers' College	Privately Employed	PTS

Civil Servants Group (Golongan Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS)

56.	H.M. Feisal Tamin	1941	Male	Islam	Graduate	Civil Servant	DPP KOPRI
57.	A. Hasan Segeiyr	1939	Male	Islam	Graduate	Director	BUMN
58.	H. Soedijarto	1938	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Civil Servant	DEPDIKBUD/PGRI
59.	S.H. Malik Ridwan Badai	1939	Male	Islam	Graduate	Ministry of Home Affairs	DEPDAGRI
60.	S.H. Warsito Puspoyo	1923	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	PB. PWRI

Youth/Students/NGO Group (Golongan Pemuda/Mahasiswa dan LSM)

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
61.	Erna Witoelar	1947	Female	Islam	Graduate	Chairman, Consumers Association	YLKI
62.	Mm. Santoso Kismomihardjo	1936	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Civil Servant	HCRI
63.	S.h. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana	1955	Female	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	APIK
64.	Ami Siamsidar Budiman	1957	Female	Islam	Graduate	Consultant	PKBI
65.	Anak Agung Gde Agung	1948	Female	Hindu Bali	Postgraduate	Businesswoman	AEKI

Regional Representatives
West Sumatra

1.	Irman Gusman		Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Unknown	—
2.	Januar Muin	1936	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Golkar
3.	H. Noer B. Pamuncak	1941	Male	Islam	Defence Institute	Retired (Military)	Golkar
4.	H. Djamin Rifti	1937	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Perti
5.	H. Mochtar Naim	1932	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Retired Lecturer	PUI

South Sumatra

6.	M. Soleh Thamrin	1948	Male	Islam	Graduate	Journalist	—
7.	Muhammad S. Zulkarnaen	1955	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	NGO
8.	H.M. Hatta Mustafa	1939	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired	Golkar
9.	Erwin Singajuru	1959	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	FKPPI
10.	M. Djakfar Murod	1938	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Civil Servant	Golkar

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Jakarta

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
11.	H.M. Syah Manaf	1931	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	islamic Organization
12.	Hobes Sinaga	1950	Male	Christian	Graduate	Lecturer	Unknown
13.	Sucipno	1935	Male	Islam	Military Academy	Retired	Policy Academy
14.	H. Achmad Suaidy	1945	Male	Islam	Islamic Institute	Businessman	Unknown
15.	KH. Zainuddin Abdul Aziz	1941	Male	Islam	Self-taught	Preacher/Religious Teacher	Islamic Dakwah Council

West Java

16.	Lilik Hendrajaya	1949	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Lecturer	Golkar
17.	H. Djojo Sutisno	1939	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	—
18.	Solichin Gautama Purwanegara		Male	Islam	Military Academy	Former Official	Military
19.	Ginanjar Kartasasmita		Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Former Minister	Golkar
20.	H.B. Syarif Muhammad Alaydarus		Male	Islam	Graduate	—	—

Central Java

21.	Oetojo	1943	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lecturer	PDI-P
22.	Moegiono	1952	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lawyer	PDI-P
23.	Tasroni Priyitno Budi	1937	Male	Islam	Teachers' College	Retired Teacher	PDI-P
24.	KH. Dimyati Rois	1945	Male	Islam	High School	Farmer	NU
25.	Bambang Raya Saputra	1952	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Golkar

East Java

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
26.	M. Anwar Iskandar	1950	Male	Islam	—	Entrepreneur	—
27.	KH. Harjono	1948	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Lecturer	—
28.	Muhammad Ali		Male	Islam	Postgraduate	—	—
29.	H. Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya	1944	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	NU
30.	Retno Triani Johan		Male	Islam	Postgraduate	—	—

Central Kalimantan

31.	Abdul Rasyid, AS	1958	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	KADIN
32.	Nusa J. Toendan	1943	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	—
33.	Donar Abel	1938	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	PNI-MM
34.	Garinda Jamin	1946	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Entrepreneur	PAN
35.	KH. Haderani HN.	1933	Female	Islam		Privately Employed	MUI

South Kalimantan

36.	J.M. Syamsiwal Qamar	1933	Female	Islam	Islamic Institute	Entrepreneur	PPP
37.	Urip Suharyanto		Female		Graduate		—
37.	H. Sulaiman HB		Male				
38.	H. Fahmi Idris		Male	Islam	Graduate	Ex-minister	Golkar
39.	H. Amidhan		Male	Islam			

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North Sulawesi

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
41.	Edwin Kawilarang		Male		Graduate	Real Estate	
42.	Theo L. Sambuaga		Male		Graduate	Ex-minister	Golkar
43.	Ishak Pulukadang	1942	Male	Islam	Graduate	Lecturer	Golkar
44.	H. Moh. Firmansyah Wuisan	1951	Male	Islam	Postgraduate		Golkar
45.	Frits H. Eman	1927	Male	Protestant Christian	Postgraduate	Unknown	Golkar

South Sulawesi

46.	H.M. Yusuf Kalla		Male	Islam	Graduate		Golkar
47.	H.A.A. Baramuli		Male	Islam	Graduate	Ex-Chairman of Supreme Council	Golkar
48.	H.M. Ishak Iskandar		Male	Islam	High School	Retired (Police)	—
49.	Andi Jaya Sose	1962	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Rector of University	—
50.	H.M. Aksa Mahmud	1945	Male	Islam	Graduate	Businessman	KADIN

Bali

51.	Ida Bagus Adnyana Manuaba		Male	—	—	—	—
52.	I. Dewa Gde Paiguna	1961	Male	Hindu	Graduate	Civil Servant	PDI(?)
53.	I. Gede Sudbya		Male	—	—	—	—
54.	I. Gusti Bagus Masri		Male	—	—	—	—
55.	I. Gusti Wayan Meregeg		Male	—	—	—	—

West Nusa Tenggara

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
56.	H. Mesir Suryadi	1943	Male	Islam	Graduate	Entrepreneur	Golkar
57.	Ny. Siti Raehanun	1952	Female	Islam		Entrepreneur	Golkar
58.	Hasan Taher		Male	—	—	—	—
59.	H. Muchlis Ibrahim	1947	Male	Islam	Islamic Institute		—
60.	Baiq Isvie Rufaeda	1962	Female	Islam	Graduate	Lecturer	—

Irian Jaya

61.	Budi Baldus Waromi			—	—	—	—
62.	Sulaeman L. Hamzah	1954	Male	Islam	High School	Entrepreneur	—
63.	Alex Hesegem	1957	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	—
64.	A.G. Subadi	1946	Male	Catholic	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	—
65.	John R. Fachiri	1963	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	—

Bengkulu

66.	H.A. Afifuddin Thaib	1943	Male	Islam	High School	Privately Employed	Golkar
67.	H. Bambang Prajitno Soeroso		Male	—	—	—	—
68.	Iwan N. Aksa	1949	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Golkar
69.	H. Basri Muhammad	1955	Male	Islam	Technical School	Privately Employed	—
70.	Bando Amin C. Kader	1951	Female	Islam	Graduate	—	PNI-Supeni

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Yogyakarta

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
71.	Arif Nursediyanto	1965	Male	Islam	Business Institute	Entrepreneur	—
72	Herman Praayitno	1947	Male	Islam	Graduate	Firm Employee	Golkar
73.	H. Purdi E. Chandra	1959	Male	Islam	Graduate	Businessman	KADIN
74.	Fuad Bawazier	1949	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Privately Employed	Close to Suharto
75.	Katin Subiantoro	1941	Male	Christian	Graduate	Retired	PDI-P

Central Sulawesi

76.	Muhiddin M. Said	1950	Male	Islam	—	—	—
77.	Murad Husain	1938	Male	Islam	Postgraduate	Businessman	Golkar
78.	Fadel Muhammad	1952	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	—
79.	H. Baso Lamakarate	1939	Male	Islam	—	—	—
80.	H. Syahruddin Kadir	1945	Male	Islam	—	—	—

East Nusa Tenggara

81.	Marzuki Darusman	1945	Male	Islam	Graduate	Privately Employed	Golkar
82.	Melchias Markus Mekeng	1963	Male	—	Graduate	Privately Employed	Golkar
83.	Mech Saba	1955	Male	Protestant Christian		Entrepreneur	Golkar
84.	Herman Y. Loli Wutun		—	—	—	—	—
85.	Vincen T. Radja		—	—	—	—	—

Maluku

	Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
86.	Freddy Latumahina	1945	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Privately Employed	Golkar
87.	A. Fatah Syah Doa		Male	Islam	—	—	—
88.	H. Abdul Aziz Imron Pattisahusiwa	1933	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired Civil Servant	PPP
89.	NN Petera Pietersz		—	—	Graduate	—	—
90.	F.F.H. Matrutty	1928	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Lecturer	PDI-P

Southeast Sulawesi

91.	Ridwan	1957	Male	Unknown	—	—	—
92.	Zaenal Asmada	1956	Male	—	—	—	—
93.	La Ode Masihu Kamaluddin		Male	Islam	Postgraduate	—	—
94.	H.R. Agung Laksono		Male	Islam	—	—	—
95.	H. Surunuddin	1953	Male	Islam	Graduate	—	—

North Sumatra

96.	H. Bachtiar Ibrahim	1926	Male	Islam	—	—	—
97.	T. Ferdinand Simangunsong	1938	Male	Protestant Christian	Graduate	Chairman of Co-operative	Golkar
98.	H. Rahmat Shah	1950	Male	Islam	—	—	—
99.	Chairuddin Panisunan Lubis	1945	Male	Islam	—	—	—
100.	Mahadi Sinambela	1947	Male	Islam	Graduate	Retired	Golkar

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Riau

Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
101. H. Syarwan Hamid	1943	Male	Islam	Military Academy	Retired General & Ex-minister	—
102. H. Said Galib Husin	1937	Male	Islam	—	—	—
103. H. Azali Djohan	1939	Male	Islam	—	—	—
104. Mahdini	1961	Male	Islam	—	—	—
105. Amir Luthfi	1945	Male	Islam	—	—	—

Jambi

106. H. Azhari	1936	Male	Islam	—	—	—
107. Umirza Abidin	1935	Male	Islam	—	—	—
108. Jaka A. Singgih	1958	Male	Hindu	—	—	—
109 H. Abu Hasan	1934	Male	Islam	—	—	—
110. Ramli Thaha	1967	Male	Islam	—	—	—

West Kalimantan

111. H. Oesman Sapta	1950	Male	Islam	—	—	—
112. Zainuddin Isman	1956	Male	Islam	—	—	—
113. Dudiono Tan	1952	Male	Buddhist	—	—	—
114. M. Ikot Rinding	1948	Male	Christian	—	—	—
115. Chairil Effendi	1957	Male	Islam	—	—	—

East Kalimantan

116. H. Nur Aliansyah		Male	Islam	—	—	—
117. H. Harbiansyah Hanabiah	1948	Male	Islam	—	—	—
118. H. Rizal Effendi	1958	Male	Islam	—	—	—
119. H. Soekarno	1938	Male	Islam	—	—	—
120. Laden Mering	1937	Male	Christian	—	—	—

Aceh

Name	Year of Birth	Sex	Religion	Education	Occupation	Affiliation
121. Ahmad Farhan Hamid		Male	—	—	—	—
122. H. Teuku Djohan		Male	—	—	—	—
123 H. Abdul Gafur		Male	—	—	—	—
124. Ghazali Abbas Adan		Male	—	—	—	—
125. Teuku Bachrum Manyak		Male	—	—	—	—

Lampung

126. H. Safrin Romas		Male	—	—	—	—
127. Andy Achmad Sampurna Jaya		Male	—	—	—	—
128. H.F. Muchtar Sani Badrie		Male	—	—	—	—
129. Mega Putri Tarmizi		Female	Islam	—	—	—
130. H. Risani Merawi		Male	—	—	—	—

Source: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004*, Jakarta, 1999.

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APPENDIX III.1
Indonesian Cabinet (1999–2004)
October 1999 to 20 August 2000

Position	Name	Affiliation
President	Abdurrahman Wahid	PKB
Vice-President	Megawati Sukarnoputri	PDI-P
Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry	Drs Kwik Kian Gie*	PDI-P
Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs	Gen. (retired) Wiranto	ABRI
Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Eradication	Hamzah Haz**	PPP
Minister for Home Affairs	Lt.-Gen. (retired) Surjadi Sudirdja	ABRI
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Dr Alwi Shihab	PKB
Minister for Defence and Security	Prof. Dr Juwono Sudarsono	Golkar
Minister for Law and Legislation	Prof. Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra	PBB
Minister for Finance	Dr Bambang Sudibyo	PAN
Minister for Trade and Industry	Drs H.M. Jusuf Kalla#	Golkar
Minister for Agriculture	Dr Ir Mohamad Prakosa	PDI-P
Minister for Mines and Energy	Lt.-Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	ABRI
Minister for Forestry and Plantation	Dr Ir Nur Mahmudi Isma'il M.Sc.	PK
Minister for Public Work	Dr Bomer Pasaribu SH	Golkar
Minister for Communications	Lt.-Gen. Agum Gumelar	ABRI
Minister for Maritime Exploitation	Ir Sarwono Kusumaatmadja	Golkar
Minister for National Education	Dr Yahya Muhaimin	PAN
Minister for Health	Dr Achmad Sujudi	PKB
Minister for Religious Affairs	Drs K.H. Muhammad Tolchah Hasan	PKB
Minister for Settlement and Regional Development	Ir Erna Witoelar	Golkar

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Position	Name	Affiliation
Minister of State/ State Secretariat	Dr Ali Rahman[##]	PKB
Minister of State for Regional Autonomy	Prof. Dr Ryaas Rasyid	Golkar(?)[†]
Minister of State for Research and Technology	Dr AS Hikam	PKB?
Minister of State for Travel and Arts	Hidayat Jaelani	Golkar(?)
Minister of State for Transmigration and Population	Ir Al Hilal Hamdi	PAN
Minister of State for Investment and State Enterprises	Laksamana Sukardi[††]	PDI-P
Minister of State for Co-operative and Entrepreneurial Development	Drs Zakarsih Nur	PPP
Minister of State for Human Rights	Dr Hasballah M. Saad	PAN
Minister of State for Public Works	Rafik Boediro Soetjipto	Golkar(?)
Minister of State for Environment	Dr Alexander Soni Keraf	PDI-P
Minister of State for Women's Affairs	Dra Khofifah Indar Parawansa	PKB
Minister of State for Youth and Sports	Mahadi Sinambela	Golkar
Minister of State for State Administrative Reform	Vice-Admiral Freddy Numberi	ABRI
Minister of State for Social Affairs	Dr Anak Agung Gde Agung	PDI-P
Attorney-General	Marzuki Darusman SH	Golkar
Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces	Admiral Widodo AS	ABRI

Notes:
*Resigned on 11 August 2000.
**Replaced by Prof. Basri Hasanudin M.A.
[#]Replaced by Lt-Gen. (retired) Luhut Panjaitan (ABRI) on 1 May 2000.
[##] Replaced by Bondan Gunawan/Marsilam Simandjuntak (PKB)
[†]Close to Gus Dur.
[††]Replaced by Rozy Munir (PKB) on 1 May 2000.

Source: *Kompas* 27 October 1999; *Tempo* 14 January 2001, p. 22.

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APPENDIX III.2
Indonesian Cabinet (1999–2004)
From 21 August 2000 to 23 June 2001

Position	Name	Affiliation
President	Abdurrahman Wahid	PKB
Vice-President	Megawati Sukarnoputri	PDI-P
Co-ordinating Minister for Economy	Dr Rizal Ramli	Golkar
Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs	Lt.-Gen. (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono*	TNI, member of PKB
Minister for Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy	Lt.-Gen. (retired) Surjadi Sudirdja	TNI
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Dr Alwi Shihab	PKB
Minister for Defence	Prof. Dr Mahfud MD	PAN
Minister for Finance	Drs Prijadi Praptosuhardjo	PKB
Minister for Religious Affairs	Drs K.H. Muhammad Tolchah Hasan	PKB
Minister for Agriculture and Forestry	Prof. Dr Bungaran Saragih	PDI-P
Minister for National Education	Dr Yahya Muhaimin	PAN
Minister for Health	Dr Achmad Sujudi	PKB
Minister for Communications and Telecommunication	Lt.-Gen. Agum Gumelar**	TNI
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration	Ir Al Hilal Hamdi	PAN
Minister for Trade and Industry	Lt.-Gen. (retired) Luhut B. Panjaitan	TNI
Minister for Mines and Energy	Dr Ir Purnomo Yusgiantoro	Golkar
Minister for Law and Human Rights Affairs	Prof. Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra#	PBB
Minister for Settlement and Regional Development	Ir Erna Witoelar	Golkar
Minister for Culture and Tourism	Drs I Gde Ardika	PDI-P(?)
Minister for Public Work	Dr Bomer Pasaribu SH	Golkar
Minister for Maritime Exploitation and Fishery	Ir Sarwono Kusumaatmadja##	Golkar

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Position	Name	Affiliation
Minister of State for Women's Affairs	Dra Khofifah Indar Parawansa	PKB
Minister of State for State Administrative Reform	Prof. Dr Ryaas Rasyid	Golkar(?)†
Minister of State for Co-operative and Entrepreneurial Development	Drs Zakarsih Nur	PPP
Minister of State for Environment	Dr Alexander Soni Keraf	PDI-P
Minister of State for Research and Technology	Dr AS Hikam	PKB(?)
Attorney-General	Marzuki Darusman††	Golkar
Junior Minister for Forestry	Dr Nurmahdi Ismail	PK
Junior Minister for Eastern Indonesia Development	Manuel Kaisiepo	PKB(?)
Junior Minister for Reconstruction of National Economy	Ir Cacuk Sudarjanto@	unknown†

Notes:
*Replaced by Lt.-Gen. (retired) Agum Gumelar (TNI) on 1 June 2001.
**Replaced by Budi Mulyawan Suyitno on 1 June 2001.
#Replaced by Baharuddin Lopa (PKB) on 1 June 2001.
Replaced by Rockhmin Dahuri (Golkar) on 1 June 2001.
†Close to Gus Dur.
†† Replaced by Marsilam Simandjuntak on 1 June 2001.
@Sacked on 1 June 2001, not replaced.

Source: Tempo Interaktif, 23 August 2000; "President fires five ministers, Attorney General", <http:www.jakartapost.com/detaillatenews.asp?fileid=200106011735&irec=5>; "Presiden Umumkan Susunan Kabinet Gotong Royong", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 9 August 2001.

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APPENDIX III.3
Indonesian Cabinet (1999–2004)
From 9 August 2001

Position	Name	Affiliation
President	Megawati Sukarnoputri	PDI-P
Vice-President	Hamzah Haz	PPP
Co-ordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry	Prof. Dr Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti	Economics Professor, former ambassador to U.S.
Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs	Gen. (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	TNI
Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare	Jusuf Kalla	Golkar
Minister for Home Affairs	Lt.-Gen. (retired) Hari Sabarno	TNI
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Dr Hassan Wirayuda	Career Diplomat
Minister for Defence and Security	Matori Abdul Djalil	PKB
Minister for Law and Human Rights	Prof. Dr Yusril Ihza Mahendra	PBB
Minister for Finance	Dr Boediono	Economist, former Governor of Bank Indonesia
Minister for Trade and Industry	Rini Soewandi	Former Director-General of ASTRA
Minister for Agriculture	Prof. Dr Bungaran Saragih	PDI-P
Minister for Mines and Energy	Dr Ir Purnomo Yusgiantoro	Golkar
Minister for Forestry	Dr Ir M. Prakosa	PDI-P
Minister for Communications	Lt.-Gen. Agum Gumelar	ABRI
Minister for Maritime Exploitation	Dr Ir Rokhmin Dahuri	Golkar

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Position	Name	Affiliation
Minister for National Education	Drs H. Abdul Malik Fadjar M.Sc.	Muhammadiyah
Minister for Health	Dr Ahmad Sujudi	Physician
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration	Jacob Nuwawea	PDI-P
Minister for Resettlement and Regional Development	Ir Sunarno	
Minister for Religious Affairs	Prof. Dr Said Agil Munawar	NU
Minister for Social Affairs	Bachtiar Chamsyah SE	PPP
Minister of State for Research and Technology	Ir Hatta Radjasa	PAN
Minister of State for State Enterprises	Laksamana Sukardi	PDI-P
Minister of State for National Development Planning	Drs Kwik Kian Gie	PDI-P
Minister of State for Co-operative and Entrepreneurial Development	H. Alimarwan Hanan SH	PPP
Minister of State for State Apparatus	Drs H.M. Faisal Tamin	Bureacrat
Minister of State for Culture and Tourism	I Gede Ardhika	PDI-P(?)
Minister of State for Environment	Nabiel Makarim	Bureaucrat
Minister of State for East Indonesian Development	Drs Manuel Kaisiepo	Former journalist
Minister of State for Women's Empowerment	H. Sri Redjeki Sumaryoto SH	Golkar
Minister of State for Communication and Information	H. Syamsul Muarif BA	Golkar
Other Positions with Ministerial Rank		
State Secretary	Bambang Kesowo SH LLM	close to Mega
National Intelligence Chief	Ahmad Hendropriyono	TNI

Source: "Presiden Umumkan Susunan Kabinet Gotong Royong", *Kompas Cyber Media*, 9 August 2001; "Cabinet Lineup", *Straits Times*, 10 August 2001.

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APPENDIX IV
Symbols of Political Parties in the 1999 General Election

1. Partai Indonesia Baru

2. Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia

3. Partai Nasional Indonesia

4. Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia

5. Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia

6. Partai Ummat Islam

7. Partai Kebangkitan Umat

8. Partai Masyumi Baru

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9. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan

10. Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia

11. PDI – Perjuangan

12. Partai Abul Yatama

13. Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka

14. Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa

15. Partai Amanat Nasional

16. Partai Rakyat Demokratik

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17. Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia — 1905

18. Partai Katolik Demokrat

19. Partai Pilihan Rakyat

20. Partai Rakyat Indonesia

21. Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi

22. Partai Bulan Bintang

23. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja

24. Partai Keadilan

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25. Partai Nahdlatul Ummat

26. PNI – Front Marhaenis

27. Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia

28. Partai Republik

29. Partai Islam Demokrat

30. PNI – Massa Marhaen

31. Partai Murba

32. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia

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33. Partai GOLKAR

34. Partai Persatuan

35. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa

36. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia

37. Partai Buruh Nasional

38. Partai MKGR

39. Partai Daulat Rakyat

40. Partai Cinta Damai

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41. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan

42. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia

43. Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia

44. Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia

45. Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia

46. Partai Nasional Demokrat

47. Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia

48. Partai Pekerja Indonesia

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Index

abangan, 6–10, 13, 16, 17, 24, 31, 35–37, 60, 108, 113–14, 212
Abdulgani, Roeslan, 18
Abdullah, Burhanuddin, 188
Abdurrahman Wahid, *see* Wahid
ABRI, *see* Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
Aceh, 53, 62–63, 169
Acehnese, 2, 72
Agama Khonghucu, 137
agami jawi (*kejawen*), 7, 16
Al-Azhar University, 151
Albright, Madeleine, 50, 70
Alfian, Dr, 39, 106
aliran politics, 22, 24, 94, 111–12, 124
Ambon, 109
Amien Rais, *see* Rais, Amien
Amin, Ma'aruf, 49
Anderson, Benedict, 3
Andojo, Adi, 100
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI), 28; *see also* Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Aquino, Corazon, 155
Arab, 2, 21
ASTRA, 149, 198
Atma Jaya Catholic University, 59
Bachtiar, Harsja, 7
Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPKI), 10
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional Indonesia (Bappenas), 37, 198
Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki), 132–35
Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog), 175, 182–83
Bagdja, Ahmad, 49
Baidawi, K. H. Cholil, 49
Bakom, 130
Bambang, *see* Soeharto, Bambang
Banjar, 2
Bank Bali (Bank Bali scandal) 86, 146, 157
Baperki, *see* Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia
Baramuli, A. A., 147, 207
Basri, Faisal, 79
Basri, Hasan, 98
Batak, 4, 15
Batavian, 2
Batubara, Cosmas, 15
Beureueh, Daud, 64

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Bimantoro, Suroyo, 188–89
Boediono, Dr, 198
BPKI, *see* Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia
Bruneigate, 182
Brunner, Edward M., 4, 15
Buddhist, 2
Budiman, Arief, 71
Buginese, 2
Bulog, *see* Badan Urusan Logistik

Central Axis, *see Poros Tengah*
CGI, *see* Consultative Group on Indonesia
Chinese, 2. *See also* ethnic Chinese
Chinese conglomerates, 45
Christian, 2
Christian Chinese, 127–28
Churmen, Imam, 120
Ciganjur Declaration, 58
Clinton, Bill, 50, 167
Communication Forum, 58
Confucian, 2
Constituent Assembly, 21, 25, 40
Constitution
  1945, 9–11, 25, 58, 92, 140, 177, 192–93, 211, 214
  1950, 11, 13, 18
Constitutional Democracy (Liberal Democracy), 20, 39
Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), 198
cronyism, 45
Crouch, Harold, 40

Dakhidae, Daniel, 205–6
Darmaputera, Eka, 18
Darusman, Marzuki, 147, 186, 188, 211
Dayak, 134
Deutsch, Karl, 15
Dharsono, 27
Dipojuwono, Budi, 135
district system, *see* electoral system
Djalil, Matori Abdul, 82, 120, 143, 198
Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, 71
dual function (*dwifungsi*), 55, 71, 93, 155, 192, 206
Dutch East Indies, 2
dwifungsi, *see* dual function

East Timor, 5, 53, 62–63, 86, 146–47, 167, 169
Eklof, Stefan, 70
Election Committee, 88
elections
  1955, 20–21, 24, 30, 39, 40, 88, 126
  1971, 27, 30–31
  1997, 32
  1999, 14, 131, 206
electoral system
  district, 87–89, 97, 121, 123
  proportional, 87, 89, 97
Esposito, John, 16
ethnic Chinese, 8, 21, 33, 35
European (Dutch), 21–23

Fadjar, Malik, 49
Fatmawati, 4
Fatwa, A. M., 93
Feith, Herbert, 17, 24–25, 39, 40, 203–4
financial crisis of 1997, 43
Forum Umat Islam Bersatu (FUIB), 57
Fretilin, 63
FUIB, *see* Forum Umat Islam Bersatu

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G-15 Summit, 48
Gadjah Mada University, 172
Gaffar, Afan, 8, 18, 88, 90, 135,
GAM, *see* Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Garuda, 6
Gatra, 108, 169
Geertz, Clifford, 6–7, 16–17, 22–25, 40, 111
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 169–70
Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (GMKI), 153
Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI), 159
Gerakan Papua Merdeka (GPM), 170
Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah, 57
Gestapu (G-30-S), 26
Ghalib, Andi, 60
globalism, 206
GMKI, *see* Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia
GMNI, *see* Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia
Golkar (Golongan Karya), 9, 24, 29–36, 57, 67, 85, 87, 89, 93–96, 103, 105, 109–10, 115, 117, 120–21, 127–28, 133, 142–47, 158, 167, 190, 194, 196, 207, 210, 212. *See also* Partai Golkar
GPM, *see* Gerakan Papua Merdeka
Guided Democracy, 26, 39
Gumelar, Agum, 179, 188, 193, 195
Gunawan, Bondan, 175
Gus Dur, *see* Wahid
Gusmao, Xanana, 63

Habibie, B. J., 4–5, 9, 15, 36–38, 43, 51–52, 56–57, 60–63, 66–67, 71, 85–86, 89–90, 96, 137, 141, 143, 145–46, 156, 165, 178, 197, 207
  East Timor , 146–47
  election laws, 85–92
  ICMI, 61
  as President, 51–52
  presidential election, 144–48
  regime of, 56–59
Hadiz, Vedi R., 98, 125
Hamid, Syarwan, 49
Hamka, Jusuf, 136
Hamzah Haz, *see* Haz, Hamzah
Hanan, Alimarwan, 79
Harahap, Syarifuddin, 81
Hardjono, Budi, 77, 82, 85, 154
Haris, Sjamsuddin, 41, 98, 100
Harmoko, 37, 49–50
Harsono, Budi, 190
Hartono, Dymyati, 208
Hartono, General R., 37
Haryanto, Petrus, 80
Hasan, Abu, 83
Hasyim, Wahid, 151
Hatta, Moh., 3, 10–11, 18
Haz, Hamzah, 62, 72, 77, 79, 92, 150, 163, 193–98, 202, 208
  and Megawati, 196–97
Hefner, Robert W., 17–18
Hill, Hal, 45, 68
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), 75–76, 207
Hindu Bali, 2
HMI, *see* Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam
Hutapea, Buttu, 82

IBRA, *see* Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
ICMI, *see* Ikatan Cendekiawan

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Muslim Indonesia
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), 36–37, 61, 76, 125, 151–52, 158
Habibie, 61
Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), 26, 30, 110
Ikranegara, 93
IMF, *see* International Monetary Fund
Indonesia Raya, 6
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), 67, 175
Indonesian Buddhist Association, 137
Indonesian nation (*Bangsa Indonesia*), 152, 164
Indonesian Ulama Council, 199
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 44, 46–47, 51, 66, 70, 146, 188, 173, 197–98
INTI (or Perhimpunan INTI), 130, 136,
IPKI, *see* Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia
Irama Suka Nusantara, 147, 157
Irian Jaya, 53, 62, 169
irregularities (corruption), 35, 95
Islamic
law, *see syariat*
nationalist (nationalism), 10–11, 13–14, 17, 111, 149
parties, 36, 106
society, 152
state, 61, 171
santri, 203
Ismail, Nur Mahudi, 81

Jahja, Junus, 131, 136
Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), 10–11, 17, 172
Jakartan, 2
Javanese, 2–7
domination, 14, 39
nationalism, 13
Jusuf, Ester, 136
Jusuf, Tedy, 130, 136

Kahin, George McT., 40
Kalla, Jusuf, 175
KAMI, *see* Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia
Kartasasmita, Ginanjar, 37–38, 50,
Karya Faction (Golkar in Parliament), 28–29
kejawen, 8, 16, 37. *See also agami jawi*
Kelompok 20 (Twenty-man group), 168
Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (KSAD, Chief of the Army), 169
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI), 197
Ketapang incident, 59
Kiemas, Taufik (Megawati's husband), 153, 159, 208
King, Dwight, 86, 97, 110–11, 125
Kingsbury, Damien, 69, 72
KIPP, *see* Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu
KISDI, *see* Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam
KKN, *see korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme*
KNPI, *see* Konperensi Nasional Pemuda Indonesia
Koentjaraningrat, Prof, 7, 16
Komando Cadangan Strategi Angkatan Darat (Kostrad), 3
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), 90–91, 94–96, 99, 100, 141, 156

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Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI), 53, 56–57, 202
Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (KIPP), 95–96
Komite Reformasi, 49
Konperensi Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI), 207
Kopasus (Special Forces Command), 54
korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme (KKN), 58
Kosgoro, 31
Kostrad, *see* Komando Cadangan Strategi Angkatan Darat
KPU, *see* Komisi Pemilihan Umum
KSAD, *see* Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat
Kumolo, Tjahjo, 120
Kuntjorojakti, Dorodjatun, 199
Kusumah, Mulyana W., 100
Kwik Kian Gie, 128–30, 134, 162, 198–99, 215

Laskar Bulan Sabit Indonesia (LBSI), 57
LBSI, *see* Laskar Bulan Sabit Indonesia
Lee Kuan Yew, 69
Legg, John D., 41
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) 56, 86–87
Lembong Eddie, 136
Lenin, 151
Lev, Daniel, 23, 40–41
Liaw Yock Fang, 178
Liberal Democracy (Constitutional Democracy), 39
Liddle, William, 42, 110
Lie, Alvin Ling Piao, 134, 173
Liem Sioe Liong, 136
Lindsey, Tim, 192–93
LIPI, *see* Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
Litaay, Alexander (Alex), 79, 93
Lopa, Burhanuddin, 186–88, 200

Ma'arif, Syamsul, 179
Mackie, Jamie, 41
Madjid, Nurcholish, 90, 108
Madurese, 2
Mahendra, Yusril Ihza, 69, 80, 104
Mahfud M.D., 186
Makarim, Zacky Anwar, 180
Maklumat, 188–90
Malay, 2
Mallarangeng, Andi, 100
Maluku, 169–70
Manipol, 18
Masyumi, 21–25, 76, 110–12
Masyumi Baru, 112
Matta, Anis, 81
McVey, Ruth, 15
Megawati Sukarnoputri, 4, 9, 33–35, 62, 79, 139, 145, 185–86
  biography of, 153–55
  and Hamzah Haz, 196–97
  and Islam, 141–42
  and military, 154–55
  as President, 191
  and presidential election, 141–50
  and Wahid, 154, 185
Minangkabau, 2–3
Mintaredja, M.S., 112
MKGR, *see* Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong
Moerdani, Benny, 17, 36, 53, 85
Muhammadiyah, 77, 112–13, 151, 172

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Muhdam, Sutrisno, 70
Mulder, Niels, 42
Murdaya, Siti Hartati, 137
Murtopo, Ali, 108
"Muslim politics", 36
Muslim state, 61
Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, 31
Muzadi, Hasyim, 93

NU, *see* Nahdlatul Ulama
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 13, 18, 21–23, 25, 30, 34, 61, 76, 109, 110–11, 114–16, 119, 151–52, 154, 159, 191, 204
Naim, Mochtar, 108, 124
Naro, Jailani (John), 82, 113
Nasution, A.H., 27–28, 40
Nasution, Adnan Buyung, 90
nation-state, 2
Natsir, M., 40, 76, 112
New Order, 26, 29–31, 39, 45, 164
NGO, *see* non-governmental organization
Noer, Deliar, 112
nominal Muslim, 9. *See also abangan*
non-governmental organization (NGO), 140

Oetama, Jakob, 181
Ojong, P. K., 181
outer islands, 1, 5, 14, 23, 25, 28, 32, 39, 88–89, 103, 105, 113, 147, 170

Paguyuban Sosial Warga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSWTI), 130
Pamungkas, Sri Bintang, 82, 214
PAN, *see* Partai Amanat Nasional
Pancasila, 8–12, 14, 19, 24, 31, 59, 75, 77, 84, 106–8, 113, 163
  and *abangan*, 203
  democracy, 155
  state, 171, 173, 189, 120
Parkindo, 26, 30, 76, 110
parliamentary democracy, 19–20, 26
Parmusi, 30, 76, 110
Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia), 66, 129
Partai Abul Yatama (PAY), 79
Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia (PADI), 78
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), 75, 79, 85, 93, 102–3, 106–8, 113, 115–16, 119–21, 127–28, 134, 141–43, 173, 185, 205, 208–9, 212
Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI), 83, 129, 131–32, 134–35, 138
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), 80, 141, 75–76, 103–4, 114–16, 119, 120–21, 148, 167, 171
Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN), 82
Partai Cinta Damai (PCD), 83
Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR), 83
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), 30–35, 62, 76, 82, 87, 97, 110, 117, 120–21, 133, 154
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P), 14, 57, 77, 79, 84, 86, 93, 102–5, 107–17, 119–22, 124, 127–28, 130–31, 139, 143, 145, 153–54, 157, 162, 175, 186, 194–96, 206, 208, 212, 214
Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB), 79, 120–21, 184
Partai Golkar, 68, 76–77, 82,

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102–3, 105, 107, 111–12, 209. *See also* Golkar
Partai Gurem (blur parties), 75, 96, 100
Partai Ikatan Penerus Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), 81
Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB), 78
Partai Islam Demokrat (PID), 81
Partai Katolik, 26
Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD), 80
Partai Keadilan (PK), 75, 81, 110, 112, 114–16, 119, 121–23, 141, 171
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP), 77, 83, 122–23
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), 18, 57, 75–77, 82, 84, 86, 93, 103–5, 108–12, 115–16, 119–20, 122–23, 127–28, 141–45, 147, 149, 159, 163, 184, 198, 205, 210
Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Kami), 78
Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU), 78
Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM), 79
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), 21–26, 30–31, 36, 74–76, 94, 110–11, 114, 203–4, 206
Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Krisna), 78
Partai Masyumi Baru Indonesia, 78
Partai MKGR, 77, 82
Partai Murba, *see* Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak
Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Murba), 26, 30, 76, 81
Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU), 77, 81, 120–21
Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (PNBI), 83
Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND), 83
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), 22, 25, 29, 76–77, 110–11, 115–16, 119, 153, 204, 214
Partai Pekerja Indonesia (PPI), 84
Partai Persatuan (PP), 82
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 30–35, 38, 72, 75–76, 79, 85, 87, 102–3, 105, 107, 110, 117, 120–21, 133, 141–43, 150, 163, 167, 171, 181, 193, 208–9
Partai Pilihan Rakyat, 80
Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PIIM), 80
Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD), 70, 80, 91, 205–6, 214
Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (PARTI), 66, 91, 128–29
Partai Republik, 81
Partai Solidaritas Nasional Indonesia (SUNI), 77, 83
Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (PSP), 80
Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (PSPSI), 83
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), 110
Partai SUNI, *see* Partai Solidaritas Nasional Indonesia
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), 21, 26, 76, 79, 111
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia-1905 (PSII-1905), 80
Partai Umat Islam Indonesia (PUI), 78, 110, 114–16, 119
Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI), 84

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Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (PUDI), 205–6, 214
PARTI, *see* Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia
PBB, *see* Partai Bulan Bintang
PBI, *see* Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia
PDI, *see* Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
PDI-P, *see* Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan
PDKB, *see* Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa
Pelopor Banser, 57
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), 25
Pemuda Pancasila, 57
Peran ABRI, 71
peranakan (Chinese), 130, 132, 134, 136
Perdanakusumah, Ian Santoso, 179
Perti, 21, 26, 76, 111
Pereira, Derwin, 180, 200, 201
Piagam Jakarta, *see* Jakarta Charter
PK, *see* Partai Keadilan
PKB, *see* Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
PKI, *see* Partai Kommunis Indonesia
PKP, *see* Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan
PNI, *see* Partai Nasional Indonesia
PNI-Front Marhaenis, 81, 112
PNI-Massa Marhaen 81, 112
PNI-Supeni, 77–78, 112
PNU, *see* Partai Nahdlatul Ummat
political culture, 24
political gangsterism, 57
Poros Tengah (Central Axis), 57, 141, 143, 191, 194
PPP, *see* Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Prabowo, *see* Subianto, Prabowo
Pratama, Rama, 100
PRD, *see* Partai Rakyat Demokratik
pribumi, 65
pribumisasi, 163
priyayi, 6, 16
Probosutedjo, 81
proportional system, 19–20, 87–89, 121, 213
PRRI, *see* Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia
PSI, *see* Partai Sosialis Indonesia
PSII, *see* Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia
PSWTI, *see* Paguyuban Sosial Warga Tionghoa Indonesia
Purnomo, Nurdin, 83, 129, 134

Rahman, Ali, 175
Rahmawati Sukarnoputri, 188
Rais, Amien, 57–58, 77, 79, 85, 93, 104, 115, 121, 124, 128, 141, 143, 150, 171–72, 177, 181, 189, 191. *See also Poros Tengah*
  biography of, 172–73
  and Central Axis (*Poros Tengah*), 142, 190
  and Gus Dur, 151, 172
  and Muhammadiyah, 172–73
Ramage, Douglas, 158
Ramli, Rizal, 186
reformasi, 52, 114, 141, 149, 172, 190
Rinakit, Sukardi, 158, 178
riots
  May 1998, 54–55, 59, 65, 73, 174

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Medan, 48
Roem, Mohamad, 76, 112
role of the military, 55
Round Table Treaty, 3, 19
Rozi, Fachrul, 166, 169, 179
Rudini, General, 94, 135
Ryacudu, General Ryamizard, 166, 168

Sabarno, Hari, 190
Saefulloh, Eep, 100
Said, Salim, 156
Saidi, Ridwan, 78
Salim, Anthony, 136
santri, 6–10, 13, 16, 24, 35–37, 77, 108, 113–14, 203, 212
Sapuan, 183
Schwarz, Adam, 152, 159
secular
  nationalist, 10, 17, 111, 149, 194. *See also abangan*
  parties, 106
  state, 6
Sekber Golkar, 26–27. *See also* Golkar
Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia (Soksi), 31
separatism, 6
September 30 Movement, 94
Shihab, Alwi, 186, 215
syariat law, 6
Siauw Giok Tjhan, 134
Siegel, James T., 70
Silaen, Timbul, 180
Silalahi, Sudi, 179
Simbolon, Romulo, 179
Sinaga, Kastorus, 100
Sindhunata, K., 173
Singh, Harider, 83
Sjahrir, Dr, 73
Sjahrir, Sutan, 214
Skinner, G. William, 15
slametan, 7
Soedirdja, Surjadi, 168, 186
Soedjatmoko, 22
Soeharto, 4–5, 9, 14, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26, 29, 34, 38, 44–45, 50, 152–53, 203
  fall of, 49–51
  and Islam, 61
  and May riots, 54
  and military, 50
Soeharto, Bambang, 46
Soeharto, Tommy, 211, 215
Soeharto, Tutut, 153
Soemitro, Prof, 54
Soerjadi, 33, 154
Soewandi, Rini, 198
Soewarman Sg, 134
Soksi, *see* Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia
Special Military Operation, 64
"student power", 50
Subianto, Prabowo, 53–54
Sudarsono, Juwono, 162, 166
Sudarto, Tyasno, 168–69, 179
Sudharmono, 207
Sudjatmiko, Budiman, 40, 70, 80, 91
Sudradjat (military spokesman), 167
Sudrajat, Edi (retired general), 68, 83
Sudyatmiko, Djoko, 135
Sugandhi, Mrs Mien, 82
Sukardi, Laksamana, 175, 199, 215
Sukarno, 3–4, 9–11, 17, 25–26, 29, 39, 64, 77, 154, 193
Sulistyo, Hermawan, 156
Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, 58
Sumargono, 49
Sumitro, Prof, *see*

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Djokohadikusumo
Sundanese, 15
Suparman, Djadja, 169, 179
Suratman, F. X. Tono, 180
Suryadinata, Leo, 41–42, 138, 178, 181
Susanti, Susi, 136
Susanto, 134
Sutarto, Endriartono (General), 169
Sutrisno, Try, 37
Suwondo, 175, 182
Syachruddin, Ekki, 124
Syaefuddin, Dr A. M., 62
Syamsuddin, Safrie, 54
syariat, 6, 172

Tanjung, Akbar, 15, 68, 76, 82, 92, 107, 111, 140, 147–48, 168,186, 189, 191, 193, 195–96, 207–8
Tanjung, Feisal (General), 53, 168
Team of Eleven, 85, 90–92
Team of Seven, 187
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), 53, 55, 169, 184, 211
TGPF, *see* Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta
Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF), 54, 55, 65, 71, 73
Tim Relawan, 73
Tjokroaminoto, Taufiq R., 79
TNI, *see* Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Tobing, Jacob, 101, 120
Tommy Soeharto, *see* Soeharto, Tommy
totok (Chinese), 130
Trisakti University, 69
Tuswandi, 82
Tutut Soeharto, *see* Soeharto, Tutut

U.S. Congress, 46
Unfrel, 95–96
United Nations, 62, 146
United States, 169
Urbaningrum, Anas, 100
Usodo, Graito, 169, 179

Wahid, Abdurrahman (Gus Dur), 9, 107
  and Amien Rais, 142
  biography of, 151–53
  and ethnic Chinese, 152, 164, 174
  and Emergency Law (*Maklumat*), 188–90
  and Megawati, 150–51
  and military, 152, 167–69
Wahid, Hasyim, 175
Walubi, 137
Wanandi, Jusuf, 136
war against terrorism, 199
Washington Post, 66
West Papua (Irian Jaya), 63
Widjaja, Tjiandra, 134
Widjojo, Agus, 166, 179
Widodo, Admiral, 166
Wirahadikusumah, Agus, 166–68, 179
Wiranto, General, 49–50, 54, 63–64, 68, 158, 166, 168–69, 179, 180
Woodward, Mark, 7, 17

Yafie, Ali, 49
Yudhohusodo, Siswono, 195
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 53, 55, 176, 178–79, 188, 193–96

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